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In 2012, the Californian poet Joshua Clover, recipient of the Walt 
Whitman Award, professor of English at University of California Davis 
and regular contributor to The New York Times and The Nation, had 
this to say about the politics of poetry:
I think that for a while now, many of us poets have been telling ourselves 
lies about the political force of poetry. Many of these we know by heart. 
Speaking truth to power. Finding the form which might both reveal and 
persuade. Preserving the space of critique. Preserving the feel of some undo-
mesticated common zone. Giving voice to the voiceless. Laying bare the 
truth of the ineluctably immiserating mechanism in which we live. We have 
been aided in this set of justiications by that peculiar historical develop-
ment known as capital-T Theory, and particularly by ideas based around the 
primacy of discourse and ‘the materiality of the signiier’—ideas which allow 
activities at the level of language to claim the same material force as a thrown 
brick. Both constitute the world.
But it’s such bullshit, isn’t it?1
Clover was arrested in 2009 for his participation in student protests at 
his workplace and has been one of the most involved activists in and 
sensitive commentators on social movements lourishing in the wake of 
the 2008 global recession. His conclusion – that recent theoretical politi-
cisations of poetry be dismissed as ‘bullshit’ – is likely not, then, the bluff 
refusal of the reactionary, rejecting any political force falling outside the 
status quo. The targets of Clover’s engaged statement, those particular 
Theory-based and language-centred conceptions of the poetic, are more 
carefully addressed than the sweep of his list would seem to imply. As 
Clover has put it elsewhere, ‘Certain things will have to be actively 
destroyed on the side of capital . . . And they will not be destroyed with 
language.’2 The one-word critique of the grand potencies of poetry we 
































 2    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
Romanticism, that treats the political eficacy of poetry as an already 
existing fact. For any political poetics put forward today, seeing this 
for the uncritical assumption it is may be a good place to start. Rather 
than presuming that all the world’s important political energies inhere 
in poetry at all times, this study examines what poems historically have 
and have not been able to do – to affect, effect, articulate – within and 
against the structures of the avant-garde.
1 Crisis and the avant-garde
For the last forty years, experimental American poetry has concerned 
itself programmatically with its own political functions. Poets and 
critics, inluenced by French theory and the Language writing that most 
successfully imported it into an American poetic context, have succeeded 
in theoretically inscribing issues of poetic technique within the broadest 
historical processes: the production of meaning, commodiication, and 
the rule of capital itself. The aim here has been directive rather than 
descriptive: Language writing and its descendants today continue to seek 
a poetry that will directly intervene in the ight against capital – that will, 
in the words of Ron Silliman, ‘carry the class struggle for consciousness 
to the level of consciousness’ through poems that, in their very form, 
challenge commodity fetishism and surplus value.3 This ambitious sense 
of literary force has necessarily been long on speculative theories of poet-
ry’s politics and short on analysis of the context and affect of individual 
political poems. From such speculation Silliman’s project has fostered an 
environment in which experimental poetry becomes the most important 
political activity of our times. Likewise, the particular energies of poetry 
are impoverished by pressing them into a direct assault on the economic 
base of capitalism they are ill-equipped to make.
This study rejects such literalisations of the poem and its alleged formal 
correspondences with economic processes.4 It investigates instead how 
moments of political crisis can sharpen our sense of the historical force 
of poetry, and how American poems have sought to intervene in speciic 
political upheavals. Such an investigation is not, however, an attempt to 
return to historicist models of literary meaning. The concept of crisis, in 
its speciic and increasingly urgent sense today, can illuminate poetry’s 
capacity for simultaneous response and intervention in a way occluded 
by both the speculative preoccupation with poetry’s relation to the com-
modity and historicism’s immovable ‘context’. There are three simple 
but important implications the concept of crisis holds for the reading 
































Introduction     3
moment; (2) it signiies a turning point, the potential for this moment to 
result in revolutionary change; and (3) as such, it invokes the agency of 
individuals. All three meanings are at the centre of contemporary philo-
sophical discussions of crisis and, as I shall outline, collectively harness 
the major characteristics of the American avant-garde, whether in its 
responsiveness to political events as opposed to the historical European 
avant-garde’s vocation as initiator of anarchy, its tendency to recon-
struction over destruction, or its search for lyric subjectivity through 
political change. My aim is not to suggest that the only legitimate poetry 
is that which engages crisis, or even that all political poetry is the poetry 
of crisis. Neither, though, do I want to propose art and politics as sites 
of accidental and temporary overlap, carnivalesque moments which 
are ends in themselves – a move typiied by the ‘transversal’ model of 
Gerald Raunig’s otherwise excellent Art and Revolution.5 Rather, crisis 
stands in this study as something throwing into relief dynamics at work 
in poetry at all times, since all times relate themselves in one way or 
another to crisis, whether in preparation for it, in the grip of its moment, 
or in its wake.
Following events like September 11, the Iraq war and the global 
recession after 2008, the word crisis has become ubiquitous in the 
Anglophone world. From politicians only too willing to invoke it as an 
excuse for a whole range of extra-ordinary measures to its commodiica-
tion in the media trade of alienated Schadenfreude, the multiple uses of 
the term show a concept itself in crisis, threatened with meaninglessness. 
The signiicance of crisis can, however, be wrested from its approxi-
mations. The key distinction for this study is between a sense of crisis 
as permanent chaos and crisis understood as an essentially punctual 
phenomenon. The former is often based on a certain reading of Marx, 
proposing that capitalism is always in crisis, which it exploits and inds 
perpetually necessary for its existence.6 Capitalism clearly does thrive on 
its destructive tendencies, endlessly adapting to its own excesses, but this 
is not the same as saying that capitalism’s permanent condition is one 
of crisis. Such permanence too easily slips into determinist reductions of 
Marx’s theory of capitalist development, in the conviction either that 
capitalism will collapse under the weight of its own contradictions, or 
that it is simply indestructible. Marx himself, obviously the most total 
theorist of economic crisis, insists that the chronic tendency of capitalism 
to crisis is not the same as a state of chronic crisis – as he unambiguously 
states in the Theory of Surplus Value, ‘Permanent crises do not exist.’7 
The lesson for art is that capital will always periodically open itself up to 
crisis, that it will repeatedly leave itself vulnerable at certain moments, 
































 4    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
from the jaws of its apparently imminent failure. In its etymological 
root, which I will return to in a moment, a crisis cannot be prolonged 
or delayed, let alone made permanent: krisis is the moment of decision, 
krinein, the turning point at which, in ancient pathology, a patient will 
either recover or die. It is this double urgency of political turning points 
that Wallace Stevens invoked when he wrote of the inescapable ‘fact’ of 
war pressing upon us the equally urgent and unavoidable moment of our 
decision: ‘in war, the desire to move in the direction of fact as we want 
it to be and to move quickly is overwhelming’.8
In concrete terms the distinction between crisis as a process and crisis 
as a multitude of moments helps to separate economic dynamics from 
the political sphere, a separation central to contemporary conceptions 
of crisis. Jürgen Habermas’s notion of a legitimation crisis, for example, 
holds that political crisis occurs when any government ‘lags behind pro-
grammatic demands that it has placed on itself’ to manage capitalism’s 
economic contradictions, but his more pertinent contention for this study 
is what the State’s increasing success means for other political agents. As 
governments better manage economic crises, according to Habermas, so 
the systemic problems of capitalism are transferred to the shoulders of 
government planning, creating an increased sense of social power over 
forces previously conceived as natural and insuperable. Structurally the 
argument is not dissimilar to Lenin’s in Imperialism: The Highest Stage 
of Capitalism: as anarchy is more and more removed from the economy, 
so human agency accrues more and more responsibility, a responsibility 
currently invested in elites but increasingly seen as transferrable to the 
majority of the population. Agency-through-crisis is equally palpable for 
Habermas culturally where, likewise, traditions lose their ‘natural’ char-
acter as they are enrolled in the emergency defence of state legitimacy, 
and thereby become called upon to ‘decide’: ‘The stirring up of cultural 
affairs that are taken for granted thus furthers the politicisation of areas 
of life previously assigned to the private sphere.’9 Returning to the ety-
mology of the word, we can see legitimation crises as prompting nor-
mally dispossessed agents to take decisions in response to the sickness 
of their regulating system.10 Twentieth-century crisis management tends, 
then, to call upon agents to act or decide, jolting them out of the general 
despondency at supposedly capricious and natural economic processes. 
Giorgio Agamben reaches a similar conclusion in his account of crisis 
dynamics, State of Exception, where the increasingly unexceptional use 
of the state of exception, or the suspension of the law in order to defend 
it, shows less the fraudulence of so-called emergency powers than the 
































Introduction     5
To show law in its nonrelation to life and life in its nonrelation to law means 
to open a space between them for human action, which once claimed for itself 
the name of ‘politics’. Politics has suffered a lasting eclipse because it has 
been contaminated by law, seeing itself, at best, as constituent power (that 
is, violence that makes law), when it is not reduced to merely the power to 
negotiate with the law. The only truly political action, however, is that which 
severs the nexus between violence and law . . . To a word that does not bind, 
that neither commands nor prohibits anything, but says only itself, would 
correspond an action as pure means, which shows only itself, without any 
relation to an end. And, between the two, not a lost original state, but only 
the use and human praxis that the powers of law and myth had sought to 
capture in the state of exception.11
The state of exception, then, allows us to see the fundamentally ‘anomic’ 
and contingent character of the law, in the process opening up a utopian 
space for collective self-constitution and liberated human action. Crisis 
breeds an extra-legal use of power, but in doing so draws into question 
the law it professes to defend. Both Habermas and Agamben insist on 
crisis as the fundamental catalyst for the assumption of agency in those 
parts of society (economics, the law) hitherto seen as immune to human 
action.12
What can all this tell us about avant-garde poetry? Crisis has always 
been at the centre of avant-garde projects, almost all of which have 
taken on the responsibility of instituting crisis, of confronting bourgeois 
complacency with disturbance and trauma. André Breton’s Surrealist 
call for ‘a general and emphatic crisis in consciousness’ is a paradigmatic 
instance of the avant-garde’s wider destructive drive to open creative 
spaces through the violence of critical moments.13 In Matei Calinescu’s 
words: ‘As a culture of crisis, the avant-garde is consciously involved 
in furthering the “natural” decay of traditional forms in our world of 
change, and does its best to intensify and dramatise all existing symp-
toms of decadence and exhaustion.’14 The avant-garde functions to 
extend into bourgeois consciousness crises that already exist politically 
in the world, a fact Peter Bürger considers to be so central that its loss 
signiies the death of avant-gardism itself:
While the historical avant-gardes could rightly consider the social context of 
their actions to be one of crisis, if not revolution, and could draw from this 
realization the energy to design the utopian project of sublating the institu-
tion of art, this no longer applied to the neo-avant-gardes of the 1950s and 
1960s . . .15
The avant-garde does not quite create crisis in these theories, but it does 
































 6    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
engineering a crisis in art. Given this tradition, it is clear that the ‘real 
politics’ of this study’s subtitle cannot refer to poets’ participation in 
government as legitimising agents whose last example in English was 
John Milton. Nonetheless, I want to describe in American poetry a dif-
ferent negotiation of crisis than that described by Calinescu or Bürger, 
and to account for a more speciic political content than what Calinescu 
describes as the ‘universal and hysterical negation so characteristic of the 
avant-garde’.16
Alain Badiou’s proposed dialectic for thinking through the charac-
ter of negation in art may be illuminating here. In a short lecture on 
Pasolini, Badiou separates the igure of negation into ‘afirmative’ and 
‘negative’ modes. The latter is the ‘destructive’ dimension which seeks 
the overthrow of existing systems – Badiou’s examples are Schönberg’s 
‘destruction of the tonal system’ and Marx’s ‘negation of capitalism 
by the complete destruction of the machinery of bourgeois State’. The 
former, negation that afirms, works in relation with destructive nega-
tion but is distinct from it:
For example, the new musical axioms which structure for Schönberg the 
admissible succession of notes in a musical work, outside the tonal system, 
are in no way deducible from the destruction of this system. They are the 
afirmative laws of a new framework for the musical activity. They show 
the possibility of a new coherence for musical discourse. The point that we 
must understand is that this new coherence is not new because it achieves 
the process of disintegration of the system. The new coherence is new to 
the extent that, in the framework that the Schönberg’s axioms impose, the 
musical discourse avoids the laws of tonality, or, more precisely, becomes 
indifferent to these laws. That is why we can say that the musical discourse is 
subtracted from its tonal legislation. Clearly, this subtraction is in the horizon 
of negation; but it exists apart from the purely negative part of negation. It 
exists apart from destruction. It is the same thing for Marx in the political 
context. Marx insists on saying that the destruction of the bourgeois State is 
not in itself an achievement. The goal is communism, that is the end of the 
State as such . . .17
Negative and afirmative negation are therefore interdependent. For 
Badiou, however, they must be properly balanced to respond to that 
which they negate, their historical situation. Destruction, Badiou says, 
is ‘the very essence of negation’ in the twentieth century, both in politi-
cal practice (Lenin or Mao) and art (Duchamp or Cage), and what we 
need now is an account of negation that can be afirmative and world-
building. My claim is that the US avant-garde’s distinctiveness lies in 
how it already shows us such an aesthetic. US poetic avant-gardism, 
































Introduction     7
tation and the sublation of art and everyday life, holds much less stock 
with the obliterative methods used by European modernism to attack 
institutions. American experimental poets, always less associated with 
the visual arts whose institutions were so decisive for historical avant-
garde practice in Europe, and always less coherent than the organised 
bodies that enabled those artists’ spectacles of shock, primarily seek to 
negate existing systems through the construction of new frameworks. In 
important ways, that is, American poetry ‘exists apart from destruction’.
This is abstract, and the challenge here is in avoiding the suggestion 
that American avant-gardes have no politics at all. This is a popular 
position, made inluential by Marjorie Perloff.18 The absence of absolute 
opposition, however, is not the same as political detachment. I want 
to claim, simply, that the US avant-garde’s forms of negation are more 
directed and responsive to particulars, particulars that will be the focus 
of the discussions below. Put simply, American avant-garde poetry 
proposes the afirmation of alternative modes of political thought in 
a manner that goes beyond the confrontations of experimental form. 
The tensions of afirmation and negation in the face of crisis are many 
and do not always ind political poetry as their resolution, as some of 
the following chapters will show. Nonetheless, afirmative negation can 
help us to explore the relations between vanguard political action and 
avant-garde artistic practice without eliding the actual distance that 
has historically existed between the two. At the centre of the divide is 
the difference between the forms of cultural confrontation and political 
struggle, and within this the tendency of the avant-garde to deny any 
such difference, as Calinescu outlines:
In the 1870s in France, the term avant-garde, while still preserving its broad 
political meaning, came to designate the small group of advanced writers 
and artists who transferred the spirit of radical critique of social forms to 
the domain of artistic forms . . . For they believed that to revolutionize art 
was the same as to revolutionize life. Thus, the representatives of the artis-
tic avant-garde consciously turned against the stylistic expectations of the 
general public, whom the political revolutionists were trying to win over 
through the use of the most platitudinous revolutionary propaganda. The 
seeds of a conlict between the two avant-gardes was there.19
As I explore the relations of aesthetic form and utopian thinking in 
American poetics, and particularly the role of lyric subjectivity within 
them, it will become clear that what is partly under discussion is the 
American negation of key avant-garde principles. My study claims that 
this particular negation is what should make the experimental, mid-
































 8    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
recapitulations of historical (or real) avant-garde practice, typiied by 
the New Conceptualism and UbuWeb (‘All avant-garde. All the time.’), 
the historical US avant-garde can serve as a reminder of sources of nega-
tion that inhabit but do not ind rest in avant-gardism, where avant-
gardism itself is more than a synonym for political-by-default, and in 
which oppositional force goes beyond the confrontations of unconven-
tional form.
2 Form and address
All twentieth-century debates about aesthetic form were debates about 
the utopian function of art. The century’s two formal paradigms are 
manifest in the celebrated argument of Lukács and Adorno, and respond 
at base to art’s conlicting impulses to realism and projection, or what 
Virginia Woolf called the granite and the rainbow.20 For Lukács, revo-
lutionary potential is always already part of the real, and so realism 
transmits a future-orientation not usually associated with the petriied 
surfaces that French theory inluentially attributed to it. The rainbow 
was also in the granite for Lukács’s American social realist comrades in 
the 1930s, who labelled Louis Zukofsky a ‘detached recorder of isolated 
events’ precisely because he was not a realist, but a writer whose Eliotic 
formalism ‘identiies life with capitalism, and so assumes that the world 
is merely a wasteland’.21 For Adorno, quite differently, ‘Art’s Utopia’ is 
a ‘counterfactual yet-to-come [that] goes on being a recollection of the 
possible with a critical edge against the real’.22 Seeing much less hope for 
revolution in existing social conditions, Adorno stresses the urgencies 
of autonomous form to negate the real in a manner ‘pure and uncom-
promised, in its innermost structure’.23 In opposition to the American 
avant-garde’s hybridising and osmotic sense of aesthetic form, Adorno 
might be said to foreshadow the commitment of its later readers to pro-
tecting poetic form as the last free space for utopian thought. Juliana 
Spahr has been one of many to recently recognise the restrictions of this 
position:
[T]he problem with the way we study literature in the academy is that 
Adorno . . . seems to have won. He is winning even when he isn’t . . . in 
that even when we talk with admiration about subversion, we do it in sadly 
narrow ways. We are often talking about the language practices of a poem as 
subversive of the idea of the poem or the subversion of genre within the work 
. . . In this moment, we tend to limit poetry’s possibilities to subversion of 
genre. And as we do this we ignore all those moments when poetry has inter-
































Introduction     9
I want to contrast the ‘subversion’ Spahr critiques here to the richer 
and more varied sense of political intervention the poetry of crisis can 
provide. The poets presented in this study are a counter to the dominant 
conception of subversion as the resistance of commodiication through 
dificulty, appropriating Adorno’s sense of modernism as though it were 
a tactic for all seasons. In this formalism poetic technique is essentially 
defensive, establishing a protective layer against commodity fetishism 
that increasingly prevents any entry into the world at all. The strange 
insistence, inherited from Adorno, that works of art have ‘their own 
internal logic’, has been the central motif of the belated, post-1970 
avant-garde’s reading of its historical model.25 Jed Rasula’s distinction 
between a ‘politics of’ and a preferred ‘politics in’ poetry, proposed as 
a means for advertising the political valences of Language writing, is 
a typical limitation of poetry’s social faculties to self-relection. I will 
discuss such reductions more fully in Chapter 6: here I mean only to 
establish that this book does not seek to interrogate a crisis within the 
poem, a crisis of verse assuming upheaval within poetic form signals 
crisis for civilisation as a whole. Rather, in what follows, I will address 
the intersections Spahr feels are neglected in discussions of poetry. These 
extensions of poetic language stand in stark contrast to the conscious 
introversion of the decadent avant-garde’s anachronistic repetitions, 
as we see Amiri Baraka, musicologist, playwright, political activist 
and pioneer of cultural studies, pit himself against directives to, in the 
words of Bruce Andrews, co-editor of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E magazine, 
‘Stay inside. It is all here. The non-imperial state: without need for the 
expansion of externalisation that comes from the refusal to redistribute 
the surplus at home.’26 Baraka’s position is only the logical end of the 
American avant-garde’s constant tendency towards leaving the house of 
the poetic, witnessed in Charles Olson’s archaeological poetics, Muriel 
Rukeyser’s documentary-journalistic work, and even in the class histo-
riography begun by Zukofsky. If we agree with Clover’s point that ‘[c]
ertain things will have to be actively destroyed on the side of capital . . . 
And they will not be destroyed with language’, but we want to retain 
a sense of poetry as a political force, we must interest ourselves in how 
poets have attempted to go beyond language.
This beyond is the political agency poetry cannot provide but can, 
crucially, point toward. Such pointing emerges from the subject. Poets 
ind themselves in crisis, that is, in inding a lack – in coming out the 
other end of upheaval with a subjectivity at once dismantled and full of 
potential. The American poetry of crisis, this study will propose, suc-
ceeds when it articulates the fullest, social, utopian sense of subjectivity, 
































 10    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
act collectively and fulil this potential. As I have noted, crisis highlights 
normally alien political processes as radically changeable and open to 
the multitude, with moments of decision trumping the smooth running 
of the system. Before this optimism gives rise to a transcendent vision 
of subjectivity, we must recognise the generally conservative tradition of 
the crisis poem, more broadly and historically conceived. Most discus-
sions of crisis in relation to poetry have had a quasi-religious focus.27 
Here, subjective potency is usually only present as the opposite of politi-
cal agency. In Harold Bloom’s theory of the crisis-poem, for example, 
the moment of decision is a fundamentally spiritual crux, an agon of 
the soul, where all ‘crisis-points’ or ‘crossings’ are heading one way: ‘A 
movement toward an even greater degree of internalisation of the self, 
no matter how inward the starting point was.’28 However ruthlessly and 
powerfully the crisis itself is expressed, the paradigm of crisis for New 
Romantics like Bloom is found in the movement famously performed 
in Wordsworth’s Prelude from an exposed social self into a private 
one, a ‘resolution’ apparently withdrawing from political uncertainty 
and confusion into Nature, where metaphor, rhetoric and duplicity are 
absent and the self is constantly in the presence of truth. With politi-
cal crisis escaped, for a reader like Bloom Wordsworth recognises the 
priority and last word of Nature, where the poet is no longer called to 
decide.29 The defence of Pound through implicit attack on the very idea 
of political poetry is also rooted in this tradition, ranging from Robert 
Lowell’s dismissal of Pound’s fascism as a manifestation of the fact he 
was an interesting person (‘He had no political effect whatsoever and 
was quite eccentric and impractical . . . [His political beliefs] made him 
more human and more to do with life, more to do with the times. They 
served him.’), to Language-centred critics who read Pound’s political 
conviction as a fascinating symptom of a mental state: ‘If the Cantos 
could speak . . . part of what it would say is “I myself am hell”’, accord-
ing to Jerome McGann.30 Emptying political content out of modernist 
poems has an obvious function in the case of Pound, but there are poets 
of crisis within the US avant-garde whose works bear a resemblance 
to this structure of withdrawal. This structure is variously igured: 
Zukofsky’s retirement from energetic engagement with social particu-
lars into an ultra-Poundian sense of aesthetic order in music; the habits 
of anti-Vietnam war poets to view individuality as something preceding 
politics and therefore threatened by it, from the pained withdrawal of 
Denise Levertov to the amor fati of Robert Duncan, ‘standing by ones 
life-work in the face of catastrophic times’; the inwardness of Language 
poetry itself.31 In the main, however, the poets under discussion here are 
































Introduction     11
withdrawal remains a potent question for them, as it does for Rukeyser. 
I have touched on the links between crisis and subjectivity in a general 
sense, but I want inally to stress how this dynamic is especially open to 
dramatisation in the particular address of American poetry, in how the 
voice of the individual speaks to the multitude in the poem.
Only seemingly against the self-centred theories of crisis outlined 
above, the great formal principle of the last forty years has been the 
prohibition on the ‘I’, a ban based on claims that subjective expres-
sion has always served as an uncritical and self-heroising guaran-
tor of authenticity. Bowing to accounts of subjectivity like Bloom’s, 
this proscription increasingly deines avant-gardism itself in American 
poetry today, principally through the trademarked anti-subjectivism 
of the New Conceptualism. The poems under discussion in this study, 
however, ind in subjectivity, in personal experience and the capacity 
of the individual to speak of and against that experience – in however 
compromised and painfully self-conscious a manner – the grounds for 
political utterance. This is often work dismissed for its naïve beliefs 
in the ability of the individual to speak truth and language’s capacity 
for political content: Zukofsky’s early politically committed poems, 
Rukeyser’s and Levertov’s public personalism, Olson’s and Ginsberg’s 
grand vatic style, Baraka’s improvisational rage. The reasons for looking 
at such poets now are obvious. Since the self is already under constant 
attack by capitalism, it is not oppositional to ratify that process by excis-
ing subjectivity in poetry. Since the urgency of today’s search for new 
political forms increases with people’s sense of atomisation, to pretend 
that this atomisation does not exist, and therefore that the poem can 
be political action by default through unconventional form, does not 
engage anybody’s social experience. If the subject is itself currently in 
crisis, increasingly unable to ind itself in social life, the complexity of 
the search for it and what the imagination can bring to this search are 
utterly lost if we blame the subject as the primary barrier to collective 
action and abandon it in revenge.
This is not to say that the poem’s value in the twentieth century 
has been to provide a site for transcendent individualism, a spa-town 
for restoring the individual agency so obviously lost in the real social 
world. This study has no overarching theory of the poetic subject, but 
it is inluenced implicitly throughout by the thinking of Paolo Virno, 
who presents a compellingly different subjectivity. In Grammar of the 
Multitude, Virno, treating Marx’s work as ‘a realistic and complex 
theory of the individual’, outlines a ‘process of individuation’, in which 
two things are important for my concerns. Firstly, individuality is the 
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as in Aristotle, Hegel and Marx, the self is found in society. More specif-
ically, though, Virno suggests a particular role for language within this 
dialectic, proposing it as one of two key sites for individual realisation. 
Language encompasses questions of potential because it moves from ‘the 
act of parole’, of the child merely speaking words still alien to it, to the 
‘capacity for saying things’, for invention and creativity. In the latter, 
‘the pre-individual linguistic faculty [becomes] the basis for individu-
ated singularity, or the real within which this singularity takes its form’. 
Secondly, this stress on potential over fulilment means that ‘individu-
ation is never concluded’. This seems like a quotidian observation, and 
obviously follows from the equally banal fact that society itself is never 
concluded. The particular vocabulary, however, partly paraphrased 
from the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon, is suggestive:
[T]he life of the group, is not, as we usually believe, the sphere within which 
the salient traits of a singular individual diminish or disappear; on the 
contrary, it is the terrain of a new and more radical individuation. By par-
ticipating in a collective, the subject, far from surrendering the most unique 
individual traits, has the opportunity to individuate, at least in part, the 
share of pre-individual reality which all individuals carry within themselves. 
According to Simondon, within the collective we endeavour to reine our 
singularity, to bring it to its climax. Only within the collective, certainly not 
within the isolated subject, can perception, language and productive forces 
take on the shape of an individuated experience.32
‘By participating’, that is, we inesse our individuality by transforming 
Gattungswesen (Marx’s term for ‘generic existence’) into an ‘opportu-
nity’. The thesis resembles Badiou’s Event in which, among much else, 
the subject is born as such in choosing the ‘totally ab-normal’ or even 
‘impossible’ act that breaches the status quo. In Virno’s words, the 
opportunity is the ‘new terrain’ that offers the ‘opportunity to individu-
ate’ in the total sense.
We are back in the realm of crisis here, and I want to bring these 
observations over to the study of avant-garde poetry in two ways. At the 
general level, the poets in this study never simply assume subjecthood, 
but rather enact the self’s becoming through language as an address to 
the multitude in which it inds itself. However, I want to propose that 
the poet is even more radically incomplete than Virno’s individual. Since 
poetic language never directly intervenes in Virno’s other key site for 
individuation alongside language, the relations of production, poems 
constantly ind themselves only able to offer themselves as a beginning. 
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The poem distributes itself according to the necessity of subjects to begin, to 
begin speaking to anybody, simply because of the perception of continuous 
co-embodiment as the shared condition of language. This shaped speaking 
carries . . . an embodied stance, an address, the poem’s most important gift 
to politics.33
A beginning, then, might articulate a potentiality, spoken from the 
multitude but at the same time posing its recreation – even if the poem’s 
will to change can never ‘climax’. The poem leaves itself open not by 
offering readers the chance to ‘participate’ in constructing its meaning 
as ‘co-producers’, as in the recent pseudo-democracy of the word, but 
in the sense that it articulates a shared lack that may help establish the 
grounds of a solidarity to overcome it. In what follows I will variously 
igure this compromised position: Rukeyser’s excluded but all the more 
willing political agency, the projective but never fully extended poems 
of Olson, Ginsberg’s vulnerable community of the lonely, the contingent 
and instrumental performances of Baraka.
It is from this incompletion that we see American poets seek out 
a radical contemporaneity. The poet, in the various facets of his or 
her subjectivity, is the point where the agency of the present mediates 
between history and the future. With some notable exceptions, the 
major project of the poetries of crisis presented here is to imagine an 
open history, to follow Benjamin’s directive: ‘To articulate the past his-
torically does not mean to recognize it “the way it really was”. It means 
to seize hold of a memory as it lashes up at a moment of danger.’34 
To seize hold of history in poetry is to write what Foucault has called 
a ‘history of the present’, conceptualising a past as something retroac-
tively founded on the present by which the imagination might show ‘the 
genesis of differences’ and ‘how that-which-is has not always been’.35 
The purpose of viewing the past ‘not so much from history as from the 
present’ is that this very act, in the explicit presentation of a contempo-
rary point of view, gives us a ‘historical awareness of our present cir-
cumstance’.36 The poets here are in the business of myth, tradition, and 
the historical document to assert the alien facts of the past, and by this 
to intimate social contingency and the fundamental fact of change. The 
poet in crisis brings this contingency to his or her own threshold, at the 
same time projecting the present into a future that can only be igured 
as something different from what exists now. This is neither a matter of 
learning the lessons of history (as in Wilfred Owen’s crisis poetry: ‘All 
a poet can do today is warn’), or an ungrounded futuristic optimism. 
American poets open up, in widely varying ways to be sure, imaginative 
ground for the unknown, the  impossible, the unprecedented, whose par-
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process is at the centre of Zukofsky’s materialist revision of modernist 
historical containment, of Rukeyser’s similar challenge from a margin-
alised feminist-activist perspective, of Olson’s project for a new ‘special 
view of history’, of Ginsberg’s visionary invitations, of Baraka’s rewrit-
ten story of the American relation to political oppression and emancipa-
tion. The historiographical thrust of American avant-gardism can only 
be sketched abstractly here, but its intersections with concrete issues of 
nation, class, gender, race should become clear in the individual discus-
sions that follow.
3 An outline
Such, then, are the concerns and motivations behind this book. The 
study is structured around six crises: the Great Depression, the Second 
World War, the beginning of the Cold War, the Vietnam war, the racial 
conlicts of the 1970s and the advent of the neoliberal regime of capital 
in the same decade.
Chapter 1 charts the tensions between modernist literary aesthetics 
and vanguard politics through the igure of Louis Zukofsky. Observing 
the shifting emphases in Zukofsky’s Objectivist poetics between a mate-
rialist art of objectives and a transcendent notion of the poem as object, 
we witness in poems like “A”-1 and ‘Mantis’ a pained but productive 
negotiation of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and a Poundian sense of 
literary tradition that helps us begin to outline initial fault-lines between 
modernism, the historical avant-garde and the ambitions of art to 
agitate and project.
Chapter 2 examines Muriel Rukeyser’s changing sense of poetry’s 
political life within the context of the Second World War. This chapter 
describes Rukeyser’s feminist appropriation of modernist myth, charting 
a move from the revision of individual myths toward a relexive concern 
with the mythopoeic itself. From here, we can observe how Rukeyser 
reconceives myth as the permanence of human restlessness for histori-
cal change as, excluded from the war proper, she seeks an imaginative 
ground to assert the force of human agency and historical progress.
Chapter 3 frames Charles Olson’s distinctive archaeological ‘post-
modern’ poetics as a response to the ‘Roman’ petriication of his-
torical dynamism in the Cold War US. Moving from Olson’s early 
interest in Mao to his attempts to imagine the forces of human history 
in general, and inally to ‘do’ another kind of politics at Black Mountain 
College, this discussion focuses on the dialectic of past and present 
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political agency against a background of international and domestic 
malaise.
In Chapter 4 a range of poets is examined to present the common pre-
occupation with conscience in the anti-war work of the 1960s, before a 
discussion of Denise Levertov and Allen Ginsberg, the decade’s two most 
important poets of crisis. Here the central trope of immanence begins to 
reveal its importance to avant-garde practice as its insuficiency surfaces. 
Both Levertov and Ginsberg, that is, reveal a shaken conidence in the 
ability of poems to carry an inherent political force, as both stage the 
necessity of incompletion for effective social address.
In Chapter 5 I survey Amiri Baraka’s neglected poetry of the 1970s 
rather than the equally pertinent but already well-discussed earlier black 
nationalist work. This chapter picks up where Chapter 4 leaves off, with 
the issue of address, investigating the importance of self-implication in 
Baraka’s ‘you’. I return here to the issue of music, and claim that the 
differences between Baraka’s and Zukofsky’s use of sound signals a split 
in conceptions of political aesthetic form. I argue that sound in Baraka 
is able to effect, through a dynamic conlation of form and content, an 
attitude that speaks to its audience but also agitates the poet himself.
Finally, Chapter 6 explores the crisis of avant-gardism itself in the 
1970s, through the retrenchment of its historical methods and motifs in 
Language writing. My aim here is to show how Language poetry can be 
construed as an afterlife of avant-gardism, especially by indicating the 
problems of responding to the burgeoning of neoliberalism with mod-
ernist techniques and an avant-garde sense of vocation. The chapter’s 
survey is brief and highly selective, but points to a response very differ-
ent from Baraka’s to the problems of vanguard politics in the seventies.
The poetries under discussion here are not intended to be exhaus-
tive, nor to represent the only relevant forms of poetic utterance – or 
even political poetic utterance. They show, however, important ways 
in which twentieth-century poets have occupied their contemporary 
moments. The poetry of crisis, in its various guises, is a phenomenon 
we have lost sight of critically just as its practice and urgency form the 
most vibrant and important aspect of twenty-irst century Anglophone 
































‘Longing for perfection’:  
history and utopia in Louis Zukofsky
Critical consensus has long been reached on the trajectory of Louis 
Zukofsky’s literary career. The story of the poet’s move from a self-
defeating political verse in the 1930s to a liberating poetics of pure form 
after the war is well rehearsed. As the world continues to face the del-
eterious effects of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, 
it is a good time reconsider the priorities implicit in this narrative, and 
in doing so the literary history that has been forgotten in its construc-
tion. This chapter will chart the development of one of Zukofsky’s key 
preoccupations: the presentation of historical particulars, seen here as a 
dialectic rooted in tensions between a materialist revolutionary politics 
on the one hand, and a modernist sense of tradition with Poundian, 
reactionary aesthetics on the other. In the argument below, Zukofsky’s 
primary value lies in his work’s embodiment of conlicts that go to the 
heart of the relationship between political vanguardism and the particu-
lar inheritance of Anglophone modernism. The lessons that Zukofsky 
offers the contemporary reader are in how his experimental political 
poetry straddles Anglophone modernism and social realism, whose 
separate tensions with avant-gardism are brought together to occasion a 
vanguard poetics in the fullest sense of the word. This chapter suggests 
that the overcoming of these dificulties in Zukofsky’s later career, in 
large part through the celebrated trope of music, is less a solution to 
than an elision of the political, a surrender to formalism that we might 
see as the inevitable outcome of attempts to reconcile modernist ideals 
of aesthetic order with a radical political impulse to change the world.
1 Historic and contemporary particulars
Since the irst essays on the Objectivist poets by Hugh Kenner and Cid 
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poets associated with the movement from the revolutionary cultural 
milieu that gave rise to their unique fusion of modernism and left-wing 
politics but at the same time made them seem naïve, political and topical. 
Kenner’s contention, for example, that Objectivism was ‘separable from 
the revolutionary high spirits of its launching’ because its poets ‘simply 
got on with their work’ has long been rendered absurd by our increasing 
understanding of the writers’ involvement in, and conceptual grappling 
with, the various controversies, organisations and publications emerg-
ing from radical, proletarian and leftist literary quarters in the 1930s.1 
The considerable extra-curricular activities of those contributors to the 
Objectivists number of Poetry alone are enough to persuade us that 
Zukofsky and his peers were doing more than simply getting on with 
their work.2 If the link between thirties political vanguardism and mod-
ernist avant-gardism cannot simply be separated, however, it has not 
yet become clear how their relations should be described – a task made 
especially dificult by the decade’s own failure to reconcile its tensions.
It is Zukofsky, the central force in the Objectivist aesthetic, who 
presents this tension between revolutionary politics and avant-garde 
aestheticism at the highest pitch, and who, not coincidently, has been 
the subject of some of the most unhelpful critical revisions regarding his 
commitment to communism. Biographical facts regarding Zukofsky’s 
deep philosophical allegiance to Marxism and his involvement with the 
US Communist Party and its organs continue to be ignored by Zukofsky 
readers at both ends of the political spectrum. Such ideological white-
washing goes back to Eric Mottram’s 1973 essay, ‘Politics and Form 
in Zukofsky’, which describes a poet ‘without ideological dogma’ who 
‘did not plump for Russian leadership in the Thirties’ (he did).3 In such 
evaluations Zukofsky’s radicalism is dismissed as youthful exuberance 
or a ‘stage of development’ preceding a proper commitment to poetry, 
or seen as mere ‘content’ irrelevant to a free radicalism of poetic form 
in which even Zukofsky’s most political work may ‘as well have been 
written by a Buddhist as a Marxist’.4 These apologies often sound 
strained:
Zukofsky’s poetry of the twenties and thirties may be among his most rhe-
torically Marxist . . . But Zukofsky’s verbal exchanges are ultimately inspired 
by a spiritual perception of language and history rather than the implications 
of one political ideology . . . using an almost mystical projection of broken 
language.5
‘Literally,’ Barrett Watten tells us, ‘Zukofsky is a poet who was inlu-
enced by Marxism in his youth, but went beyond it for modernist 
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to herald this as a step ‘beyond’ is to decide key questions of poetry 
and politics in advance, however much one celebrates the gesture as ‘an 
intervention in Zukofsky studies’.7 Charles Bernstein, likewise, claims 
that Zukofsky’s ‘proletarian mode’ only becomes meaningful once its 
‘insuficiency’ as a political form is admitted by the poet.8 The ques-
tion of Zukofsky’s conscious aims is entirely avoided by such readers, 
because it would take us back to the awkward facts of the poet’s 
activism within the Communist Party, the Soviet-sponsored League of 
American Writers, and New Masses (‘at formidable cost of time and 
energy’), along with his defence of Stalinism in the decade, before we 
even come to consider the ubiquitous presence of Marx’s and Lenin’s 
writings in the poetry itself.9 All such facts suggest Zukofsky was, at 
least at one time, a poet interested in a good deal more than subverting 
‘New Critical close reading’, which is constantly and anachronistically 
presented as the great aim of his work.10
The distance commentators have attempted to place between Zukofsky 
and the cultural leftism of the 1930s is partly based on misunderstand-
ing. No reader wants to associate a poet they admire with dogmatic 
anti-intellectualism, personality cults and aesthetic conservatism; that 
post-war critics have traditionally read the radical literary scene of the 
1930s as such has led to the assumption that 1930s politics and mod-
ernist poetics are separated by an unbridgeable gulf. Left literary move-
ments of the 1930s, however, were far less uniied or consistent than 
this characterisation suggests, and they remain very dificult to extricate 
from other, especially experimental, movements of the period. Eric 
Homberger’s suggestion that the ‘gap between the verse in New Masses, 
Anvil, and Dynamo [and] An “Objectivists” Anthology was too great to 
be meaningfully crossed’ assumes two constitutionally opposed camps, 
but the revolutionary literary scene in the 1930s was not a marginal 
constituency any modernist, much less a Marxist one, could simply pass 
by.11 It was ubiquitous, forcing its controversies into mainstream and 
experimental publications of the time and the minds of their writers, 
and in many cases setting the very terms under which issues of creative 
freedom, social function and aesthetic value were being discussed. Al 
Filreis’s book on ‘the conservative attack on modern poetry’ in the 1950s 
exhaustively presents us with exactly this phenomenon to show the con-
certed attempts of Cold War anti-communists to obliterate its history 
and sanitise modernism; his book on Wallace Stevens, meanwhile, 
shows the inluence of revolutionary aesthetic thought in even the most 
apparently dégagé of poets.12 New Masses and other magazines crossed 
Homberger’s ‘gap’ into modernism, sometimes with friendly, sometimes 
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ingful, as we shall see. Zukofsky was not, however, a mere observer 
of the burgeoning revolutionary aesthetic in the manner of curious or 
sympathetic poets like Stevens and William Carlos Williams. His early 
poems, after all, though they did not appear in Anvil and Dynamo, did 
appear in similar magazines such as The Left, Contempo, Front, The 
Symposium, The Windsor Quarterly and repeatedly in New Masses 
itself, where Zukofsky reached the largest audiences of his career.13 
Mark Scroggins is one of the few critics to take Zukofsky’s Marxism 
seriously, but his habit of treating Mike Gold’s hard-line social-realism 
as representative of the 1930s cultural left obscures the period’s plural-
ism and spirit of debate, which Zukofsky, far from being the passive 
victim of editorial policy Scroggins describes, participated in as a writer 
and editor.14 Zukofsky had an up-to-date knowledge of these debates, 
as his letters to both Pound and Williams, who censured Zukofsky for 
a ‘ixation’ with New Masses in 1936, show. Zukofsky peppers these 
letters with expressions of frustration and excitement at the operations 
of various leftist publications, worrying over their future direction, and 
constantly attempting to intervene in them, often on behalf of Pound or 
Williams (or, more broadly, on behalf of modernist poetry).15 Zukofsky 
knew many of the igures presiding over such controversies personally; 
that he felt many of them were ‘bastards’, ‘nitwits’ and ‘shit-heads’ 
does nothing to obscure his commitment to a different order of poetry, 
responsive to the crisis of capitalism, of which they were offering various 
versions.16 In the shape of the early movements of “A”, his launch and 
subsequent defence of the Objectivist aesthetic, his abandoned Workers 
Anthology, and much else besides, Zukofsky was, for a period, seeking 
to intervene in literary innovations whose practices both irritated and 
inspired him.
Zukofsky initially saw a convergence between the new revolutionary 
literature and the Poundianism he had invested in from the beginning 
of his poetic career. In terms of a shared internationalism, a common 
challenge to bourgeois liberalism, and a broadly economic aesthetic, 
Zukofsky at irst felt Pound could be made congenial to Marx and 
vice versa. The belief was not far-fetched. Even Gold was friends with 
Pound, and his apparently anti-intellectual directives for proletarian 
poetry in 1930, for ‘technical precision’, ‘as few words as possible’ 
and ‘clear form, the direct line, cinema in words’, have obvious afini-
ties with Pound’s early, imagistic manifesto statements and Zukofsky’s 
own Objectivists programme.17 Pound, indeed, appeared in the irst 
ever issue of New Masses with a salutary greeting in which he her-
alded the magazine for almost making him ‘think of a trip to America’; 
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XXXI–XLI (1934) bears striking similarities with the agitational verse 
of the magazine.18 Zukofsky’s 1929 essay on Pound draws deeper con-
nections, describing a poet allied with Lenin whose words ‘are principals 
of a line of action’, whose archaic references project into the ‘Soviet Idea’ 
as attacks on private property, and who embodies ‘the complete passage 
through, in and around objects, historical events, the living them at 
once’.19 Though Pound’s inluence on Zukofsky is of a speciically poetic 
order, Zukofsky sees Pound’s medium as the artistic equivalent to the 
political upheavals in Russia and around the world, and quotes Pound’s 
1926 enthusiasm for Lenin approvingly: ‘Lenin has invented . . . a new 
medium, something between speech and action which is worth . . . 
study.’20
Clearly, however, as much as he was excited by Pound’s political 
poetics, Zukofsky was far from sharing Pound’s actual political view-
point on such ‘historical events’. The friction of the two poets’ letters in 
the mid- to late thirties, in large part prompted by disagreements on the 
nature of labour, along with other economic issues, strained the personal 
relationship between the two to breaking point. Pound, indeed, threat-
ened to bar Zukofsky from inclusion in a collection of ‘economic’ poetry 
he was editing because of the younger poet’s Marxism.21 Zukofsky’s 
exchanges with Pound in the period show, above all, the younger poet’s 
deep commitment to Marxist theory. Zukofsky was, at this point, an 
orthodox Marxist-Leninist who believed in the proletarian revolution as 
the saviour of mankind, and conscientiously defended this belief against 
the fascist and racist hectoring of Pound. ‘[T]he communist idea of 
action is the right one,’ Zukofsky assured Pound in 1936, adding: ‘It’s 
very simple. Any intelligence worth anything can see that communism 
is the only way out – whatever he thinks of the present control of the 
Party.’22 That this conidence comes from a sure theoretical grounding in 
Marxist thought is evident in the arguments Zukofsky had with Pound 
over the iner points of subjects varying from internationalism to the 
status of the commodity, from Marx’s critique of anarchism to the role 
of the Party.23 That Zukofsky considered his Marxism to be intimately 
connected with his writing is demonstrated throughout Zukofsky’s 
theoretical statements of the thirties, as well as intricately Marxist 
poems like “A”-8 and the irst half of “A”-9. Zukofsky thought, like 
many other writers of the time, that Marxism had as much to give to 
the writer as the writer Marxism: ‘in Marx’s economy, of all economies, 
alone there is substance for doing the new canzone’.24 The presence of 
such ‘substance’ in Zukofsky’s writings of the 1930s – in the shape of 
poetic interrogations of Das Kapital, historical vistas of European revo-
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of Lenin – is clear and vital, and must be analysed as more than so much 
arbitrary raw material in a carnival of bricolage.
In Zukofsky’s work, the conlict between Poundian poetics and 
Marxist-revolutionary politics is embodied in two speciic approaches 
to history. That Zukofsky is equally committed to both Marxist his-
torical materialism and the early Pound’s conservative sense of literary 
tradition in which ‘all ages are contemporaneous’ is decisive for his 
poetry.25 This tension is expressed early in his career, in the Objectivist 
essays written for the Zukofsky-edited March 1931 number of Harriet 
Munroe’s Poetry, and 1932’s An ‘Objectivists’ Anthology. For all their 
talk of ‘contemporary particulars’ like ‘the Russian Revolution and the 
rise of metallurgical plants in Siberia’, these statements of intent insist on 
ideals of abstraction like ‘a realization of rested totality’.26 The relation 
between the two is obscure: how is the poem to be considered an ‘act 
upon particulars’, as Zukofsky writes, but at the same time ‘the totality 
of perfect rest’?27 Poetry should aspire to be ‘a context’ at one moment, 
and to a ‘pure poetry’ in the line of Johnson, Dryden and others the 
next.28 How Zukofsky seeks to forge a radical poetry of the present 
responding to the Depression while remaining tied to nostalgic notions 
of literary tradition can tell us much about the relations of modernism, 
vanguardism and avant-gardism in the American 1930s.
One way Zukofsky connected these two impulses was to press liter-
ary history itself into the service of socialist revolution. Zukofsky’s 
1935 Workers Anthology, an unpublished compilation of poems from 
the likes of Ovid, Villon and Robert Herrick for the ediication of the 
working class, intended to establish a tradition of proto-Marxist verse.29 
Showing the manifestation of ‘revolutionary struggle and idea [sic] in 
some of the best poetry of 2000 years’, the anthology’s preface, like the 
earlier ‘Program: “Objectivists”’, invoked Lenin:
Lenin has said that art must unite the feelings, thoughts and wills of the 
masses, and awaken and develop the artist in them. The excellence of these 
selections should help to develop the artists in the worker, and awaken 
the class conscious artist to the possibilities for excellence in poetry for the 
masses.
Pound had claimed that the myths of the classics could be interpreted 
‘as equivalent of some current struggle which they are unable to treat 
more directly’, but never that Ovid, Dante and his like were forerun-
ners of Marxist struggle to the point that they could act as agitators.30 
The past, that is, is appropriated by the future in A Workers Anthology. 
Just as Zukofsky had cast Pound as an agitator for the Soviet Idea and 
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 dialectical materialism elsewhere, the book assimilates poetry apparently 
distant from Marxist theory into its tradition.31 The fourteenth-century 
Kildare poem, ‘Lollai, lollai, litil child’, is annotated by Zukofsky as 
‘the cry of the enslaved folk’, which is ‘hardly a coincidence’ consider-
ing its ‘basis in fact’. The note to Shakespeare’s ‘The Phoenix and the 
Turtle’ reads: ‘cf. Marx’s emotional attack on the nationals of property 
. . . Shakespeare, in these verses, seems to have anticipated Marx’s irony 
with greater accuracy than just poetic instinct’. The historical ‘fact’ of 
each poem is described (slavery in the context of fourteenth-century feu-
dalism, the nascent capitalistic property relations of Shakespeare’s time), 
and then inscribed within a larger logic of ‘struggle’.
This manoeuvre stands at a slant angle to both the early Pound’s 
ahistorical conception of tradition and the deterministic readings of 
Marxian historical materialism prevalent in the 1930s. By it, Zukofsky 
wants to outline a tradition that is neither a timeless standard detached 
from social conditions nor a materialism conining aesthetic value to 
a certain context. Rachel Blau DuPlessis and Peter Quartermain see 
the dynamic between the two as Zukofsky’s attempt to bring a ‘dia-
lectical, materialist, and situational accountability to [Pound’s] notion 
of “order”’.32 Speciically, Zukofsky describes a ‘tradition’ in which 
a poem’s durability is paradoxically dependent on a commitment to 
its present. Zukofsky praises his own contemporary William Carlos 
Williams for writing such poetry:
History is in these pages and in the poems – history deined as the facts about 
us, their chronological enlivening for the present set down as art, and so 
good for the next age and the next . . . realized by one vitally of his time . . . 
 unsatisied by the routine repetition of events.33
Permanent value and contemporary vitality exist side by side here: as 
in A Workers Anthology, timelessness is a function of topicality. In the 
terms of Zukofsky’s introduction to An ‘Objectivists’ Anthology, ‘pure 
poetry’ is a type of verse ‘bound up with events and contingencies’.34
Before analysing these claims in the context of the Objectivist episode 
itself, it is illuminating to look at “A”-1, the forerunner to most of 
Zukofsky’s poetry of the Depression era. “A”-1 can be considered the 
original experiment in what would become the contextualising material-
ism of the Objectivist essays, since its story is essentially the unfolding 
of disembodied aesthetic value into the situation of the real world. Most 
readers of the poem have noticed the conlicts it rehearses between the 
aesthetic and the material, but have tended to assume Bach’s music 
represents a desirable standard of transcendent art. Tim Woods, for 
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Theodor Adorno’s sense: that is, cut off from the world to the point 
where, by virtue of its very autonomy, art begins to show just how 
hostile and anti-social the (capitalist) world is. Bach here is at once the 
counterpoint to early twentieth-century class struggle and the symbol 
of its solution. This, however, reduces the ‘outside’ world (what Woods 
calls the poem’s ‘trivialities’) to an entirely negative status very differ-
ent from the importance Zukofsky would attach to ‘particulars’ in his 
Objectivist aesthetic.35 In “A”-1 itself, any question of Bach’s autonomy 
is dismissed: Zukofsky is acutely conscious of the sleight-of-hand that 
has made Bach seem above the concerns of the real world. As the poem’s 
irst thirty lines show, Bach’s opera is not intrinsically transcendent but 
actively severed from any grounding in a context by the performance 
Zukofsky witnesses. Here silence and black dress are insisted upon by 
the producers, abstracting the artwork from both its original eighteenth-
century context (‘where are your motley / Country people in Leipzig 
. . .?’) and its current twentieth-century setting, revealed only after the 
show. It is the context-negating nature of the 1928 performance, rather 
than Bach’s work itself, that creates the dialectic between the ‘feet off 
ground’ aesthetic transcendence on the one hand, and ‘the reverses’ of 
production relations on the other. Indeed, the poem critiques transcend-
ent abstraction for facilitating the concealment of the material world:
A round of iddles playing
Without effort –
As into the ields and forgetting to die.
The streets smoothed over as ields,
Not even the friction of wheels . . .36
Zukofsky knows much better than to think the Carnegie Hall produc-
tion of the Matthäuspassion is ‘without effort’ or ‘friction’, however 
much it excites a ‘longing for perfection’. He knows the opera’s possibil-
ity is dependent on the class exploitation that forms its backdrop, and 
tells us so:
About me, the voices of those who had been at the concert,
Feet stopping everywhere in the streets,
High necks turned for chatter:
‘Poor Thomas Hardy he had to go so soon,
He admired so our recessional architecture –
What do you think of our new Sherry-Netherland!’
‘Lovely soprano,
Is that her mother? lovely lines,
I admire her very much!’
And those who perused the score at the concert,
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Zukofsky admires Bach’s opera, but not as these chatterers do. With 
high necks like ivory towers, this bourgeoisie conceals from itself ‘the 
tramp’s face’, just as it has stripped the contexts of Bach’s art down to 
a ‘lovely soprano’. Bach is patronised in both senses of the word by this 
class, who transplant his work from a context to a site of ahistorical 
consumption. Such ‘smooth[ing] out’ is soon linked to the speciically 
poetic escapism of ‘launters / of the Classics and of / Tradition / . . . 
Who sang of women raped by horses’: a critique of Eliotic modernism’s 
penchant for reducing the past to a reiied mythological network whose 
incidents have nothing to do with them having happened in history.
“A”-1 has another ‘longing for perfection’ in its utopian yearning 
for proletarian victory in the class struggle. If Bach is expressly not the 
representative of aesthetic purity, however, his positive relation to the 
world of capitalist exploitation is less simple. Zukofsky’s quotation 
from the opera can help us here. The libretto is presented in contrast to 
the situations it punctuates – not in the way Carnegie Hall evades all sit-
uations per se, but as a counterpoint to the actual social relations of the 
United States in 1928. We see such a contrast at the poem’s conclusion:
And the great Magnus, before his confrères in industry,
Swallow tail, eating a sandwich,
‘Road map to the stomach,’ grinning,
Pointing to a chart, between bites.
‘We ran ’em in chain gangs, down in the Argentine,
Executive’s not the word, use engineer,
Single handed, ran ’em like soldiers,
Seventy-four yesterday, and could run ’em today,
Been ishin’ all Easter
Nothin’ like nature for hell-ire!’
Dogs cuddling to lampposts,
Maybe broken forged iron,
 ‘Ye lightnings, ye thunders
 In clouds are ye vanished?
 Open, O ierce laming pit!’38
The plights of the chain gang and Christ are, of course, deliberately 
conlated here. We are not, though, supposed to read Christ’s Passion as 
a serious equivalent to working-class life under Fordism. Bach’s Christ 
is less a concomitant of the proletariat than of the suffering Zukofsky 
struggling to reconcile the two. What is emphasised, via this ironic 
similarity, is the essential difference of Bach’s time and our own ‘Dead 
century’.
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poem, but that his relevance is more than a matter of expressing identi-
cal themes. We might read the poem’s contrapuntal rhythm of past and 
present in relation to the historiography of Quentin Skinner in which 
‘classic texts are concerned with their own quite alien problems, and not 
. . . somehow concerned with our own’.39 By this we can escape the time-
less ‘themes’ alleged to be essentially ‘relevant’ to the present, and allow 
history to instead provide its lesson that things change. In Skinner’s 
terms Bach does not ‘anticipate’ Zukofsky’s dilemmas: his work is a 
‘context’ of it. Bach heightens Zukofsky’s self-awareness by represent-
ing something quite different to the New York of 1928. In this sense, 
the Christianity of Bach’s opera, though it has been ignored in critical 
discussions of “A”-1, is crucial to its status as an ethereal counterpoint 
to class struggle. As such, the Matthäuspassion is already concerned 
with an unworldly perfection, whatever the ontological status of music 
generally. Christ’s status in the opera as a passive receptacle of our suf-
fering at once gives weight and dignity to the suffering observed outside 
the opera and, given the quite obvious culprits of it, shows the insufi-
ciency of passivity and trust in a higher power. Bach’s art has a limit in a 
foreign context it had no intention of addressing, and the opera is partly, 
therefore, a prompt for the poet to look for something new. “A”-2 will, 
indeed, make this lesson explicit, rejecting the ‘clear music’ promoted by 
the hypocritical character of Kay as an abandonment of contemporary 
particulars like ‘imperialism, wave games, nations’.40 That Zukofsky 
called his irst collection of short poems ‘18 Poems to the Future’ is no 
accident: the future is the context that makes experimentation worth-
while and prevents the present from becoming the mere repetition of the 
past. Zukofsky’s Objectivist essays will go on to theorise such projec-
tion further, thinking through how poetry should not simply record the 
world as it is, but in some way ‘aim at’ something better.
2 Objects and objectives
“A”-1 brings us to a question raised by Zukofsky’s Objectivist propos-
als for a poetry ‘in the direction of historic and contemporary particu-
lars’: how should the poem be ‘in’ history?41 Direction presupposes an 
‘objective’, a sense in which poetry acts in the world rather than simply 
observing its particulars as a bystander. But does Objectivist verse seek 
to direct or does it merely look in a certain direction? Fundamentally, 
how do we read the word ‘Objectivist’? The term splits into a number of 
distinct meanings. Zukofsky tries to have it three ways: the Objectivist 
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 objectives, and the producer of poetic objects. Leaving the last of these 
aspects aside for the moment, we are immediately faced with a dialectic 
of truth and action. In Zukofsky’s terms, the ‘revolutionary word’ of 
the Objectivist should be at once a poetics of precision or ‘historical 
and contemporary particulars’ in which ‘shapes appear concomitants of 
word combinations’, and a poetics of ‘direction’ where such precision 
should have a partisan perspective, something ‘aimed at’.42 Objectivity, 
as it were, both is and is a means to an objective. There is something in 
the relationship of these terms, approximating the ‘great writer’ alluded 
to in Zukofsky’s issue of Poetry, Lenin, whose practice ‘between speech 
and action’ had so impressed Pound and Zukofsky.
Marxism itself has an ambivalent attitude towards objectivity as a 
perspective that is at once a myth of neutrality and detachment and 
a necessary universalist concept to ight liberal subjectivism. Objective 
as a term meaning the sober and true version of historical events remains 
a cliché in communist terminology, and yet it carries no ‘bourgeois’ con-
notation of disinterested observation. The American Trotskyist Max 
Eastman, the most inluential writer to think such dilemmas through in 
the 1920s and 30s, typiies the attempt to reconcile objective fact with 
utopian perspective: objectivity, he says, means being
ruthless in confronting the facts, whether they be tough or tender, and clear 
in conceiving the ideal . . . employing thoughts in order to better the real 
world, the world of all men, not in order to attain a comfortable equilibrium 
in your own mind.43
Objectivity should not be solipsistic, but neither should it be classless, 
non-partisan or without direction. Lenin himself refers to the ‘partiality 
of objectivity’, making the splitting of objectivity central to orthodox 
Marxist epistemology. The French philosopher Alain Badiou, mean-
while, has aptly summarised the radical logic of Marxism:
Every Marxist statement is – in a single, dividing movement – observation 
and directive. As a concentrate of real practice, it equals its movement in 
order to return to it. Since all that is draws its being only from its becoming, 
equally, theory as knowledge of what is has being only by moving toward 
that of which it is the theory. Every knowledge is orientation, every descrip-
tion is prescription.44
In the mini-controversy surrounding his ‘Objectivists’ Anthology (1932), 
Zukofsky was accused of louting precisely this dialectic of objectivity. 
In the months following the volume’s publication, despite its theoreti-
cal emphasis on something ‘that is aimed at’, Zukofsky’s poetics were 
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of Gold’s famous claim that revolutionary literature ‘is never point-
less’.45 The March 1933 issue of Poetry, for example, carried a review by 
Morris Schappes, a left intellectual (but not, at the time, a member of the 
Communist Party). Entitled ‘Historic and Contemporary Particulars’, the 
review attacked the anthology, and particularly Zukofsky’s “A”, move-
ments 1 to 7 of which were included in the book, for a descriptiveness that 
was ‘without direction, but mere’ and discouraged ‘conscious action’. The 
Objectivists, according to Schappes, are defeatist nihilists: ‘In protesting, 
[the Objectivist poet] nevertheless accepts [capitalism’s] premises; instead 
of questioning its economics, its politics, its morals, its values, he denies 
that there are values.’46 Having no perspective but a vague objectivity, 
Zukofsky ‘withdraws into rootless esotericism’. The editors of Dynamo, 
an independent quarterly of proletarian literature, would make much the 
same charge a year later. Sol Funaroff claimed that ‘the Objectivist has 
no objective’, is ‘pre-occupied with the external’ and ‘remains the dispas-
sionate one, the non-partisan, without direction’, when in fact the role 
of the revolutionary artist was to ‘transform himself from the detached 
recorder of isolated events into the man who participates in the creation 
of new values and of a new world, into the poet who is proud to give voice 
to this new experience’.47 Herman Spector, a poet Zukofsky had helped 
to get published in Pound’s Exile ive years earlier, asserted in the same 
issue of Dynamo that the ‘fatal defect of the Objectivist theory is that it 
identiies life with capitalism, and so assumes that the world is merely 
a wasteland’.48 All these readings claim that Zukofsky’s focus on the 
objects of contemporary capitalism leaves the reader feeling that nothing 
else, no objective beyond capitalism, is possible. The consensus was that 
Objectivism the self-proclaimed ‘revolutionary’ poetic movement was 
indistinguishable from objectivism the bourgeois myth of detachment.
Zukofsky did not agree. In a reply to Schappes in Poetry, he invoked 
Lenin, whose ‘relation . . . to the subject of poetry’, even the mediating 
editors of the magazine admitted, may be ‘a trile overstressed’:
As for the failure ‘to ally oneself with the revolutionary proletariat’: ‘This 
party rejected Marxism, stubbornly refused to understand (it would be more 
correct to say that it could not understand) the necessity of a strictly objec-
tive estimate of all the class forces and their inter-relation in every political 
action.’ (Lenin–Left: Communism, An Infantile Disorder [sic]). In a word, 
this statement is the concern of the editorial presentation and the poetry of 
An ‘Objectivists’ Anthology, whether the presentation be statement, image, 
contrast (satire), or assertion.49
Zukofsky had himself criticised poetry in which ‘Nothing [is] “aimed 
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as his detractors here. His notion of aiming is markedly different to 
Schappes, Funaroff and Spector, however. Despite the desire to ally 
himself with the revolutionary proletariat, Zukofsky had said that, for 
all its being ‘bound up with events and contingencies’, Objectivist verse 
should be ‘free of predatory intent’.50 The revolutionary emphasis in 
Zukofsky’s case is on the importance of seeing the truth of things as they 
are, rather than in promoting aims for the future with the supposedly 
non-poetic designs on the reader this requires. That is, Zukofsky feels 
his notion of objectivity as perception is in itself a political objective. 
Objectivist description is action, unlike passive realism, because of its 
function to construct relations. To this extent, Zukofsky’s means for 
overcoming a bourgeois objectivity that ‘carries the mind to a diffuse 
everywhere and leaves it nowhere’ is contextualisation, the ‘interrela-
tion of every political action’.51 ‘The context’ of thought is what, in the 
essays, turns a naïve conception of discrete particulars into a properly 
Marxist account of the world as a series of relations. It is only with 
‘everything aptly, perfectly, belonging within, one with, a context’ that 
‘writing occurs which is the detail, not mirage, of seeing, of thinking 
with the things as they exist’.52 In 1936 Zukofsky speaks similarly of 
Charlie Chaplin’s ilms possessing a ‘material thoughtfulness and . . . 
historical meaning’ that give more than ‘merely a notion, a general sense 
of today, or an understanding of politics, art, life or whatever, but inven-
tive existence interacting with other existence in all its ramiications’.53 
For Zukofsky, art can be an act of context, an ‘interacting’, thereby 
requiring no further justiication or instrumentalist abstraction. Poetry 
is a matter ‘of thinking with the things as they exist’, not simply thinking 
of them as they apparently ‘are’. Objectivist poems are therefore politi-
cal, simultaneously descriptions of and ‘acts upon’ particulars.54
We see this dialectic in action in ‘Mantis’ (1935), which with its 
sister-poem written a week later, ‘Mantis: An Interpretation’, is perhaps 
Zukofsky’s most signiicant investigation into the possibilities of the 
Objectivist aesthetic.55 Together the poems are Zukofsky’s deinitive 
engagement with the issue of propaganda in art. The crucial threshold 
the poem occupies is between a propagandistic poetics that wilfully 
overcomes existing material relations and a realist aesthetic focusing 
on objects as they are. ‘Mantis’, as its ‘Interpretation’ explains, seeks 
to transform the demoralising ‘growing oppression of the poor’ into a 
call to arms for its overthrow. In this sense, the status of the mantis as 
a political idea (an objective) is just as important as its signiicance as 
a living thing in need of representation (an object). The mantis strives 
to conirm revolutionary theory (the historical destiny of the working 
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subway), to ‘ly . . . on the poor’ and ‘build the new world in your eyes’. 
This is the structure of the poem Zukofsky summarises in the interpre-
tation: ‘the mantis / the poor’s strength / the new world’. The poem’s 
utopia remains rooted in the real, however: ‘The facts are not a symbol.’ 
Utopia and description are never mutually exclusive in the work, which 
describes its projections as the natural outgrowth of what it observes: 
‘No one would be struck merely / By its ungainliness, / Having seen the 
thing happen’. Zukofsky seeks to ‘think with the thing as it exists’, and 
in doing so witnesses its potential to unfold into historic originality.
This thinking returns Zukofsky to the urgent question of form. It has 
been claimed that Zukofsky rejected Gold’s aesthetic of ‘proletarian 
realism’ out of hand because of its assumptions of the natural emergence 
of form from content, and of words as a transparent medium to commu-
nicate reality. Tim Woods, for example, pits Gold’s ‘naïve proletarian 
fundamentalism’ and ‘doctrinal representation’ of proletarian realism 
against the early movements of “A”, written years before Gold ever for-
mulated proletarian realism.56 Charles Bernstein makes a similar gesture 
in an analysis of the poem.57 Both ‘Mantis’ and its interpretation are in 
agreement with Gold in many important respects, however. Zukofsky is 
explicit that the use of the sestina should be seen as organic:
That this thoughts’ torsion
Is really a sestina
Carrying subconsciously
Many intellectual and sensual properties of the
   forgetting and remembering Head
One human’s intuitive Head
Though the sestina may appear constraining, Zukofsky claims that, for 
the scene he observes, ‘one would lie to one’s feelings not to use it’. The 
epigraph to the ‘Interpretation’ from Dante’s Latin, ‘names are sequent 
to the things named’, makes the notion of organic form central to the 
poem’s argument. The work makes the case for the ability of poetic form 
to mould itself around thought: the unlikely idea that an strict form 
like the sestina is what naturally grows out of the mantis encounter is 
explained by the ‘ungainliness’ of the poor and Zukofsky’s relation to 
them.
Counter to this organicism, however, is the interpretation’s radical 
historicisation of the sestina, making the form seem contingent and 
compromised. Here, content becomes far less important to ‘Mantis’: 
‘the mantis itself [is] only an incident’, and not ‘all that was happening’. 
This ‘all’, the context, is what separates the poet from the poor, who fail 
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separateness’ is a result of their failure to empathise with the poet’s 
‘fright’ in the face of the mantis, which they simply ‘laugh at’, failing to 
perceive the utopian potential of the immediate scene. Just as ‘Mantis’ 
is more about Zukofsky’s surroundings than the mantis itself, so its 
‘Interpretation’ is less about the poem than the context of its form. In 
this, the ‘Interpretation’ does not so much repudiate the propagandising 
of ‘Mantis’ as contextualise it. In the light of its interpretation, ‘Mantis’ 
inhabits the history of its production, from an account of the original 
experience and irst drafts to the wider historical determination of the 
poem. The work, then, enacts a similar dialectic to “A”-1, contrasting 
archaic art (in this case the Dantean sestina) with contemporary poverty.
Again, the past model is not just ‘relevant’ to the ‘growing oppres-
sion of the [twentieth century] poor’, however much it spontaneously 
suggests itself to Zukofsky’s ‘many and diverse thoughts’. Zukofsky 
does not want to return to the ‘original’ as Pound did in his imita-
tions of Provençal achievements in the form. Zukofsky indeed said 
that the ‘general insight’ of the sestina was based on Pound’s Sestina: 
Altaforte, suggesting that the contextualising interpretation itself was an 
attempt to correct an ahistorical tendency in Pound’s use of the form.58 
Zukofsky’s concern is as much with what the proletariat of ‘our time’ 
does to the sestina as it is with how the sestina determines the portrayal 
of the poor. ‘[T]he mantis can start / History’, we are told.
Whatever seeming modelling after the event,
649 years, say, after Dante’s irst canzone,
If it came back immediately as the only
Form that will include the pertinent subject of our day—
The poor—
Cannot mean merely implied comparison, unreality
Usually interpreted as falsity.
The fact that the ‘world will not stand . . . a too regular form’, is not an 
indictment of sestinas per se, but of unchanging form generally. The use 
of an old form should not simply imply comparison with the present: 
rather, the introduction of the proletariat to the sestina changes the form. 
At one point, it is not even clear whether ‘Mantis’ itself is ‘a sestina / Or 
not a sestina’. Zukofsky’s strange justiication of the original sestina, 
therefore, rests on the way it ‘jumbles’ its strict poetic form through the 
force of its necessary subject matter of poverty and revolution:
                the
only thing that can sum up the
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‘thoughts,’ pulsations, running commentary, one upon the other,
itself a jumble of order
as far poetic sequence is concerned:
         the mantis
         the poor’s strength
         the new world.
The combined sense of the sestina as an organic standard and histori-
cised form expresses a dialectic between creative agency and historical 
determination. On the one hand, that is, the sestina is a natural form for 
an imagination that, like Adam, awoke and found it true; on the other 
it is a radically contextualised, contingent and self-conscious device 
deined by the ‘particulars’ of its history. Taken together, these two con-
ceptions of poetry create a sense of ‘Form that will include the pertinent 
subject of our day’, that will be determined by historical forces, but also 
able to intervene in them.
Marx said ‘social revolution . . . cannot draw its poetry from the past, 
but only from the future’.59 The brilliance of the ‘Mantis’ poems lies 
in how they accommodate a future or ‘new world’ into their contexts. 
That the mantis can ‘start’ history as well as being of it gives the poem 
its objective. ‘Mantis: An Interpretation’ overhauls Eliotic collage tech-
niques that seek a ‘return to the source’ by throwing items together to 
‘exhort’ the future into existence.60 Stephen’s Fredman’s ideas on assem-
blage in post-war American poetry, laid out in his Contextual Practice, 
are invaluable here: ‘Contextual practice works by uncovering new ener-
gies and images through juxtaposing found materials’ and ‘deliberately 
seek[s] to create a new context by selecting materials from the most dis-
parate sources, leaving in plain view the fact of their having been “torn” 
from elsewhere’.61 American poetry’s jarring elements are not used, as 
in Eliotic modernism, to show up the degradation of modern society by 
comparing it unfavourably with the achievements of the past, but to 
open up new contexts. The transparency of Zukofsky’s labour in writing 
the poem is key to this. Radical context, Fredman argues, has a ‘trans-
formative’ quality because it places process at the centre of its opera-
tions, something ‘Mantis’ makes its theme. In not simply going back to 
past sources, but rather in going back to them from the present context 
of thirties poverty, Zukofsky is able to present the mantis, like its sestina 
form, as itself in a process of becoming. Crucially within this, however, 
the sestina itself carries an ability to speak revolution: the interpreta-
tion refers to propaganda as ‘real’ and ‘necessary’ because the original 
poem shares its desire to expressly speak a particular future, to explicitly 
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both process and proposition, becoming and statement, that Zukofsky is 
able to open up a context of change.
3 What is objectively perfect
The notion of the poem as a perfect object has been put to one side in my 
argument so far, but cannot be permanently dismissed from Zukofsky’s 
thinking. Though the usual task of the scholar is to resolve a writer’s 
contradictions into something comprehensible, Zukofsky is one of 
many artistic igures whose lessons to us are found in the wider cultural 
dialectic he represents. To fail to unveil the supposed underlying con-
sistency of Zukofsky’s thinking is, therefore, less a critical shortcoming 
than an accurate representation of the complex and paradoxical igure 
Zukofsky was. We can see this inconsistency everywhere, though it has 
so far been elided. While “A”-1 has been presented as a discussion of 
the impossibility of pure art, for example, such perfection echoes into 
the Objectivist essays as a legitimate aspiration for poetry; at the same 
time as Zukofsky appropriates swathes of literary history for the cause 
of proletarian revolution he can be seen rejecting a propagandistic aes-
thetic; though Zukofsky wants to historicise his historical moment and 
literary materials, he is drawn towards a Poundian, ahistorical sense of 
aesthetic order. More importantly, while I have suggested that change 
is central to Zukofsky’s Objectivism, this commitment coexists uneasily 
with an ideal of the poem as ‘rested totality’.
These tensions represent conlicting political and poetical modes and 
objectives. Considered in its broadest terms, Zukofsky’s positing of a 
political objective within rather than in addition to perceptual objectiv-
ity is as much a rejection of the supplementary per se in poetry, as of the 
bad politics of generalisation. With a concern arguably more aesthetic 
than political, Zukofsky repudiates not only the ‘predatory’, but more 
broadly the desire for ‘a something else from poetry–not poetry’ in the 
1930s.62 As I have outlined in my introduction, this fortiied sense of 
poetry and its sanctiied interiority is a withdrawal twentieth-century 
political verse often effects. When such an order of poetry informs 
Zukofsky’s Objectivism, attention to present particulars is impeded by 
a desire to order beauty into a universal aesthetic standard without the 
interference of the non-poetic. In his enthusiasm to show that ‘the good 
poems of today are not far from the good poems of yesterday’, Zukofsky 
wants to show how their ‘rested totality’ is equally present and appli-
cable to contemporary problems.63 Despite not dealing with metallur-
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‘more modern’ than anybody. In this sense, the term ‘Objectivist’ is 
synonymous with the term ‘poetry’ – all great writers are essentially 
Objectivists, and the term does not announce a new kind of poem so 
much as it acts as a standard for all poetry. Zukofsky, that is, wants 
the term ‘Objectivist’ to simultaneously describe an ‘eternal’ standard 
of the ‘classic’, as outlined in Pound’s ABC of Reading (1934), and a 
poetry ‘bound up with events’ and ‘thinking with the things as they 
exist’.64 The latter is essentially projective (‘in the direction of . . .’), 
the former conservative (‘[n]o more modern than a Shakespearean 
conceit’).65 The conlict stems from an attempt to take Pound’s early aes-
thetics in combination with a quite different historiography. This leads 
to considerable confusion, as in Zukofsky’s tortuous deinition of the 
word ‘context’ in his preface to An ‘Objectivists’ Anthology, where the 
‘revolutionary word’ could easily be read as a matter of recycling the old 
masters.
The strains begin to get resolved in Zukofsky’s 1946 annotated 
anthology, A Test of Poetry. Test builds upon the aborted Workers 
Anthology mentioned above, retaining most of its poems, and adding 
150 extra works. The difference in purpose of the two projects, however, 
could not be greater. The original Anthology was to be an agitational 
collection of revolutionary verse: ‘the purpose’ of Test is to provide a 
standard of taste.66 Rachel Blau DuPlessis’s suggestion that Zukofsky 
is interested in ‘normalising’ the verse of the poor in Test is suggestive, 
but if one accepts this, it is hard to escape the conclusion that such nor-
malising effectively co-opts class struggle into a bourgeois standard of 
aesthetic pleasure, or at least neutralises it under a generalised rubric 
of ‘objectiied emotion’. The irst thing one notices about Test is that 
Zukofsky’s relationship with Poundian aesthetics has become markedly 
less complicated. Pound noted in 1950 that it ‘looks like [Zukofsky] is 
following ABC’ in the book, and the afinities of Test with Pound’s edu-
cational tracts are obvious.67 Where Pound’s ABC of Reading deined 
the effects of poetry as a question of ‘phanopoeia, melopoeia, logopo-
eia’, Zukofsky’s book announces that ‘The test of poetry is the range 
of pleasure it affords as sight, sound and intellection’.68 Where Pound 
grandly announced that ‘ONLY EMOTION ENDURES’, Zukofsky 
asserts: ‘As poetry, only objectiied emotion endures’.69 Almost all of 
the poets in Test appear in Pound’s ABC, and Zukofsky’s tradition is 
indistinguishable from Pound’s: its heroes are Chaucer, Elizabethan 
verse (especially Golding) and Browning, and its enemies the Romantics 
and Victorians. Zukofsky even chooses the same candidate for the 
best English-language sonnet ever written, Mark Alexander Boyd’s 
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 tendency, which was heavily qualiied by the dialectical materialism in 
his earlier work in the 1930s. The claim that ‘certain lasting emotions 
ind an equivalent or paraphrase in all times’ is a direct repudiation of 
the historicism at the centre of the Objectivist experiment.70 Rather than 
particulars, Test is exclusively concerned with what ‘endures’. Shortly 
after the book’s publication, in a 1948 piece on Williams, Zukofsky con-
solidates this idea: ‘Art means standards, recurrences. True enough with 
a difference in each instance – of medium, person, place, material, time, 
whatever the residues that wear: but leaving the recurrence, “made by 
man.”’71
Williams’s greatness in 1930 stemmed from his dissatisfaction with 
a ‘routine repetition of events’; here, eighteen years later, history 
is reduced to a series of recurrences. Such a changed conception of 
‘historical particulars’ would force Zukofsky to literally revise his 
earlier aesthetic: his early essays, because of a desire to create what 
Mark Scroggins calls ‘timeless and contextless critical dicta’, ind 
most of their particular detail removed when collected in Prepositions 
(1967).72 In ‘An Objective’, for example, the three essays, ‘Sincerity and 
Objectiication’, ‘Program: “Objectivists,” 1931’ and ‘“Recencies” in 
Poetry’, are combined, leading to the removal of references to Mussolini, 
Ernest Hemingway, Charles Reznikoff, the Russian Revolution and 
other ‘historical particulars’.
Sound dominates this decontextualised aesthetic standard in Test. The 
book’s contention is that, though ‘mere fashions of poetic style’ force 
us to admit supericial differences in poems over different historical 
epochs, the fundamental musicality of poetry reassures us that ‘certain 
lasting emotions ind an equivalent or paraphrase in all times’.73 Music 
is the ‘universal language’. The ‘whole art of poetry’ can therefore be 
boiled down to music, ‘music being the one art that more than others 
aims in its reach to speak to all men. Beside this deinition of poetry, 
all other deinitions of poetry would appear niggardly’.74 In his rejec-
tion of Marxism just after the Second World War, Zukofsky uses music 
to make the point: ‘Materialist philosophers of history may do well to 
think about Bach’s remark: ‘The order which rules music is the same 
order that controls the placing of the stars and the feathers in a bird’s 
wing.’75 From here music is well placed to transcend history. In the 
late 1940s, ‘music’ or ‘sound’ are part of Zukofsky’s attempts to name 
something essentially poetic, unsullied by the particularity of historical 
circumstance.
What has changed for Zukofsky, then? After all, the early parts of 
“A” and Zukofsky’s 1930s essays were equally attracted to a musical 
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difference between early and late Zukofskian sound is how, in a move-
ment that mirrors the universalising liberalism of former radicals in 
the post-war years, music goes from being a metaphor that can help 
describe some of poetry’s workings to become a literal model. In the 
Objectivist essays, for example, music is a igure for what is tangible 
in a poem. In the mantis poems musical shape is a symbol of how the 
instrument of poetic form can animate readers. Slightly differently, 
music is important thematically in the early movements of “A”, where 
Bach comes to symbolise the relationship between aesthetic beauty, his-
torical context and political crisis. Even formally, Zukofsky conceived 
the well-known ‘fugal principal’ of “A” as an analogy for literary 
technique as a ‘matter of musical approximation’, stressing in the letter 
to Pound discussing this his ignorance of actual musical principles.76 
After the war the role of music becomes much more literal and exag-
gerated in importance. In this period Zukofsky insists not on music as 
a general analogy for poetry, but on poetry’s structural embodiment 
of speciic musical forms, as words are increasingly made to imitate 
music phonetically. In this sense “A”-24 is a logical extension of the 
other verbal music in the post-war movements of “A”: the mime of a 
Bach partita in “A”-13, the musical suites of a number of movements, 
the ubiquitous homophonic translations, the dodecaphonic ‘tone row’ 
in “A”-20, and so on. The ‘itting of words to musical composition’ 
becomes the great preoccupation of Zukofsky’s later years, with his 
famous ‘upper limit music’ standing as a practical speciication for the 
‘desire for perfection’ expressed earlier in the Objectivist experiment.77 
The historical reasons for this change are open to debate: his marriage 
to a musician and composer in 1939, and the gradual disappearance 
of cultural communism in the US, no doubt helps to explain the move 
from ‘the revolutionary word’ to ‘speech tapped off music’.78 My aim, 
though, is to draw attention to this movement as implicit in the con-
tradictions the 1930s had already given rise to in Zukofsky’s work. 
Zukofsky does not so much reject a straightforwardly political poetry 
in favour of an essentially hermetic, musical aesthetic, as he is forced 
into resolving the tensions between what the Objectivist essays juxta-
posed as ‘what is objectively perfect’ and ‘historical and contemporary 
particulars’.79 Music, that is, represents a return to a certain version 
of modernism insofar as it functions as a de-historicising gesture. 
As the so-called music of poetry is taken literally by Zukofsky after 
the war, it takes on a universal and transcendent status as a model. 
The ‘strictly objective estimate of all the class forces’ that the early 
Zukofsky claimed for his Objectivists issue of Poetry is substituted for 
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Music does not always
Call on the human voice
Only free (often wordless)
Men are grateful to one another
Voice without scurf or gray matter
For the eyes of the mind are proofs.80
The withering away of the State has been achieved through the wither-
ing away of words in the face of music. In one simple gesture, political 
discord is neutralised by sonic perfection. Richard Parker’s term for this 
changed utopianism, the ‘paradisal’, is apt to express the ‘more trans-
cendent utopianism’ Parker rightly sees in Zukofsky’s musical turn, 
aimed at ‘an ideal audience in which the boundaries and temporalities 
of normal understanding are removed’.81
In an essay written while translating Latin, Zukofsky makes a bold 
claim regarding the transhistorical nature of poetry based on an argu-
ment about its musicality. The ‘musical horizon of poetry’, Zukofsky 
writes,
permits anybody who does not know Greek to listen and get something out 
of the poetry of Homer: to ‘tune in’ to the human tradition, to its voice which 
has developed among the sounds of natural things, and thus escape the con-
ines of time and place, as one hardly every escapes them in studying Homer’s 
grammar.82
Catullus (1969), Zukofskian music in extremis, shows us just what 
such an ‘escape’ to the ‘human tradition’ looks like in practice. Worked 
on by Louis and his wife Celia over two decades, these translations 
embody much of what Zukofsky’s post-war criticism had recom-
mended. Zukofsky’s preface to Catullus reads: ‘This translation of 
Catullus follows the sound, rhythm, and syntax of his Latin – tries, as 
is said, to breathe the “literal” meaning with him.’83 We can see what 
such literalism means in practice in number 70 (the Catullus original is 
followed by the literal Loeb translation, then the Zukofsky version):
Nulli se dicit mulier mea nubere malle
quam mihi, non si se Iuppiter ipse petat.
dicit: sed mulier cupido quod dicit amanti,
in vento et rapida scribere oportet aqua.
*
None, says my woman, would she want to marry more
than me, not if Jupiter himself insisted.
says: but what a woman says to a smitten lover,
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*
Newly say dickered my love air my own would marry me all
   whom but me, none see say Jupiter if she petted.
Dickered: said my love air could be o could dickered a man too
   in wind o wet rapid a scribble reported in water.84
Ron Silliman says that Catullus ‘gives primacy to the signiier’ in a 
process he calls ‘composition as action’.85 Zukofsky’s translation obvi-
ously resists transparency and emphasises materiality through tangible 
sound, but it does not simply abandon Catullus’s meaning to the con-
tingencies of sound correspondence. The odd words that permeate his 
poem, such as ‘dickered’ (to haggle), show that Zukofsky is attempting 
to combine sound with sense. Indeed, the homophonic method is aban-
doned to ensure the words ‘love’ and ‘water’ appear. The centrality of 
syntax and pauses to Zukofsky’s method should also be borne in mind: 
Zukofsky is dedicated to keeping the sound of the poem as a whole 
intact, rather than just mirroring the individual sounds of its words. 
Beyond a mere primacy of signiier, Zukofsky’s poems enact a complex 
relationship with their originals in which historicity, the distance 
between the two, inevitably comes to the fore.
One reading of the work that does address the question of history 
claims that Catullus makes the Latin poet strange, which is to say it 
emphasises the Latin’s foreignness and historicity.86 This has partly 
been my contention about Zukofsky’s earlier engagements with Bach 
and the sestina. There are a number of problems with this reading in 
the context of Catullus, however. Firstly, it runs counter to Zukofsky’s 
announced aim in the preface and his other statements about foreign 
literature, as on Homer above. Secondly, it makes an uncritical assump-
tion that translations that sound strange necessarily portray an original 
as strange. Thirdly, it begs the question as to why Catullus needs to be 
made strange in this manner at all, since he is already so before trans-
lation (Zukofsky’s versions were irst published alongside their Latin 
originals). Since Catullus ambitiously attempts to ‘breathe’ Catullus into 
the present in his entirety – sound, rhythm, syntax, ‘literal’ meaning 
and all – there is something to be said for the idea that Zukofsky’s aim 
is to make Catullus less strange. Paul Mann, analysing the work in the 
context of translation studies, says Catullus
reaches back to very old poetic modes, shamanic or even talmudic attitudes 
toward language . . . Zukofsky’s translation is therefore not just new and 
experimental but anachronistic, even a bit superstitious: it comes from a 
poetic perspective where one cannot tamper with a thing’s name without 
































 38    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
– ‘breathe the “literal” with him’ – brings the spirit back from the dead. The 
spirit is literally in the letter. This is translation-by-séance and, as in a séance, 
the form that reappears is frightening, mangled, ghostly, no longer quite 
alive.87
By ‘breathe the “literal” with him’, therefore, Zukofsky essentially 
means at the same time as him – homophonic translation in this sense 
can bridge gaps in history by virtue of the transcendental musical quality 
that all poetry shares. ‘Music being the one art that more than others 
aims in its reach to speak to all men’, in Zukofsky’s 1946 deinition 
of poetry, homophonic translation speaks to all epochs: it can update 
Catullus by simply echoing his noises through a contemporary language 
serving as a form of musical notation.88 Catullus, that is, is made to 
sound like us, removed from history into the present; he is ultimately 
made more familiar to us than is the case in conventional translations. 
Zukofsky’s use of the word ‘literal’ to mean sound is revealing in this 
sense, since it signiies the priority of poetry’s music as the primary site 
of its meaning.
One question here is to what extent Zukofsky continues earlier mod-
ernist strategies, and to what extent he predicts postmodern or poststruc-
turalist ones. As Mark Scroggins has shown, the roots of Zukofsky’s 
application of music to poetry are decidedly in the early Pound, whom 
Zukofsky closely echoes in all his theorising on the subject.89 At a basic 
level, Pound’s melopoeia, ‘wherein the words are charged, over and 
above their plain meaning, with some musical property’, predicts the 
Zukofskian musical essence transcending material circumstance.90 The 
igure is not Pound’s alone, however; in an essay written just before the 
completion of the musically modelled Four Quartets, ‘The Music of 
Poetry’, Eliot made a number of speciic musical analogies with poetry 
that would echo into Zukofsky’s Test of Poetry and his essays after:
There are possibilities for verse which bear some analogy to the develop-
ment of a theme by different groups of instruments; there are possibilities 
of transitions in a poem comparable to the different movements of a sym-
phony or a quartet; there are possibilities of contrapuntal arrangement of 
subject-matter.91
These comparisons are a development of Eliot’s conception of the ‘audi-
tory imagination’, a quality characterised by ‘the feeling for syllable 
and rhythm, penetrating far below the conscious levels of thought and 
feeling’ and ‘sinking into the most primitive and forgotten, returning 
to the origin’.92 Music for Eliot is a device for lattening poetry into a 
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current, and the new and the surprising, the most ancient and the most 
civilized mentality’: ‘Poetry begins, I dare say, with a savage beating a 
drum in a jungle, and it retains that essential of percussion and rhythm; 
hyperbolically one my say that the poet is older than other human 
beings.’93 Such an ahistorical conception of poetry easily translates into 
a standard of taste, and would later be used to justify the removal of 
context from the poem-as-object poetics of the New Criticism. Music, 
the non-discursive alternative to rationality, was indeed a cornerstone 
of that critical movement’s notion of the ‘heresy of paraphrase’, and 
informed its central metaphor, in the oft-quoted phrase of Archibald 
MacLeish, that ‘a poem should not mean / But be’.94
Zukofsky’s relation to this reactionary notion of music is not easily 
gauged, though he must be considered within its context. As the model 
of Language writing’s ‘materiality’, Zukofsky is usually posed as the 
polar opposite of such a fundamentally closed and reiied conception 
of the poem. Bernstein’s choice of words to describe Zukofsky’s work, 
however – ‘It’s not a matter of what it says, but of what it is’ – tells us 
that the opposition is not always so clear-cut.95 Exactly what Zukofsky 
means when he says music, and how far it chimes with post-Eliotic 
New Critical ideas, might be usefully approached comparatively in 
relation to his contemporary, John Cage. Cage, who was at least as 
inluential on the New American Poetry and Language writing as 
Zukofsky, shares many of the qualities often associated with the poet, 
especially his emphasis on form as a material. As far as sounds are con-
cerned, Cage treats them as tangible objects rather than receptacles of 
meaning:
When I talk about music, it inally comes to people’s minds that I’m talking 
about sound that doesn’t mean anything. That is not inner, but is just outer. 
And they say, these people who inally understand that say, You mean it’s 
just sounds? thinking that for something to just be a sound is to be useless, 
whereas I love sounds just as they are, and I have no need for them to be any-
thing more than what they are. I don’t want them to be psychological. I don’t 
want a sound to pretend that it’s a bucket, or that it’s president, or that it’s in 
love with another sound. I just want it to be a sound.96
Here, Cage foreshadows the New American Poetry’s consciously anti-
symbolist interest in language as a thing, and resembles the Zukofsky 
described by Language poetry, ‘excisi[ng] all but ears to the language 
itself’.97 Cage, like Zukofsky, is part of the anti-interpretation aesthetic 
of the 1950s, as inally theorised in Susan Sontag’s 1964 ‘erotics of art’.98
There is, however, something fundamentally different about 
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 materiality’, Zukofsky’s art is singularly hermetic in comparison to 
Cage.99 Cage’s notion of music is a radically situational and socialised 
form:
And what precisely does this, this beautiful profound object, this masterpiece 
have to do with Life? It has this to do with Life: that it is separate from it. 
Now we see it and now we don’t. When we see it we feel better, and when 
we are away from it we don’t feel so good. Life seems shabby and chaotic, 
disordered, ugly in contrast.100
Music is context in Cage: art is the happening of a situation rather its 
transcendence. 49330 is, of course, the recognised pinnacle of this aes-
thetic, where art is literally, though not unproblematically, reduced to 
life, and life becomes the object of attention. ‘Wherever we are,’ Cage 
writes, ‘what we hear is mostly noise. When we ignore it, it disturbs us. 
When we listen to it, we ind it fascinating.’101 The emphasis Cage places 
on his work’s theatricality, and on the theatre’s democracy (‘The reason 
I want to make my deinition of theatre that simple is so one could view 
everyday life itself as theatre’), is part of a project to make art present by 
making the concrete conditions of its performance and the situation of 
its reception apparent.102
Leaving aside oppositions of Zukofsky and the New Critics based 
on tired generalisations regarding closure, the late Zukofsky seems 
less Cagean and more a follower of the New Critic Cleanth Brooks, 
for whom ‘the primacy of the linguistic medium’, as in Zukofsky, is 
summed up in a music that gives poetry ‘its own dynamic’ and tangi-
ble emotionality.103 Zukofsky, who would eventually be introduced to 
Cage’s work by his son Paul (‘John Cage is an intellect; I think that’s 
the trouble with him,’ Louis later told L. S. Dembo), sees music as not 
just the unbroken thread running through poetry and history, but the 
very means to ‘escape the conines of time and place’.104 Compared 
with Cage, whatever other status it holds, late Zukofskian music is 
supposed to emanate from elsewhere than ‘Life’, from outside contem-
porary or historical particulars. Zukofsky’s 1959 poem, ‘Peri Poietikes’ 
(About Poetry), is revealing as a sort of statement of intent: ‘What about 
measure, I learnt: / Look in your own ear and read.’105 Unsurprisingly, 
this aural solipsism is inspired by words in a letter from Pound, in turn 
inspired by Philip Sidney, ‘Look into thine owne eare and reade’.106 The 
emphasis throughout Zukofsky’s theorising is on the essential separate-
ness of music and the supposed ‘conines’ of the non-aesthetic world. 
Poetry, therefore, is the freedom of transcendence. Zukofsky says in 
1966, a year before the publication of Catullus: ‘I want to present things 
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the poem is its own little world again’.107 The resemblance of this con-
ception of poetry with the ‘clear music’ critiqued in the early parts of 
“A” as an escape from the dynamics of history hardly needs mentioning.
Though these intentions are of importance in themselves, the extent 
to which Zukofsky’s theorising inds expression in his poetry remains 
debatable. To reduce “A”-23, for example, to an aesthetic of ‘upper 
limit music’, as here outlined, would hardly do the work justice. In 
general, the later parts of “A”, as the ‘poem of a life’, work differently, 
retaining a natural tie to Zukofsky’s earlier work in a way a book like 
Catullus does not. In “A”, music is always a situated phenomenon pro-
duced in a particular space. The space is, nonetheless, the increasingly 
highly idealised locus of family and less rich than the tense context of a 
poem like “A”-1. Furthermore, especially in its very inal movements, 
“A” turns history back on itself, as in “A”-22 and “A”-23, where 
music functions as a means of aligning the past with the natural world, 
and thereby erasing it, ‘best emptied of names’ / impertinence’.108 One 
can ultimately trace the convictions of Zukofsky’s musical poetics 
from Catullus, through the experimental music-making of “A” and 
Autobiography (1970), up to Zukofsky’s last work, the ‘book of songs’ 
80 Flowers (1978), where Zukofsky can at least be considered as putting 
the ‘wrought’ in the New Critical notion of the ‘well wrought urn’.109 In 
this sense, Zukofsky radicalises certain post-war assumptions about art 
and poetry rather than offering radical alternatives to them.
The older Zukofsky would not, I think, object to such an evaluation, 
given that it relects his avowed intentions.110 There remains a need to 
stress it, however, given the exaggerated politicisation his later work 
has been subjected to. This chapter has argued that there are other 
ways of looking at the removal of political content in Zukofsky’s work 
than those proposed by igures admittedly central in re-establishing 
Zukofsky’s importance. The long-overdue removal of stigmas attached 
to consciously political content in poetry is a key step to rediscovering 
the radicalism of Zukofsky’s early work, and the compelling routes it 
had offered out of Eliot’s and Pound’s narratives of inexorable histori-
cal decline. It may be that Zukofsky’s later work goes back to the more 
complacent assumptions of reactionary modernism, with its concern 
to transcend history and establish language as the pre-eminent social 
form, and that Zukofsky’s early work is the more distinctive in rela-
tion to the mainstream offspring of this modernism, the New Criticism. 
This is not to say Zukofsky’s later work is without considerable value 
for other reasons; the contention here has been that the compelling 
approach to the politics of history, opened by Zukofsky’s early work, is 
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and dynamic contextual practice within the Poundian tradition he so 
 obviously worked within for most of his career is unsurprising; indeed, 
it is built into the very dialectic Zukofsky is briely able to establish 
between past, present and future, tradition and agency, history and 
action. The key question suggested by the narrative told here seems to be 
whether, politically, the compromised political poetics of ‘contemporary 
particulars’ was always destined to be subsumed by its counterpoint, 
the Poundian ‘rested totality’, into an ultimately idealised utopia of 
‘imagined music’.111 Such a radical interiority, a sense of poetry’s power 
to inhere political force, is one pole of American poetry’s response to 
crisis. Zukofsky began, however, by suggesting a quite other response. 
This would be more fully developed by poets both following his example 
with similar allegiances, and those seeking very different modalities and 

































‘Atlantis buried outside’:  
Muriel Rukeyser, myth and war
In 1968 Muriel Rukeyser wrote a poem called ‘Myth’, responding to 
Gustave Moreau’s 1864 painting Oedipus and the Sphinx:
MYTH
Long afterward, Oedipus, old and blinded, walked the
roads. He smelled a familiar smell. It was
the Sphinx. Oedipus said, ‘I want to ask one question.
Why didn’t I recognize my mother?’ ‘You gave the
wrong answer,’ said the Sphinx. ‘But that was what
made everything possible,’ said Oedipus. ‘No,’ she said.
‘When I asked, What walks on four legs in the morning,
two at noon, and three in the evening, you answered,
Man. You didn’t say anything about woman.’
‘When you say Man,’ said Oedipus, ‘you include women
too. Everyone knows that.’ She said, ‘That’s what
you think.’1
Oedipus fails to recognise the mother because he refuses to acknowledge 
the feminine. He gives ‘the wrong answer’, a revision that changes the 
entire story: the patriarchal ‘correct’ answer is reigured as a mistake, a 
blindness to female difference that is shown to be the origin of Oedipus’s 
misfortunes. The sphinx, meanwhile, both reclaims woman from the 
hegemonic category Man and rejects the presumptuous universalism of 
Oedipus’s second person pronoun: the you that speaks of Man, she tells 
Oedipus, is only your you, and certainly not me as a woman. Rukeyser’s 
version is an alternative explanation for Oedipus’s blindness, but also 
a troubling of mythic origin itself: where Oedipus’s victory over the 
man-eating femme fatale ‘made everything possible’ in the original, 
his mistake here has a doom-laden legacy, in itself a counter to the 
Old Testament origin-myth of the Fall through Eve, but perhaps also 
refusing the Oedipus narrative in general. Inverting and undermining 
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usually unsullied window onto human consciousness myth is assumed 
to be.
1 ‘a hope and a perspective’: positioning myth
This chapter will sketch the movement in Rukeyser’s career, which 
‘Myth’ performs in miniature, from the revision of individual myths, 
adapting their political content to the demands of testimonial witness, 
toward an interrogation of the mythopoeic itself, occasioned by the loss 
of direct witness during the Second World War. ‘Myth’ is a cheeky poem 
facetiously wielding Oedipus as a stick with which to beat lazy gendered 
language. Throughout her career from the early 1930s to 1980, though, 
Rukeyser would insist on the necessary energy of myth for the writing 
of all political poetry, for the articulation of ‘everything possible’. Her 
central statement on the imagination, The Life of Poetry, written over 
a ten-year period in the thirties and forties, places myth at the centre of 
the poet’s proposed contribution to ‘the future’:
If our imaginative response to life were complete, if we were fully conscious 
of emotion, if we apprehended surely the relations that make us know the 
truth and the relations that make us know the beautiful, we would be—
what? The heroes of our myths, acting perfectly among these faculties, loving 
appropriately and living with appropriate risk, spring up at the question. We 
invented them to let us approach that life. But it is our own lives of which 
they remind us. They offer us a hope and a perspective, not of the past in 
which they were made—not that alone—but of the future. For if we lived 
in full response to the earth, to each other, and to ourselves, we would not 
breathe a supernatural climate; we would be more human.2
Here myth functions as a reminder of desire and possibility: its reso-
nances are not rooted in humanist universals, but remind us of a fuller 
though unspeciied way of living. Myth for Rukeyser was a central mode 
of passion, a powerful expression of struggle: when we see ourselves in 
myth, we do not see our uncorrupted, primitive being, but a common 
desire for a better world. Rukeyser allies myth to poetry as a ‘type of 
creation in which we may live and which will save us’.3 It comes from 
what she called ‘the lost, the anonymous, the dream-singers’: myths are 
forgotten dreams rather than hidden qualities, and as such they are con-
tingent and future-oriented. Myth’s ‘wishful dreaming’, as she termed it, 
is seen in Indian tribes’ ‘singing of how they would save themselves, and 
would rise and ight; and then, losing that promise, began to tell, to sing 
their dreams’.4 Myth is struggle for Rukeyser, but it is also ‘morphology’ 
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it also imagines fulilment, that we can be ‘heroes of our myths’, since 
‘[t]he world of this creation, and its poetry, is not yet born.’5 In sum, 
Rukeyser conceives of myth as a projective resource, propelling us with 
a unique visionary energy to seek fulilment as a society, in a struggle 
retaining heroic and utopian possibility. Such a conception, as we will 
see, is not dissimilar to Charles Olson’s inversions of Pound, in which 
the scholar-poet labelled himself ‘an archaeologist of morning’.6 As I 
will outline, Rukeyser’s modernist mythopoeia is distinctive in its refusal 
of origin.
Rukeyser’s career is an example to American poets because she so 
consistently put herself on the frontline of history, and yet so insisted 
on imaginative forms unique to poetry to explain its political power. 
Rukeyser was a poet, unlike any other, who sought crisis out – from her 
home country’s biggest ever domestic industrial disaster, as a journal-
ist in Spain at the outbreak of the Civil War, as a propagandist in the 
Second World War, later as a visitor to Vietnam – but insisted, simulta-
neously, that poetry had a life of its own, that was not to be in thrall to 
political demands, but that could rather bring its special energy to social 
movements. A sustained engagement with myth is only one aspect of 
this life in Rukeyser’s work, but through its development we can see a 
changing engagement with crisis that says a great deal about the legacy 
of high modernist poetics in the hands of marginalised igures writing in 
changing political contexts.
The two immediate commitments that complicate and galvanise 
Rukeyser’s mythopoeia, to feminism and communism, can be sketched 
separately. The phallo- or at least androcentric nature of most myth has 
been well documented since Rukeyser died in 1980. Jane Caputi’s notion 
of ‘psychic activism’ as a counter to such patriarchal narrative suggests 
one possible response. This is the strategy of ‘ight[ing] ire with Fire’, 
reclaiming the power of the female from phallocentric myth by reassert-
ing the force of the Goddess.7 The American poet Robin Morgan’s con-
ception of this power is uncomplicated, for example: ‘We are the myths. 
We are the Amazons, the Furies, the Witches. We have never not been 
here, this exact sliver of time, this precise place.’8 As well as a response to 
the deep history of narratives that women were not involved in writing, 
this is also a corrective to the twentieth century’s misogynistic reading 
of myth, be it in the passive-mother-fertility female igure that domi-
nates Frazer’s The Golden Bough or Pound’s macho inhabiting of Isis 
gathering the limbs of Osiris.9 Rukeyser directly takes up the approach 
recommended by Caputi – indeed, Isis herself is the empowered igure 
at the centre of The Book of the Dead, her irst mythopoeic writing. 
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task of challenging the biological naturalism implicit in myth per se. 
Donna Haraway’s ‘Cyborg Manifesto’ is of interest here. Haraway calls 
her cyborg igure a ‘myth’, but distinguishes it fundamentally from the 
‘organic’ mythmaking of her contemporaries:
American radical feminists like Susan Grifin, Audre Lorde, and Adrienne 
Rich have profoundly affected our political imaginations – and perhaps 
restricted too much what we allow as a friendly body and political language. 
They insist on the organic, opposing it to the technological. But their sym-
bolic systems and the related positions of ecofeminism and feminist pagan-
ism, replete with organicisms, can only be . . . oppositional ideologies itting 
the late twentieth century.10
For Haraway, Grifin, Lorde and Rich privilege the organic or given 
over the made or techneˉ. Cyborg myths, on the other hand, ‘subvert 
the central myths of origin of Western culture’, challenging the myth of 
myth, as it were.11 Not merely oppositional, such post-humanist mytho-
poeia, full of ‘creatures simultaneously animal and machine’, rejects the 
essentialism of traditional myth (there’s an Amazon in every woman) 
with an emphasis on the created and contingent nature of myth itself.12
Rukeyser was, perhaps more than any other experimental poet of 
the period, involved in the project of proletarian writing: her poems, 
reviews and articles naturally gravitated toward New Masses as well as 
Louis Zukofsky’s ‘Objectivists’ Anthology and Partisan Review. The 
stance of New Masses toward experimental modernism is complex, but 
its generally social realist tendency had space for a poet like Eliot. Since 
even unorthodox Leftists, like Adorno and Horkheimer, have been dis-
missive of myth as the bourgeois siren-song of pre-capitalist fantasy, ‘the 
nostalgic stylization of what may no longer be sung’, this space among 
social realists was predictably small, and would ultimately be unsatisfac-
tory for Rukeyser.13 Alongside the usual anti-intellectual denunciations 
of New Masses editor Mike Gold, who deemed Eliot ‘dull, bloodless, 
intellectualistic’ though ‘well-tailored’, there were serious engagements 
with Eliot’s work.14 Joseph Freeman, also an orthodox communist, 
could make the distinction between the Eliot of twenties and the Eliot of 
the thirties, claiming in the pages of New Masses that Eliot only turned 
reactionary and that, indeed, his early work was ‘revolutionary’, with 
his aesthetic and political trajectory mirroring that of Wordsworth and 
Coleridge. The Russian D. S. Mirsky was gushing in his praise for the 
‘unsurpassed . . . bourgeois poet’ whose ‘rare poetic gift is allied with 
a social theme of real signiicance’.15 Rolfe Humphries admired ‘the 
white-hot fervor of energy which fused and smelted the scrap-metal in 
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prophet of the revolution’.16 In all this appreciation of Eliot, however, 
there was a still a fundamental reserve: Eliot was always in the end an 
enemy, a poet whose brilliance lay in his ability to manifest the symp-
toms of his decadent class. Humphries, for example, concluded:
he has written, with poetic authority too great to be questioned, the elegy of 
an age that is passing. Let us not be so boisterous shouting our war songs 
that we fail to hear from the citadel of our enemies the cry of capitulation.17
In essence, the proletarian critic could only engage with Eliot as a recon-
naissance exercise, with suspended disbelief. In other words, the formal 
achievements of a poem like The Waste Land could not be conceptual-
ised in a way that could be put to use by radical poets.
This chapter will explore Rukeyser’s own dissenting interrogation 
of high modernist myth, but it is worth pointing out from the start 
that she differed from New Masses-type readings in that she thought 
modernism’s mythical modes were worth using and interrogating in 
the irst place. Rukeyser shows us how the radical writer could exploit 
the mythopoeic achievements of Anglo-American experimental verse, 
however much they carried assumptions about history at odds with her 
own as a Marxist. Rukeyser, though she mixed in CPUSA circles, was 
a regular contributor to New Masses and appeared at the irst Soviet-
sponsored American Writers Congress, undoubtedly felt frustrations 
with the critical reception of experimental poetry on the radical left. 
Her review of John Wheelwright’s Rock and Shell in 1934, for example, 
praises the collection’s intertextual exploration of religious texts at the 
same time as predicting its neglect by other communist critics:
Fine poetry which is not obviously propagandist has confused the critics 
again and again . . . Here is a book of ine poetry that must have an uneasy 
reception . . . [Wheelwright’s] work cannot be dismissed as confused or con-
fusing. Too many poets whose work might be exhibited as vital inluences 
have been too faintly praised . . . Such writers are laying a base of literary 
activity and revolutionary creation . . .18
Wheelwright, dismissed as a follower of Eliot by Hicks, is here praised 
as a visionary poet because of his complex intertextual ‘passing from 
religious preoccupation to activity in the revolutionary movement’. 
‘Faint praise’, a kind of toleration, is perhaps the best way of describing 
the reception of such poetry in the pages of New Masses. Through her 
early work, I will claim, Rukeyser shows us how the apparently obscu-
rant or mystical technique of writers like Eliot or Wheelwright might be 
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As I have suggested, the impulse to challenge phallocentrism and 
reactionary nostalgia combined with Rukeyser’s commitment to the 
mythopoeic to give rise to a complex dialectic. On the one hand, par-
ticular patriarchal and reactionary narratives need to be combatted, but 
on the other there is a danger that the very act of revision will reinforce 
the primacy and privileged status traditionally reserved for myth per se. 
How, for example, can the feminist stop short of characterising myth 
as primal, primitive and therefore somehow the ‘true’, presocial version 
of human relations? Which is to say, how can the very form of myth 
be challenged at the same time its content is revised? Myth revision is 
not itself new: The Book of the City of Ladies, a ifteenth-century text 
by one Christine de Pizan, put what one might call a ‘feminine slant’ 
on Western myths about women to show the ‘massive ingratitude 
of . . . men’.19 Such works suggest that tinkerings fail to fully chal-
lenge what is fundamentally a patriarchal and conservative form that 
emphasises essential biological characteristics and timeless universals 
over historically determined and changeable agencies and identities. 
Rukeyser’s mythical revisions are hardly of de Pizan’s order, but they 
do focus their efforts on transforming mythical content. In The Book 
of Dead, Rukeyser’s famous quasi-epic, documentary collage is used 
to adapt, revise and re-energise myth. Here Isis and the Egyptian Book 
of the Dead are used to establish female political agency in the context 
of public outrage (the poem concerns an industrial disaster in which 
700 men died as a result of Union Carbide’s opportunistic greed). The 
emphasis is on the appropriation and exploitation of certain myths to 
transform feminine lament into a spur to action and vitality, as Isis 
had, whose tears were said to lood the Nile each year after the death 
of Osiris. In one of the work’s central poems, ‘Absalom’, the female 
speaker, assumes the phallus through a reworking of the central fact of 
the Osiris myth, his re-membering by Isis, placing all the work’s agency 
with the living and present woman rather than the dead, lamented son – 
a reversal enforced, as it were, by the reportage of the poem, which sees 
the mother ‘beg[ging] of X-ray money’, taking on the court, and hon-
ouring the dead’s memory.20 In another, ‘The Cornield’, Rukeyser grue-
somely parodies the idea of natural fertility, associating the corn-gods 
Isis and Osiris with the corrupt undertaker who secretly buried black 
workers on arable land. What we witness at the start of and during the 
Second World War, on the other hand, is a questioning of the underly-
ing assumption of the mythopoeic itself, an interrogation of the basic 
structure of an Eliotic ‘return to the sources’.21 The reasons for this shift 
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2 ‘Atlantis buried outside’: myths of occasion
World War Two was peculiarly double-edged for a poet who had until 
the war based her career on a poetics of witness,22 but who now, as a 
woman, found the position of witness and the poetic authority of direct 
experience denied her. The revision of myths in the light of witness 
remains central to Rukeyser’s poetics in her irst-hand experience of 
the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, the most famous episode of her 
career. Rukeyser’s great poem about Spain, ‘Mediterranean’, retains 
the poet’s central task of testimony evident in The Book of the Dead 
and other poems from U. S. 1. Indeed, ‘Mediterranean’ is premised on 
the responsibility of witness more than any other work in the collec-
tion. The war was the beginning of the end of Rukeyser’s testimonial 
poetry, however, as it physically denied women any vantage of direct 
witness. The way in which the crisis of war forced Rukeyser into a 
different, more distant perspective regarding it, necessarily led her to 
a different concern with myth. Namely, the project to reframe certain 
myths with the concrete details of the occasional, makes way – partly 
as an accommodation for the unavailability of direct experience, partly 
as a response to the Nazi mysticism that had drawn myth-making itself 
urgently into question, and partly as a response to the total nature of 
a war whose occasions were used as propagandistic symbols in other 
political poetry of the period – to a concern with the mythopoeic 
itself.
The gender trouble of the war had especially profound implications 
for Rukeyser’s work. At the broadest level, the paradigms of war poetry 
existing at the beginning of the war left no place for a female voice. 
There was deemed to be no such thing as women’s war poetry. Rukeyser 
herself was excluded from all-male anthologies like Alan Calmer’s Salud! 
Poems, Stories and Sketches of Spain by American Writers, despite the 
vastly superior quality of her work on the subject. This terrain is suc-
cinctly outlined by Susan Schweik:
In the modern war poem as it is usually deined, the experience of the mas-
culine soldier and the voice of the masculine author predominate. In 1941, 
when American editors and critics sough to answer that urgent and irritating 
question – ‘Where are the war poets?’ – they expected, and were expected, 
to seek out military men, men whose poems could engage the war with the 
effect of authenticity, of earned outrage and courage, which the poems of the 
famous Great War soldier poets, then again widely in circulation, possessed.23
The Great War poets’ use of the body and direct experience to demystify 
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dominated the American poetry of war at least up until the US inva-
sion of Vietnam, when its method became shorthand for ‘the horror 
of war’.24 In its original incarnation, modern war poetry identiies that 
bodily experience is obscured by an often versiied jingoistic idealism 
and that the poet should correct this. Since it is the man who experi-
ences war directly, this poet will be male. In the context of the First 
World War, of course, such a focus on the material experience and 
physical trauma of war had much to recommend it, and represented 
a commitment that Rukeyser, a materialist pledged to the responsi-
bility of the author to know directly the material she treated, would 
have taken for granted. The problem is that women are denied the 
authority of experience by war. In the case of the Spanish Civil War, 
as Rukeyser repeats many times, she wanted to stay and support the 
ight but was forced into the ‘exile’ of evacuation and ‘never allowed to 
return’ despite repeated attempts to do so.25 The way the war distanced 
women from its centre was a singular problem for Rukeyser since her 
own poetics had been premised on an ethics of witness, and an insist-
ence that the poet address the most important political subjects of the 
day.
Symptoms of concerns more fully explored in ‘Mediterranean’ can be 
found in Rukeyser’s news dispatches from Spain, where she had been 
sent by Life and Letters To-day to cover the anti-fascist First People’s 
Olympiad. Three articles were published by Rukeyser, the most detailed 
of which was in Life and Letters itself, with the other two in The New 
York Times and, later, New Masses.26 In each, the authority of the 
reportage lies in Rukeyser’s being a witness: the motif is of the survivor 
‘escaped to tell thee’, with Rukeyser’s evacuation from Spain mentioned 
each time. Rukeyser accordingly insists on distancing herself from the 
tourist, especially in the Life and Letters report. In Moncada, where 
her train halts as war breaks out, she facetiously collages advice from 
a travel guidebook: ‘There is nothing in it that need detain the tourist.’ 
Tourists themselves, Rukeyser’s fellow travellers, are the constant 
butt of satire in the report, as with an ‘English couple, on their way to 
Mallorca [who] have it in for the man from Cook’s, who should have 
told them there was to be a revolution’.27 The detachment of the tourist 
to the crisis is repeatedly the subject of sarcasm: ‘All during the hot 
noon, the train waits for the attack. The tourists set up bridge games.’28 
The inadequacy of bourgeois exoticism is summed up toward the end 
of the article as Rukeyser’s account of the war is juxtaposed with the 
landscaping of travel literature, as ‘all the cars armed and painted’ and 
‘churches are burning all over the city’ are set alongside Barcelona’s 
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guish herself from such dilettantism, Rukeyser stresses her vocation. In 
a story that Rukeyser would tell again and again in various versions, 
the chief organiser of the Games tells a mass meeting attended by 
Rukeyser that evacuated foreigners ‘will carry to their own countries 
. . . to the working people of the world, the story of what they see now 
in Spain’.30 Rukeyser, in the unfolding of this ‘story’, is a witness with 
great responsibility.
Closely following this account, ‘Mediterranean’ is, on the surface, a 
paradigmatic occasional poem that can be placed in a tradition extend-
ing back at least to Shelley’s ‘Mask of Anarchy’. Published as both a 
fundraising pamphlet for the Medical Bureau to Aid Spanish Democracy 
and in New Masses shortly after the outbreak of the Civil War, and 
written, as it were, on the spot, the poem conceives of crisis in the classic 
sense of a ‘turning point’, just as with W. H. Auden’s ‘Spain 1936’ had. 
Rukeyser’s excitement at the immediate ‘pulse of war’ is part of the situ-
ation’s urgency. The demands of testimony are made clear:
Here is home-country, who ights our war.
Street-meeting speaker to us:
             ‘. . . came for Games,
   you stay for victory; foreign? your job is:
   go tell your countries what you saw in Spain.’31
The poem’s relation to the events it describes, however, is far more 
complicated than this directive seems to require. The reportage central 
to The Book of the Dead is, in ‘Mediterranean’, problematised by the 
distance that has been forced on Rukeyser as an evacuee unable to ight 
in the war – a point made even in the news dispatches, where ‘foreign-
ers stand helplessly around the fringes’.32 It is for this reason that the 
dominant theme of the poem is exile, the exile of a poet literally at sea, a 
theme announced in the opening lines: ‘At the end of the July, exile. We 
watched the gangplank go / cutting the boat away, indicating: sea.’ From 
the beginning of the poem, that is, Rukeyser is cut off from the event 
to which she would give witness. The war is ‘home’ for Rukeyser, but 
something to which she has been rendered ‘foreign’.33 As the metaphor 
of exile suggests, leaving the war occasions pain, not least because it is 
also a separation from a lover: ‘I saw irst of the faces going home into 
war / the brave man Otto Boch, the German exile . . .’ As a ‘brave man’ 
with a ‘strong square breast’, the Boch is permitted to go ‘home into 
war’ in a way Rukeyser, a female foreigner, is not.34
The symbolic relations established in this irst section of the poem are 
clear enough. Spain represents an ideal, a noble struggle and therefore 
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   The Games had not been held.
A week of Games, theatre and festival;
world anti-fascist week. Pistol starts race.
Machine gun marks the war. Answered unarmed,
charged the Embarcadero, met those guns.
And charging through the province, joined that army.
Boys from the hills, the unmatched guns,
the clumsy armored cars.
Drilled in the bullring. Radio cries:
To Saragossa! And this boat.35
The comfort of sea is ruefully compared with the action, guns and charg-
ing of war. The excitement and urgency of ‘To Saragossa!’ is pointedly 
contrasted to the unheroic evacuation, with the inal sentence fragment 
serving as a resented shadow and afterthought. It is this relation between 
land and sea, between war and peace, home and exile, that informs 
the central myth of the poem, of Atlantis, which makes the coordi-
nates of these symbols more complex and dynamic than they initially 
appear. Atlantis is irst glimpsed, through mysterious Minoan ghosts, as 
Rukeyser revaluates her ‘escape’:
Escape, dark on the water, an overloaded ship.
Crowded the deck. Spoke little. Down to dinner.
Quiet on the sea: no guns.
The printer said, In Paris there is time,
but where’s its place now; where is poetry?
       This is the sea of war; the irst frontier
       blank on the maps, blank sea; Minoan boats
       maybe achieved this shore . . .36
Beginning as a trivial cruise diary, this account of the voyage is trans-
formed by the printer’s question. At this point the sea becomes ‘the irst 
frontier’. The sea, that is, emerges as the frontier of witness: it is the 
poem’s testimony from it, away from the war proper, that can ill its 
readers in on what is currently ‘blank on the maps’.
Why, though, is this role attributed to poetry, rather than the journal-
ism Rukeyser was oficially in Barcelona for? ‘Mediterranean’ intimates 
one key difference between these two forms of communication. Poetry, 
unlike the ‘fact’ of reportage, contains the mythopoeic, and therefore 
carries a projective quality absent in journalism. It is the myth of Atlantis 
that proves this for Rukeyser, and that is central to her negotiation of 
witness in a context of distance. As a space literally ‘blank on the maps’ 
and only available through the mediation of the sea, Atlantis is invoked 
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ter city is present throughout the poem as an absence, a no-place, a 
utopia:
Frontier of Europe, the tideless sea, a ield of power
touching desirable coats, rocking in time conquests,
fertile, the moving water maintains its boundaries
layer on layer, Troy . . .37
Troy, lost like Atlantis, shows us the power of the sea to thrust forward 
as ‘moving water’ – a ‘tideless’ force that consigns Troy, and may 
consign the colonial powers of the last war, to what the poem calls ‘the 
overthrown past’.38 The sea, therefore, is a ‘frontier’ in the sense that it is 
incessantly at the forefront of the world’s movement and change (as well 
as in the more obvious sense that Rukeyser is among the irst to carry 
news of the war beyond the shores of Spain). At this point, Rukeyser’s 
position as an exile on the sea takes on projective qualities:
The wheel in the water, green, behind my head.
Turns with its light-spokes. Deep. And the drowning eyes
ind under the water igures near
in their true picture, moving true,
the picture of that war enlarging clariied
as the boat perseveres away, always enlarging,
becoming clear.39
The movement of and through the sea is equated with clariication and 
enlargement here. The central factor in this enlarging clariication is the 
depth of the sea, with an obvious pun on the word itself and a reference 
to the phenomenon of magniication through water. Rukeyser now no 
longer sees as a direct witness, but with the clarifying vision of absence: 
‘Deep in the water Spanish shadows turn, / assume their brightness past 
a cruel lens, / quick vision of loss.’40 The absent poet’s vision represents 
loss, but not obscurity – rather, the war ‘assume[s] brightness’ at this dis-
tance. Looking down, that is, leads the poet to look up as the enlarged 
war now casts its shadow across the sea, beyond its borders, like a 
shadow orienting the vision toward what casts it. Depth here, then, is an 
illumination of surface. It is also, though, a realisation of blockage: of 
how the ‘cruel lens’ of distance necessitates vision at a remove.
This new, stranger sense of witness allows Rukeyser to invert the 
Atlantis myth in the poem’s remarkable closing lines, which come after 
the boat has reached the relative, if temporary, safety of France:
          Barcelona
everywhere, Spain everywhere, the cry of Planes for Spain.
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to carry and spread and daily justify.
The single issue, the live man standing tall,
on the hill, the dock, the city, all the war.
Exile and refugee, we land, we take
nothing negotiable out of the new world;
we believe, we remember, we saw.
Mediterranean gave
image and peace, tideless for memory.
For that beginning
make of us each
a continent and inner see
Atlantis buried outside
to be won.41
The usual currency of Atlantis as a lost past to be found, a forgotten 
way of being to be remembered, repeated in modernist poems like 
Hart Crane’s The Bridge and H.D.’s Trilogy, or even in Auden’s more 
sceptical ‘Atlantis’, is subverted here to create a projective rather than 
archaeological myth. The utopian associations of Atlantis are retained 
from Plato, Francis Bacon and Thomas More, and indeed from the 
nineteenth-century pseudohistorian Ignatius Donnelly, responsible for 
the modern popularity of the myth. Rukeyser’s utopia, however, is 
much closer to the etymology of the word, ‘no-place’, with the poem’s 
conclusion rejecting backward-looking searches for exotic prehistory by 
instead insisting on a ‘picture at our eyes, past memory’ that we must 
‘daily justify’. It is for this reason that Spain is, ironically enough, termed 
‘the new world’ and a ‘beginning’. The myth is still at stake, remaining 
to be decided, paradoxically ‘buried outside / to be won’.
The clearest indication of the strangeness of ‘Mediterranean’ as an 
occasional poem is in its revision for fundraising purposes, published 
in 1938 as a small pamphlet for the Medical Bureau to Aid Spanish 
Democracy.42 The shorter revised version excises almost all refer-
ence to problematic themes of exile and distance. The abridged poem 
removes the irst section, for example, and so begins at the ‘Frontier of 
Europe’. This version capitalises on precisely the sense of witness that 
the original poem troubles, with no reference to the gendered perspec-
tive so central to it. All reference to evacuation and the poet on the 
sea are removed to make it seem that Rukeyser is really still there, as 
an eyewitness. The demands of direct and immediate agitation called 
for quite a different poem, one less true to Rukeyser’s experience. The 
revised poem’s uncomplicated ‘occasional’ nature, of course, its better 
with the urgency of the form in which it is published – as the pamphlet’s 
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lance drivers, with ifty-two ambulances and tons of medical equipment 
are saving hundreds of lives daily. What you contribute today, will 
receive the heartfelt thanks of a heroic people.’ There is no suggestion 
Rukeyser did not believe in the pamphlet: it does reveal, however, that 
direct poetic involvement in such events, or the writing of conventional 
war poetry, would require a certain level of self- censorship. In the 
full version utopian myth has already, as it would more completely 
during the war proper, begun to qualify and stand in for testimo-
nial access in a way that could not be introduced to the agitational 
pamphlet.
Self-censorship is one of two routes Rukeyser explores after the water-
shed of ‘Mediterranean’. It is the more quickly abandoned, however, not 
least because of its lamentable result: 1942’s pamphlet Wake Island, a 
celebration of the defence of its eponymous Paciic military base by US 
Marines. The poem, linking the US entry to the war with a worldwide 
struggle for ‘Freedom’, differs little in purpose from US propaganda 
poems for the war, like Edna St. Vincent Millay’s ‘Murder of Lidice’, 
and therefore exhibits an uncomfortable relation to the State, far from 
in keeping with Rukeyser’s earlier work. Where Rukeyser’s earlier agi-
tational work was rooted in particularity, Wake Island tends toward 
empty abstraction. One page reads:
Proof of America in a ighting age—
we see the face of the world, and its eyes are brave,
the men and women we stand with ight to save
our hope, our discovery, our unappeasable rage
against the enemy cutting us apart.43
Were it not for its bathos the poem could seem dangerously jingoistic. It 
resembles the ‘policy of the governments of English-speaking countries’ 
criticised in The Life of Poetry, written in the war years, ‘to win the war 
irst, and work out the meanings afterward’.44 Wake Island was rightly 
savaged by a range of critics, and though it was attacked most famously 
in a misogynistic Partisan Review piece entitled ‘Grandeur and Misery 
of a Poster Girl’, a review that would lead to a debate known as the 
Rukeyser Imbroglio, astute women poets were equally unimpressed, 
including Louise Bogan, who lamented its ‘rhetorical hollowness and 
limpness’.45
Wake Island is an anomaly in Rukeyser’s Collected Poems, however, 
especially in the context of collections appearing before and after it (it 
was in fact excluded from a previous Collected Poems). The evidence 
in the trajectory of Rukeyser’s career suggests that she knew the short-
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poetic response to the war. Indeed, she makes such a conclusion explicit 
later in the decade:
One of the worst things that could happen to our poetry at this time would be 
for it to become an occasional poetry of war. A good deal of repugnance to 
the social poetry of the 1930’s was caused by reactionary beliefs; but as much 
was caused, I think, because there were so many degrees of blood-savagery 
in it, ranging all the way from self-pity – naked or identiied with one victim 
after another – to actual bloodlust and display of wounds, a rotten sort of 
begging for attention and sympathy in the name of an art that was supposed 
to produce action.46
The ‘occasional’ here is linked to the kind of graphic directness typical 
of the heroic suffering of the First World War poets – poets deined by 
their bodily, direct, ‘naked’ experience of the horrors of war. Rukeyser 
is not simply rationalising the rejection of a position that is in fact una-
vailable to her, or critiquing wound-display to compensate for her own 
lack of wounds. Rather, her point about the necessity of new forms of 
‘social poetry’ is a response to the need to represent the experience of 
previously unrepresented constituencies and imagine new resistances to 
new forms of war and politics.
3 ‘the painted cave of dream’: war and mythopoeia
It is, as I have been hinting, the total nature of the Second World War 
that forces Rukeyser’s eventual rejection of the occasional. The war 
proper, unlike its prelude in Spain where Rukeyser thought of herself 
as at least indirectly involved, necessitates a move away from poetic 
attempts to affect immediate events. World War Two, that is, casts his-
torical events in a totalised light that seemingly precludes such concep-
tions of direct poetical agency, where the Spanish Civil War had been 
a crisis in the sense of a turning point, an opening and opportunity for 
change in which the poet was explicitly called upon. The distinct phe-
nomenon of the Second World War is discussed by Maurice Blanchot as
the fundamental crisis . . . we do not know how to measure for lack of lan-
guage . . . that keeps getting deeper and that literature also conveys accord-
ing to its mode, war is always present and, in some ways, pursued . . . the 
Second World War was not only a war, a historical event like any other, 
circumscribed and limited with its causes, its turns, and its results. It was an 
absolute.47
Poetry as the pursuit of the war would become central to Rukeyser’s 
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Beast in View (1944). Here, we witness a shift in the focus of Rukeyser’s 
mythopoeia even further away from the use and revision of individual 
myths. Rukeyser moves away from the reframing of myth through docu-
mentary fact for three reasons: irstly, she observes fundamental prob-
lems with the poetics of the occasional in this period; secondly, she feels, 
as many writers did during the war, an urgent need to revisit myth in the 
light of problematic political manifestations; and thirdly, because myth 
critique functions as a necessarily indirect engagement with the war that 
is nonetheless penetrating, and can therefore respond to the blockage of 
witness while getting to the heart of the war’s political issues.
Firstly, then, the Second World War means that particulars, central 
to the poetry of witness and occasion, have become absorbed into an 
all-embracing absolute that alienates and bewilders individuals. That 
is, the idea that the war can be changed through a focus on any of its 
single occasions is, in Rukeyser’s words above, ‘a rotten sort of begging 
for attention and sympathy in the name of an art that was supposed to 
produce action’. The war must be accepted, in Wallace Stevens’s term, 
as the ‘fact’ for which a conception of poetry as direct agitation for 
action will ring hollow, as the most famous occasional poems of the 
period, like ‘The Murder of Lidice’ or Archibald MacLeish’s Colloquy 
for the States, show. For Rukeyser, however, poetry can at least go 
some way to making the fact of the war less overwhelming, stepping in 
where a ‘lack of language’ currently fails us. One problem of language 
immediately evident to a poet like Rukeyser, committed throughout 
her career to the mythopoeic, was the dominance in political discourse 
and propaganda of a certain kind of myth. Rukeyser’s shift is similar to 
the twentieth century’s great philosopher of myth, Ernst Cassirer, who 
turned away from examining mythology to interrogate mythopoeia in 
the face of Nazism. Individual myths, Cassirer wrote, cannot be fought, 
however ‘ludicrous’ they might be: to ‘combat’ the adversary we must 
‘study the origin, the structure, the methods, and the technique of the 
political myths’.48 To pursue the war, to understand it, an interrogation 
of mythopoeia is necessary, an interrogation that poetry, for Rukeyser, 
is uniquely positioned to undertake.
Before examining Rukeyser’s response to these new demands, it is nec-
essary to contextualise the nature of the problem by returning to Pound 
and Eliot, who were also transforming their relation to myth in the late 
thirties.49 Both poets distance themselves from the mythical methods 
of the twenties in a manner that literalises myth. Where they could be 
seen to use myth in a relativistic way before the 1930s, as distinct from 
writers like W. B. Yeats or D. H. Lawrence, who seem rather to have 
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war gives rise to a need for more than ‘fragments’ to shore against ruin, 
and calls upon myth to establish conviction. What is important here is 
how Pound’s and Eliot’s renewed mythopoeia is igured as history in the 
late 1930s onward. Both poets construct a mythological history that, 
in appearing to be history, obscures its mythopoeic nature: both Eliot’s 
‘dissociation of uniied sensibility’ and Pound’s route through Dante 
to pre-Socratic thinking to the sources of virtù are mythical structures 
igured as historical truth. The picture is complicated in Eliot’s case with 
the increased importance of Christianity, which does not fold easily 
into either category, but in Pound, the more worrying poetic voice 
of the Second World War, the conlation is more clear-cut. Pound’s 
dogmatism was permitted by the belief that he had, by uncovering 
medieval, Confucian and other pre-modern energies, rid language of its 
metaphoricity. This supposed historical shift from a ‘language beyond 
metaphor’ to symbolic sensibility, encapsulated in the fact that Dante 
‘tends towards actual reproduction of life, while Shakespear [sic] tends 
towards a powerful symbolic art’, is a mythical narrative of history 
pretending to non-symbolic objectivity.50 Though Pound ignored its 
roots, what this claim to objectivity allowed for was the articulation of 
conviction. The implications of this trade-off are at the heart of attitudes 
toward Pound today.
For Rukeyser, there is obviously a great deal to recommend a poetry 
that reconciles myth and conviction. Her deinition of poetry as a ‘gesture 
of the imagination that takes its side’ is on one reading compatible with 
the major Anglophone modernist ‘mythopoets’ (Yeats, Pound and Eliot) 
where myth is a means of access to the belief that modernity had made 
problematic, a route to the underground roots of conviction buried by 
the relativism of the modern world (Eliot’s ‘futility and anarchy that is 
contemporary history’).51 Equally, however, each of these poets publicly 
expressed at some point, and to varying degrees, fascist sympathies. In 
each poet’s work myth is literalised from its original universal human-
ism, meaning what was formerly a plurality of worldviews is pressed 
into a singular mythical history that is, especially in Pound’s case, not 
recognised as such. Again, the move away from myth as the embodi-
ment of a supposedly universal human condition towards a use of myth 
to explain the processes of history is a progressive one that would have 
had considerable appeal for a poet like Rukeyser. Nonetheless, the 
application of myth to history is hardly likely to be straightforwardly 
compatible with the dynamic historical materialism Rukeyser and other 
Left poets were invested in, privileging as it does a lost past. The real 
problem, though, was in how Pound treated this mythical historiogra-
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history is no accident: the historical is to a great extent collapsed into 
the mythopoeic, as virtù’s battle with usura is retrenched to the point 
of dogma. In Pound’s Chinese and John Adams Cantos (Cantos LII–
LXXI, 1940), documentary form obscures the mythical historiography 
at work (indeed, the lack of imaginative work on the historical material 
seems to many a major shortcoming of these cantos): the apparent dis-
appearance of the aesthetic from them can, though, be seen as the ulti-
mate literalisation of myth, a claim to objectivity and truth that earlier 
modernist poems like The Waste Land were likely to express as iction 
and imaginative exploration. Ultimately, the mythological is so thor-
oughly a source in Pound’s thought, so absolutely the foundation of his 
poetics, that it becomes naturalised and effectively unnoticed. The link 
of such a dynamic to a wholly more sinister absolute is obvious enough.
Rukeyser’s working deinition of politically engaged mythopoeia is in 
opposition to Pound’s in important ways. We see its outlines in the irst 
words of her great book-length statement on poetics, The Life of Poetry, 
published in 1949 but mostly written much earlier in the decade:
In time of crisis, we summon up our strength.
 Then, if we are lucky, we are able to call every resource, every forgotten 
image that can leap to our quickening, every memory that can make us know 
our power . . .52
The notion of a forgotten underground has resemblances to the stereo-
typical modernist notion of myth as source, but Rukeyser’s idea here, 
also the central motif of the book, is far richer than that. ‘Strength’ 
is a ‘resource’, not a source; remembrance is projective, ‘quickening’; 
memory itself is primarily a reminder of ‘power’, of creativity, of poten-
tial – of what could once be done and could therefore be done again. The 
past here is not returned to as origin, but as a reminder that the past was 
once a present – that the present has the same powers of originality, cre-
ativity and agency we habitually think dead. Crucially, these resources 
are not the universals of a static humanism, but are there to be chosen:
The silence of fear. Of the impoverished imagination, which avoids, and 
makes a twittering, and is still . . . Now we turn to memory, we search all 
the days we had forgotten for a tradition that can support our arms in such 
a moment. If we are free people, we are also in a sense free to choose our 
past, at every moment to choose the tradition we will bring to the future. We 
invoke a rigorous positive, that will enable us to imagine our choices, and to 
make them.53
Memory ‘arms’ us to bring this tradition to the future. As Rukeyser 
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 modernist writers: ‘The way is before us, and culture is the future as well 
as the past.’54 The ‘rigorous positive’ provokes the freedom to create, 
to ‘make’ choices and to make; it refuses to rest, as Williams described 
Pound and Eliot, ‘content with the connotations of their masters’.55 
Rukeyser reminds us that the past has always had a future, and that we, 
concerned with our own, may use that past to overcome the currently 
impoverished imagination that prevents us conceiving it.
The dynamics of this projective sense of memory – exactly how one 
might do the rigorous choosing to bring a tradition to the future – is 
dramatised in Rukeyser’s capacious 1944 collection, The Beast in 
View. At the centre of the collection’s many mythological scenarios is 
the igure of the eponymous ‘beast’, based on Dryden’s lines from ‘The 
Secular Masque’:
All, all of a piece throughout:
Thy chase had a beast in view;
Thy wars brought nothing about;
Thy lovers were all untrue.
’Tis well an old age is out,
And time to begin a new.56
As I will outline, this beast is the mythical igure of the minotaur but 
also a metonym for the mythical quarry of meaning more generally. 
The ‘chase’ for this beast is a symbol of predestination, of a mythopoeic 
process that cheats, making history ‘all of a piece throughout’ because 
of its duplicitous design. What is made to look like a ‘chase’, or search 
for history unfolding, is in fact a trick always directed to an end, ‘a beast 
in view’, that is resigned and reactionary: ‘Thy wars brought nothing 
about; / Thy lovers were all untrue.’
Dryden’s lines are directly referred to throughout the collection, but 
Rukeyser joins Dryden’s critique best in the book’s title poem:
Conigurations of time and singing
   Bring me to a dark harbor where
   The chase is drawn to a beginning.
   And all the myths are gathered there.
   . . . I came here by obscure preparings,
   In vigils and encounters being
   Both running hunter and ierce prey waring.
I hunted and became the followed,
   Through many lives leeing the last me,
   And changing fought down a far road
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Chaos prepared me, and I ind the track,
   Through life and darkness seek my myth—
   Move toward it, hunting grow more like . . .57
This hunting is the corrective to what Dryden satirises. The chase here 
is a discovery: the ‘myths are gathered there’, but are not to be taken as 
authoritative – they must, indeed, be sought and chosen. Rukeyser is out 
to ‘seek my myth’. The crucial revision of Dryden’s ‘beast in view’ is that 
the hunter also becomes the hunted: the chase is self-constituting, the 
‘running’ a form of self-invention, a ‘changing’. The quarry here has not 
been earmarked in advance: our ‘obscure preparings’ are chaotic, and 
what we ‘will be’ is radically open and contingent on the hunt in which 
we determine ourselves. Rukeyser interrogates mythologies that tie the 
future to the past in endless self-fulilling projection under the guise of 
investigation. By performing an actual ‘chase’, open-ended and without 
a predestined prey in view, she attempts to prove the inal lines of her 
epigraph: ‘’Tis well an old age is out, / And time to begin a new.’ The 
ambiguity of the beast as subject and object is intentional and crucial 
to the poem’s enactment of the sincere hunt’s process: seen and unseen, 
contingent, unfolding in a now that cannot be bracketed off so the myth-
ical universals always known beforehand may be steadily recapitulated.
Rukeyser’s methods for beginning anew are best shown in the col-
lection’s long opening poem (after a brief dedication to Otto Boch), 
‘Ajanta’. The title refers to Indian cave frescoes: Rukeyser describes 
these in the collection’s endnotes as characterised by ‘their acceptance 
of reality which may be illed with creation’, noting, in the motif that is 
central to the poem: ‘The wall is accepted; the air, the space between the 
walls and the observer, is illed with creation.’58 The poem’s irst section, 
‘The Journey’ stages the same distancing gesture as ‘Mediterranean’:
Came in my full youth to midnight cave
Nerves ringing; and this thing I did alone.
Wanting my fullness and not a ield of war,
For world considered annihilation, a star
Called Wormwood rose and lickered, shattering . . .59
Her ‘nerves ringing’ at the confusion of war whose star was Hitler 
(Wormwood) and that has the effect of ‘denying all our words’, Rukeyser 
searches for meaning in a world of otherness (she never went to the caves 
herself): ‘Nothing was left among the tainted weather / But world-walk-
ing and shadowless Ajanta.’ Though the imaginative journey to Ajanta 
represents ‘a moment of peace’ away from the war, its momentariness is 
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Likewise, the motif of escape is further complicated by its iguring as a 
‘hollow behind the unbreakable waterfall’ – which is to suggest a space of 
refuge, but nonetheless a space that allows one to see the waterfall, and 
close up. In the second section, now in the ‘cave where the myth enters 
the heart again’, Rukeyser qualiies this space further:
Space to the mind, the painted cave of dream.
This is not a womb, nothing but good emerges:
This is a stage, neither unreal or real,
Where the walls are the world, the rocks and palaces
Stand on a borderland of blossoming ground.60
The cave is not a ‘womb’, not a return to infancy or primitivism, but 
a ‘stage’ that should be read as temporary in the manner of Thoreau’s 
hermitage on Walden Pond, rather than as a permanent refuge from the 
‘real’ world of the war. The mythical importance of the paintings is as 
resource rather than source: again here, the cave is deined as a ‘space’ 
rather than an originary destination. Such space is primarily an instru-
ment for greater clarity: ‘there is no frustration, / Every gesture is taken, 
everything yields connections’, ‘nothing leads away, the world comes 
forward’. The world is igured as present in the cave: ‘the walls are the 
world’, but they have been illuminated by the imagination of the paint-
ings, made clearer by the ‘space’ this mythical art has created. Indeed, 
throughout the poem it is never the content of the myths (the paintings 
depict the Jataka tales of the Bodhisattva) but in the imaginative energy 
(‘creation’) they transmit to the present. They are for use.
Illumination is a crucial term for the poem, which constantly opposes 
the darkness of its contemporary moment to ‘shadowless’ Ajanta. The 
‘black blood’ of history is placed outside the cave, but its ‘acts’ con-
stantly cast a shadow over the poet’s experience: ‘I am haunted by inter-
rupted acts, / Introspective as a leper, enchanted / By a repulsive clew, / A 
gross and fugitive movement of the limbs.’61 The light of Ajanta is not so 
much undermined by such hauntings, but rather all the more necessary. 
At the beginning of the poem’s inal section a broken contemporary 
world is again invoked in its absence, but at this point Rukeyser gives an 
account of how the light of distant Ajanta may help us see it:
No shadows fall. There is no source of distortion.
In our world, a tree casts the shadow of a woman,
A man the shadow of a phallus, a hand raised
The shadow of a whip.
Here everything is itself,
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On summer earth.
Brightness has overtaken every light,
And every myth netted itself in lesh.
New origins, and peace given entire
And the spirit alive.
In the shadowless cave
The naked arm is raised.62
Ajanta brings clarity, ‘no source of distortion’. Its brilliance displays 
a world as ‘itself’, without the shadows of contemporary oppression 
and deceit. The cave’s display reminds of hope, and at this point the 
poem becomes projective: ‘Here all may stand / On summer earth.’ 
‘New origins’ are invoked as the spirit again becomes ‘alive’. Now the 






I stand and am complete.
Crawls from the door,
Black and my two feet
The shadow of the world.
World, not yet one,
Enters the heart again.
The naked world, and the old noise of tears,
The fear, the expiation and the love,
The world of the shadowed and alone.
The journey, and the struggles of the moon.63
Ajanta has given the poet the strength and completeness to confront the 
‘world of the shadowed and alone’, to see ‘the expiation and the love’. 
Rukeyser has come back up from the depths of myth and found the pos-
sibility of purity in resolve: as these lines remind us, even the moon has 
struggled for her purity and brilliance. The caves and the poem, then, 
ultimately come to offer hope. These closing lines are remarkably close 
to Rukeyser’s The Life of Poetry’s comments on myth that opened this 
essay: ‘We invented them to let us approach that life. But it is our own 
lives of which they remind us. They offer us a hope and a perspective, 
not of the past in which they were made—not that alone—but of the 
future.’64 Rukeyser’s interrogation of myth in ‘Ajanta’ has revealed a 
world incomplete, ‘not yet one’ and thereby open to the hearts and will 
of the living, to be struggled with and for. The cave paintings are there 
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The quest of ‘Ajanta’ is imaginative in a conscious and literal sense, 
viewing its light of fancy at a post-Romantic distance. This distance is 
what distinguishes the poem from Pound’s war Cantos, which conceived 
of themselves as an interventionist discourse – as proof of the historical 
catastrophe of usury. Not only does such a method obscure the mythos 
at its centre, it is also a pose unavailable to Rukeyser, as we have seen: 
the blockage of her engagement with the material realities of the war, 
and the totalised nature of that war, forces interventions in imaginative 
language itself that are at once distancing and more thoroughgoing. 
‘Ajanta’ therefore must also be, as an attempt at intervention, distin-
guished from the anti-Poundian mythopoeia of H.D.’s Trilogy in which, 
as she wrote, ‘the outer threat and constant reminder of death drove me 
inward’.65 Rukeyser’s withdrawal is a strictly temporary measure for 
gaining perspective, a means through which her actual distance from 
war’s occasions is given imaginative space, and where an engagement 
with that war’s dangerous imaginative assumptions could still occur.
In The Beast in View’s most direct riposte to the modern war poem, 
‘Letter to the Front’, an explicit revision of the usual authority of the 
‘letter from the front’, Rukeyser begins: ‘Women and poets see the truth 
arrive.’66 It is a strange statement that only takes on meaning in the 
context of the whole collection. Both poets and women, that is, away 
from the ‘blood-lust’ of the masculine ‘occasional poetry of war’, see 
arrival through distance imposed on them. Rukeyser’s great achievement 
in the war years is to make a virtue of this distance, to create from it a 
space able to look beyond crisis, in which poetry can project different 
futures and possibilities from the same sources constituting our current 
reality. Rukeyser’s move from an aesthetics of witness into a poetics of 
the visionary is at the centre of her remarks toward the end of The Life 
of Poetry: ‘To be against war is not enough, it is hardly a beginning . . . 
We are against war and the sources of war.’67 In the thirties this may 
have read as Marxist common sense, but in the forties such ‘sources’ are 
explicitly psychic, in the structure of our symbols:
In a time of long war, surrounded by the images of war, we imagine peace. 
Among the resistances, we imagine poetry. And what city makes the welcome, 
in what soil do these roots lourish?
 For our concern is with sources.
 The sources of poetry are in the spirit seeking completeness. If we look for 
the deinitions of peace, we will ind, in history that they are very few.68
The tension here is obvious: our concern today is with sources, but there 
are ‘very few’ sources of peace. Rukeyser’s answer to this is to rethink 
































Muriel Rukeyser, Myth and War     65
say they are, like modernist myth, foundational springs of creativity, but 
also forms of creation that must be constituted by ourselves. Rukeyser’s 
beast in view is, as she wrote in a statement for a 1945 anthology, The 
War Poets, ‘the living changing goal’ of possibility: ‘[We] can work 
together for a wide creative life. I believe that poetry is part of that, of 

































Slipping the cog:  
Charles Olson and Cold War history
In a key episode of his legend, Charles Olson was born as a poet when he 
died as a political organiser. Beyond this, the relation between Olson’s 
two careers has gone unspeciied in narratives of his creative develop-
ment. The clean break described in Tom Clark’s detailed biography has 
been countered only by perverse portraits such as Robert von Hallberg’s 
otherwise shrewd account, which presents the poet as an uncritical 
politically centrist defender of US imperialism, unreconstructed from 
his days as a New Dealer – a view that has persisted to the present 
day, as in Heriberto Yépez’s less incisive Empire of Neomemory.1 
All accounts either see Olson breaking from politics or continuing 
already established liberal-democratic convictions in the humanities. 
The key question regarding Olson, still, concerns what he considered 
himself to have left behind, and what aspects of the category ‘political 
organiser’ we might consider him to have pursued in poetry, prose and 
wider cultural practices where, famously, ‘the affairs of men remain a 
chief concern’.2 The argument of this chapter is that Olson abandoned 
what he called ‘the trick of politics’ being staged in an increasingly 
corporate and bureaucratic party-political system for a more meaning-
ful sense of the political where his agency could register actively in a 
particular constituency.3 Explaining his decision to become a poet in 
a letter to Ruth Benedict, Olson makes such a motive clear from the 
outset:
I regret we are not city states here in this wide land. Differentiation, yes. But 
also the chance for a person like yourself or myself to be central to social 
action at the same time and because of one’s creative work.4
This early vision of polis, and of the role the poet might play in ‘social 
action’ from within it, gives us the germ of a concern that would occupy 
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poetics and cultural activities generally as a project to imagine and enact 
political self-determination. Olson, that is, saw at the inception of the 
Cold War a dangerous separation of constitutions and constituents both 
within the US and as a result of its interventions overseas. In response to 
this, his poetry, prose and teaching attempted to articulate and advance 
forms of real constituent power in which communities constitute them-
selves.5 This perpetually creative sense of the political and the historical 
sees direct participation and constituent action as both the form and 
content of politics. In what follows I will claim that we see in Olson’s 
work – in its attempts to imagine a history determined by human 
agency, to resist ixed notions of the human and the historical, and to 
demonstrate practical action as a rhythm of the poetic – a project to 
celebrate collective self-determination, re-imagine forms of constituent 
power, and empower disenfranchised constituents.
1 Rising and acting
There are various ways of directing the abstract conception of power 
outlined above to Olson’s particular preoccupations. On a general level, 
I will claim that the central antagonist in Olson’s ight for constituent 
power was the post-war United States itself.
Don Byrd’s contention that ‘Olson is perhaps the irst writer to 
produce a major body of work in full consciousness of the implications 
of modern totalitarianism’ may be true, but its implied bracketing of 
the activities of the United States, which Olson insistently allied with 
totalitarianism, is misleading.6 The US and the Soviet Union resembled 
each other, according to Olson, because of a shared alienation from 
populations equally viewed as victims of overbearing governmental 
forms – of what Olson termed, in this context, ‘“Conspiracy”’.7 His 
experience within government is predictably central to a disillusionment 
generally unfelt by his contemporaries further from the action.8 At the 
Ofice of War Information (OWI), from which he resigned in disgust in 
May 1944, Olson witnessed irst hand how ‘the popular front vision of 
the anti-fascist war was defeated by the corporate vision of an American 
century in the OWI’.9 Clark’s biography describes the deterioration of 
the OWI from a creative ‘spur-of-the-moment’ organisation run by its 
workers to a top-down, bureaucratic front for the ‘petty businessmen’s 
ideas of empire-building’: a state of affairs alluded to in Olson’s resigna-
tion letter, which claimed censorship and bureaucracy had ‘hamstrung’ 
his and colleagues’ efforts. Generally, Truman’s ‘merchandise men’, as 
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forms to the ‘courthouse politics’ of manoeuvring and manipulation 
increasingly distant from the population it was supposed to represent.10 
‘Other Than’, written in 1946, shortly after Olson’s goodbye to politics, 
had urged its readers to ‘beware // of permanence’ in the face of US 
cold warriors ‘who would run in, who . . . think to make the land’.11 
The attempt to ‘repossess [man] of his dynamic’ is igured in large part 
against the apparent permanence of imperial history, seeking to chal-
lenge the authority that entrenches such an invulnerability to human 
action.12
What Olson witnessed in the half-decade after Roosevelt’s death in 
1945 was the deterioration of the late president’s ambitions for an inter-
nationalised New Deal. Roosevelt’s ‘one worldism’, which envisaged 
the global creation of governments institutionalised by a US-led United 
Nations and driven by the allocation of inancial aid, was instrumental-
ised and co-opted by a regime increasingly interested in global planning 
only as a means to military and inancial power in the drive for Cold 
War supremacy and global dominance. As Franz Schurmann described 
it,
For the irst time in world history, there was a concrete institutionalisation 
of the idea of world government . . . What Roosevelt had the audacity to 
conceive and implement was the extension of this process [the birth of the 
US state] of government-building to the world as a whole. The power of that 
vision must not be underestimated, even as one looks at the shoddy reality 
that began to emerge even before the San Francisco Conference [of 1945].13
What was an ideal of patrician but egalitarian uplift in Roosevelt 
became under Truman, and in reality, a drive for national hegemony 
increasingly dominated by the use of violence, as in the establishment 
of a permanent network of overseas military bases ‘without historical 
precedent’, in the words of one commentator.14 The ease with which 
the quasi-imperial idealism of Roosevelt’s UN was adapted to a nar-
rowly self-interested imperialism was a key occasion for Olson’s dis-
illusionment with (though occasional nostalgia for) the politics of 
beneicent oversight. Accompanying this disillusionment, Olson showed 
an increasingly radical preoccupation with self-determination and self-
constitution among non-Western communities and civilisations, often 
igured as a struggle against the geopolitical activities of the United 
States.15
In the context of the early Cold War, Olson conceived of constituent 
power as a resistance to imperialist interference and the right of postco-
lonial self-determination. The problem was US foreign policy. As early 
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which men fought for themselves, and the ‘big, oficial war’ waged by 
US leaders on behalf of business interests:
If we, the people, shall save ourselves from our leaders’ shame, if we, the 
people, shall survive our disgust, if we, the people, shall end our own confu-
sion, we must see this big war for the lie it is become. Make no mistake: it is 
a lie. Unwrap the charters and pacts. Recognise the deals.
Stomach the people’s hope for security. Tighten the soil over the men, always 
little men, who are dead. Call the big war what it is: a defeat for the people.
And take a look at the other war. You might call it little. It is, where Italians 
in the triangle of Milan, Turin and Genoa are ighting it. Little in Jugoslavia. 
Little in the night of France. Small like a seed in the undergrounds, wherever 
men of Europe stand up to the beast.16
Olson privileges little wars because they are fought by the people, not in 
spite of them; from Mexico in 1951, Olson considered himself ‘angered 
and bored as much by the old answers of foreign policy as by the old 
answers of writing’ for this reason.17 US politics in the international ield 
was ultimately harmful at home, as in this grim description of the politi-
cal process in 1954: ‘I sit in the midst of these dreary States, all atomic 
and anti-Russian events served up to people to kill them off with botu-
lism before botulism.’18 ‘The Americanization of the world’ that Olson 
observed in 1950 was for him a defeat for the people, in both the US and 
the rest of the world.19
A key inluence on Olson’s decision to abandon party politics, then, 
was the Democratic Party’s rightward turn in foreign policy after 
the war. Henry Wallace, Olson’s preferred candidate for the unwell 
Roosevelt’s vice-president, had been dumped by the party in favour of 
Harry S. Truman, and after Truman ascended to the presidency in April 
1945 he demanded and received Wallace’s resignation from the cabinet 
after the secretary of commerce delivered a speech castigating American 
foreign policy, especially the hard-line position on the communist world. 
Olson, who had only recently helped to get the Party back into govern-
ment, witnessed these developments with foreboding. Central to his 
concerns was the issue of China, in the grip of a civil war between the 
authoritarian Chang-Kai Shek government and Mao Zedong’s com-
munist People’s Liberation Army after 1945. Clark argues that Olson’s 
observation of the inluence of the right-wing China lobby group was 
decisive in conirming his disillusionment with the Party:
The pro-Chinese Nationalist lobby in Congress, [Olson] feared, was about to 
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Tse-tung. In that historically momentous springtime when his own Eastern 
policy releases went to the White House for checking by presidential Asian 
policy advisors, he saw and heard things that caused him to grow increasingly 
dismayed.20
Clark tells a story of a gift of hybrid rice that was supposed to be given 
to both Mao and Chiang-Kai Shek, but only ended up with the latter, 
a ‘decision [that] symbolized all that was myopic about the new breed 
of policymakers’ for Olson.21 Shek’s wife came to Washington in 1943 
while Olson was working there – a fact reported in The Maximus 
Poems, which asks why ‘that international doll’ is ‘put up with’.22 Olson 
was no doubt aware of US interferences in the Chinese revolution far 
more invidious than gifts of rice in the months and years leading up 
to Madame Shek’s second visit in 1948, just before he began his most 
important work.
These questions of realpolitik are not peripheral for Olson. Asia is at 
the centre of Olson’s view of history from the start, and especially his 
vision of America within it. In Call Me Ishmael the West’s need to ‘clear 
[itself] of the biases of westernism’ is tied up with the fate of ‘Paciic 
Man’. Olson writes: ‘With the Paciic opens the NEW HISTORY . . . 
America completes her West only on the coast of Asia.’23 It is tempt-
ing to hear Manifest-Destiny imperialism in such words, but Call Me 
Ishmael as a whole makes it clear that America completes itself only in 
its own abnegation. Olson proposes the transposition of Asia onto the 
US, not the other way around, and the job of the US is to facilitate that 
transposition: ‘The basic exterior act is a BRIDGE,’ Olson writes, ‘we 
must go over space, or we wither.’24 Indeed, ‘Asia today’, according to 
a 1947 notebook, is ‘the only course’.25 Though at this stage, before the 
success of the Chinese revolution, Asia represents an abstract newness 
as ‘the FUTURE’ or ‘the end of the UNKNOWN’, its changing society 
is enthusiastically heralded by Olson as ‘the coming into existence of 
the MASSES. Pound and his kind want to ignore them. They try to lock 
them out. But they swarm at the windows in such numbers they black 
out the light and the air’.26 It is after reading his friend Robert Payne’s 
work on Mao, The Revolt of Asia, that Olson’s feelings on the issue 
become decidedly concrete. In a letter to Frances Bolderoff he notes,
Man as object . . . is the buried seed in all formulations of collective action 
stemming from Marx . . . It seems also necessary to remind the western mind 
of Asia, to point out the persisting failure to count what Asia will do to col-
lectivism, the mere quantity of her people leverage enough to move the earth, 
leaving aside the moral grace of her leaders of Nehru, Mao, Shjarir. The will 
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The ‘enemy’ to Call Me Ishmael’s ‘FUTURE’, an enemy described as 
‘quantity, materialism, the suave’, now acquires a name: ‘Chiang Kai 
Check’.28
These concerns inform Olson’s irst major poem, ‘The Kingishers’. 
The poem was originally published in Montevallo Review, edited by 
Payne, who was privy to its plans and development – appropriately 
enough, since most of Olson’s knowledge of Mao (though he owned 
some Mao pamphlets) came through The Revolt of Asia. If we ask what 
picture Payne paints of the Chinese leader, it is easy to see the attrac-
tion of Mao for Olson. Payne’s Mao is the amateur scholar of the West 
that Olson is of the non-Western – a man who ‘read omnivorously’, 
‘a scholar in [his] own right, with the historian’s understanding of the 
political forces at work and the poet’s sensitivity’.29 Just as importantly, 
Mao was also a participant, in Payne’s overstated opening words, in ‘the 
greatest single event in human history’.30 For Olson, a poet searching 
for an art that ‘does not seek to describe but to enact’,31 Mao seems to 
merge imagination and practice: a fact encapsulated in Olson’s use in 
‘The Kingishers’ of Mao’s performative utterance, ‘We must rise and 
act’.32 Ultimately, according to Olson’s high praise, Mao was ‘a igure 
of action’, the kind of creative man-of-action Olson was so obsessed 
with and later found more fully in ‘that great successor to Shakespeare’, 
John Smith.33 As such a igure of action, and indeed of radical success 
by the time ‘The Kingishers’ was completed in July 1949, Mao was 
the ideal representative of ‘the will to change’. Olson’s conception of 
truth, as expressed in ‘The Human Universe’ a year later, essentially 
repeats Mao’s On Practice, a book in Olson’s library. Where Mao says 
‘Whoever wants to know a thing has no way of doing so except by 
coming into contact with it, that is, by living (practicing) in its environ-
ment’, we hear Olson repeat, ‘deinition is as much a part of the act as 
is sensation itself . . . we are ourselves both the instrument of discovery 
and the instrument of deinition’, adding that ‘if there is any absolute, it 
is never more than this one, you, this instant, in action’.34 Mao’s phrase, 
‘we must rise and act’, is not mere rhetoric but an expression of Mao’s 
insistence on voluntary agency as opposed to the relative historical deter-
minism of his ancestors, Marx and Lenin. In its emphasis on a cultural 
revolution, its stress on the ideological in class war and its optimism that 
the Chinese peasantry and proletariat would change the world by chang-
ing themselves, Maoism casts itself as the Chinese ‘practice’ of Marxist 
‘theory’. By the time Olson started ‘The Kingishers’, Mao’s Communist 
Party was already overrunning China and becoming, in Payne’s words, 
‘the only party [putting] the social revolution in practice’.35 Indeed, early 
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the end it seems Olson was content to present the philosophy of praxis 
implied by Mao’s words.
‘The Kingishers’ contrasts Maoist action with two things: the king-
ishers themselves and what Olson calls ‘the Roman’. In the case of the 
former, the opposition is between nesting and acting, between the fetid 
mass of the Second World War, details of whose Holocaust and atom 
bomb had recently emerged, and the need to rise and act to change the 
conditions that had led to it. Such a reaction accounts for the relief we 
feel at Mao’s interruption of the kingisher’s description:
             On these rejectamenta
 (as they accumulate they form a cup-shaped structure) the young are born.
 And, as they are fed and grow, this nest of excrement and decayed ish
becomes
                 a dripping, fetid mass
 Mao concluded:
        nous devons
              nous lever
                    et agir!36
In sequence and syntax, Mao seems to draw his conclusion from a con-
sideration of the kingishers. His response is to project outward from the 
decaying nest, which is done in a literal, spatial sense that complements 
the expansive import of their semantic meaning. Mao’s stance is also 
contrasted with the Roman who ends the poem, and in this opposition 
we see what truly constitutes an act for Olson: the Roman, as he says 
in the poem, ‘can take no risk that matters’. Olson means something 
quite speciic by this igure: in ‘The K’, his sign-off to party politics, the 
cynical and hypocritical American Cold War politicos are named as 
‘romans’, while Call Me Ishmael makes this charge: ‘the American has 
the Roman feeling about the world. It is his, to dispose of. He strides 
it, with possession of it. His property. Has he not conquered it with his 
machines?’37 Roman and American imperialists may change in the sense 
that, as ‘The Kingishers’ has it, ‘they are fed and grow’: the difference 
is that, unlike the ‘courage’ of rising and acting, the Roman takes no 
risks, but is a continuation and expansion of the mechanical status quo. 
If, as Olson wrote Robert Creeley in 1951, ‘the substances of history 
now useful lie . . . anywhere but in the direct continuum of society as 
we have had it’, the Roman is past use.38 Mao and the Roman, then, 
respectively personify what the poem terms ‘discrete’ and ‘continuous’ 
‘events distributed in time’. The Chinese revolution is non-continuous 
change that refuses to go with the low – in the words of Olson’s plan 
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on the other hand, acts merely to prolong his own existence, his world 
changing only insofar as it continues, like the kingisher’s nest, to bloat 
and decay. His utility for the poet of ‘feed-back’, therefore, is exclusively 
as a warning of decadence, a representative of what Olson called ‘those 
who clutch old answers in a new terrifying world . . . the middle-aged, 
the reactionary’.39
The poem’s most singular dificulty is how we read Mao’s ‘dawn’ in 
ethical and political terms – especially in relation to the poem’s other 
protagonist, the Spanish Conquistador Hernán Cortés. A number of 
critics have used Cortés as a stick with which to beat Mao, assuming 
an identity between the two. Guy Davenport, for example, instructs 
us: ‘Do not miss, out of ideological blindness, the fact that Mao, like 
Cortés, was exterminating a civilization, with comparable cruelty.’40 
This seeming parallel, however, is not clearly in evidence in the poem, 
though the two are obviously related in being so pointedly juxtaposed. 
But what is the relationship, precisely? At an obvious level, both Mao 
and Cortés represent violence and the action at the heart of watershed 
historical events. The key political question concerns what this vio-
lence acts against in the poem. The subjects of overthrow by Cortés, in 
Olson’s version of events, are Aztec priests:
In this instance, the priests
(in dark cotton robes, and dirty,
their dishevelled hair matted with blood, and lowing wildly
over their shoulders)
rush in among the people, calling on them
to protect their gods
The priests, in their dirt and dishevelment, resemble the nest of the king-
isher. Unsurprisingly then, in a political sense they seem similar to the 
Roman or US Cold Warrior, detached from ‘the people’, clutching old 
answers in a new terrifying world (the inal two lines here evoke the Cold 
War hysteria of the poem’s immediate context). The blood in their hair, 
meanwhile, is of sacriices, leading us to associate Cortés with Mao, who 
implicitly ‘conquers’ the Chinese cannibalism reported by Marco Polo 
in the poem. And yet, Cortés is also described as ‘that other conqueror 
we more naturally recognize / he so resembles ourselves’ – hardly a 
recommendation, since it links him directly to US imperialism. While 
the conquest of Mexico is certainly ‘not accumulation but change’, 
and is therefore different from the Roman imperialism critiqued in the 
poem, it remains part of the colonial history that Mao acts against. 
‘Mao makes Mexico certain,’ Olson wrote in a letter to Creeley shortly 
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igure between the Roman and Mao, in a dialectical relationship to 
both.41
However, Mao differs from all of the other materials in the poem in 
that his speciic nature, his ‘leap’, is in a strict sense abstract and unde-
cided. His ‘act’ is purely projective – an imperative rather than a fact, 
a constitutive form insofar as its content will only be decided by the 
masses urged to act. Speciically, the poem warns against ‘the too strong 
grasping’ of change because it is insistent on the new as unmeasurable: 
this is what deines a ‘risk that matters’, and why the poem makes no 
discursive remarks on politics. Mao represents a birth rather than a 
rebirth – something new and therefore not describable per se. Olson’s 
outline for an abandoned poem of the period, ‘West’, has plans for a 
‘igure, yet unnamed’:
the man who, like Ulysses for the West, carries in him the seeds of the way of 
life which shall replace the West, and in a dying world is restless to open the 
new; confused, harried, but breathing the air of another Indies while those 
around him stile from the dead will.42
Though ‘The Kingishers’ asks the question of how change, as distinct 
from low, comes about, a condition of the question is that it can only be 
gestured at within the poem’s formal convictions. A dynamic has begun 
to be named, here and in other poems of the period, as a rising or awak-
ening. The truth of awakening, however, lies in the Heraclitean move-
ment of becoming awake, not the contemplation of wakefulness. The 
seeds of a new social life are, therefore, yet to fully take form. The ‘END 
OF WHAT WAS’ is followed only by possibility, ‘the BEGINNING OF 
WHAT CAN BE’, as Olson states in 1950.43 Mao is ‘what stalks / this 
silence’, but we are presented with a void, a silence, a presence dawning 
but not yet fully grasped.44
‘The Kingishers’ brings together a number of concerns for Olson: Asia, 
popular revolution, colonialism, war, the death of old cultures and the 
birth of new ones. The poem is Olson’s most successful attempt at an 
anti-Poundian use of history that gestures at futurity, summed up in Call 
Me Ishmael’s idea that ‘the man of antiquity, before he did anything, took 
a step like the bullighter who leaps back in order to deliver the mortal 
thrust’.45 The urgency of the particular anxieties Olson felt about the 
West, the horror of its world war and its continuing chauvinism follow-
ing it, made the poem’s projective historiography, here tentatively titled 
‘feed-back’, an almost instinctive form – something emerging from Olson’s 
keenly felt sense of Cold War amnesia rather than a theoretically con-
ceived mode into which such concerns were placed. The formal discoveries 
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nation of the assumptions implicit in what he later called a ‘post-modern’ 
way of writing history, and a thorough investigation of the abstract and 
even universal relation between the old and new, the past and present. 
Olson’s concerns in ‘The Kingishers’, that is, take on a emblematic impor-
tance in his later work, prompting the ‘special view of history’ that has 
come to deine Olson’s contribution to the American long poem.
2 Breaking the egg of history
By the mid-ifties Olson had become an inluential pedagogue in a 
burgeoning poetical counterculture. On leaving Black Mountain in 
1956 he had published three full collections with some renown in 
the literary underground, was known for important expository prose 
including Mayan Letters, ‘Human Universe’ and the seminal ‘Projective 
Verse’, and exercised a more informal and direct inluence on younger 
poets such as Robert Creeley, Cid Corman and a number of then 
Black Mountain students, including Ed Dorn and John Wieners. As 
the ifties wore on, Olson’s work changed, developing deft personal 
responses to the war and its aftermath to give a more rhetorical and 
systematic account of the workings of change in human society. The 
immediate problems raised by the failure of Western ideas manifested 
in the war, and the escalation of such failure through an expanding 
US imperialism, are elaborated in these later works’ capacious and 
comprehensive philosophy of the historical per se. By articulating a 
changing and ultimately changeable version of human history, Olson 
was also able to overcome vocational teething problems experienced in 
his apprenticeships to Pound, ‘the snob of the West’ who ‘feared any-
thing forward’ and Williams, criticised as a poet who ‘lets time roll him 
under’.46
Olson’s key terminological distinction in this poetics of history is 
between life and death. Early in his career, in a series of repetitions, 
Olson pushes and pulls these terms to create variations on the basic 
theme of death as the past and life as the present. ‘La Préface’, Olson’s 
irst mature poem, placed ‘The dead in via / in vita nuova / in the way’. 
Though emanations from Nazi concentration camps, Olson contends, 
these dead must not be claustrophobically mourned in an indulgent 
navel-gazing, but rather used to open up a new time:
The closed parenthesis reads: the dead bury the dead,
                 and it is not very interesting.
Open, the issure stands at the door, horror his
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The poem warns us that we, ‘the new born’, must leave these dead 
buried, for there are present concerns, personiied in ‘the Howling Babe’, 
that must take our attention away from mere lament: ‘We are born 
not of the buried but these unburied dead.’ ‘La Chute’, a poem written 
shortly after ‘La Préface’, takes on the persona of Gilgamesh to raise 
similar questions about the role of the artist in the aftermath of death:
         . . . my drum fell
where the dead are, who
will bring it up, my lute
who will bring it up where it fell in the face of them
where they are, where my lute and drum have fallen?48
The lute’s fall from ‘lustiness’ to death is a primordial concomitant of 
the poet’s own crisis in the aftermath of Buchenwald. The dead, that 
is, hinder the production of living art, inlecting it with their fallenness. 
This sense of contamination is most vividly described in ‘At Yorktown’:
At Yorktown the church
at Yorktown the dead
at Yorktown the grass
are live
      at York-town the earth
piles itself in shallows,
declares itself, like water,
by pools and mounds49
Death here should not be equated with destruction, a living force in 
Olson’s work, as ‘The Kingishers’ makes clear: ‘To destroy / is to start 
again // to let breath in’, as he declaims in one of his very irst poems, ‘La 
Torre’.50 In Yorktown’s landscape, death is what lingers, what unnatu-
rally continues to attach itself to life, what ‘piles itself’, endlessly repeat-
ing like the poem’s incantatory lines. The decaying dead are anathema 
to the living landscape, where now ‘only the lies / dawdle’. In short, 
‘the dead’ drag us down: ‘the long dead / loosen the earth, heels / sink 
in’.
Olson would eventually account for the seductiveness of such fatalism 
in addition to exhorting against it. The trace of the dead, that is, must be 
speciied for Olson, and an explanation given for its continued existence. 
Such a project is tentatively outlined in a letter to Creeley at the time of 
these early poems:
If you and I see the old deal as dead (including Confucius, say), at the same 
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there is bound to be a tremendous pick-up from history other than that which 
has been usable as reference.51
This superluous but unavoidable ‘pick-up’ is merely resisted in most of 
Olson’s earliest poetry, but its problematic, unusable energy, especially 
following the death of his mother in 1951, persists in such a manner that 
understanding its workings becomes a necessary complement to resist-
ing its temptations. One of Olson’s most graceful poems, ‘As the Dead 
Prey Upon Us’, is crucial in this regard. Here, ‘death in life (death itself)’ 
is deconstructed with a distinctive intensity. A kind of anti-elegy, the 
piece urges a wakefulness, an awareness of a proper resting place for the 
dead that we currently and erroneously position ‘in ourselves’. Though 
it seeks ‘peace’ from the dead mother, ‘As the Dead Prey Upon Us’ was 
composed six years after the death of Mary Olson and, while the inspi-
ration for the poem apparently comes from a dream, the extrapolation 
from this central theme is universalising in impulse.52 The poem’s desire, 
in Robert Duncan’s gloss, ‘to be released from the grievance and ache 
of the mother-lesh’, establishes it as a drawn-out struggle of general 
dimensions rather than a personal dirge.53 Its yearning to ‘grow, and 
act, away from / the mother’, should be read as a universal struggle 
between the past and the present and how ‘the dead prey upon us’ all.54 
One implication of this universalising tendency is that ‘As the Dead 
Prey Upon Us’ should properly be read alongside Olson’s ‘special view 
of history’ as a whole. Here I intend to give an account of the aesthetic 
experience of this ‘view’, before going on to explore it in the abstract.
Where ‘A Newly Discovered Homeric Hymn’, a shorter poem written 
around nine months earlier, is a warning to ‘Beware the dead’, ‘As the 
Dead Prey Upon Us’ explores what we must do when we have inevitably 
become ensnared in its ‘blackmail’.55 The poem begins with a proposi-
tion followed by an imperative that we are also invited to read as an 
entreaty:
As the dead prey upon us,
they are the dead in ourselves,
awake my sleeping ones, I cry out to you
disentangle the nets of being!
I pushed my car, it had been sitting so long unused.
I thought the tires looked as though they only needed air.
But suddenly the huge underbody was above me, and the rear tires
were masses of rubber and thread variously clinging together56
The irst question here concerns address: who are ‘my sleeping ones’? 
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and yet the boundaries are blurred given that we ourselves seem to be 
halfway to death in our sleeping. This complication of living and dead 
is continued with the abrupt entrance of the car, whose exposed under-
body resembles a laid-out corpse. Here, the vehicle is symbolic of the 
dead mother who enters immediately after – it imposes itself despite its 
‘long unused’ lifelessness, with a ‘huge underbody’ ironically ‘above’ 
Olson.
The pun of ‘dead souls in the living room’ introduces the irst revenants 
proper of the piece, and inesses the original confusions of living and 
dead. These wandering dead are in two places at once: ‘in ourselves’ and 
‘in hell’. The poem offers no heavenly habitation for the deceased, and 
yet its hell is peculiar, characterised above all by ‘poverty’ and ‘tawdri-
ness’. Though the dead lead a ‘life in hell’, with Olson’s mother ‘alive as 
she ever was’, it is a lifeless life in which people are ‘poor and doomed 
/ to mere equipments’. The poem at this point stages various attempts 
(visionary lyric, Buddhist philosophy) to escape from these remains, but 
still cannot evade the mother, ‘as present’ as when she was alive, with 
a body ‘as solid’. The impasse leads to this frustrated self-castigation: 
‘The nets we are entangled in. Awake, / my soul, let the power into the 
last wrinkle / of being, let none of the threads and rubber of the tires / 
be left upon the earth. Let even your mother / go.’57 So far, so similar 
to the injunction of ‘A Newly Discovered Homeric Hymn’: ‘Greet the 
dead in the dead man’s time.’58 However, at this point in ‘As the Dead 
Prey Upon Us’, unsatisied with the mere statement of rectitude, Olson 
introduces a new term with which to imagine letting go: the vent. This 
Shelleyan ‘wind’, in the face of ‘the ugly automobile . . . the heaviness 
of the old house, the stuffed inner room’, is offered as a force that ‘lifts 
the sodden nets’:
The vent! You must have the vent,
Or you shall die. Which means
never to die, the ghastliness
of going, and forever
coming back, returning
to the instants which were not lived
The meaning of the dead is fully described here: they are undead igures 
of backwardness whose net of ghastly, self-referential enclosure must be 
opened if the living are to become more than the mechanical repetition 
of ‘instants which were not lived’ by them but by their forebears. Olson 
sees agency in these articulations: since ‘I am myself netted in my own 
being’, he suggests, the living possess their own resources to, mixing 
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Section two unites the concerns of nets and circling in the igure of the 
knot. Here, it is the work of ‘hands’ that forms the action – a signiicant 
advance on section one’s pleas to the dead mother or ascetic renuncia-
tions of living desire. This ‘touch’ is not content with the act of untying, 
which would approach the net, as it were, on its own terms, but rather 
causes each knot to catch ire:
The death in life (death itself)
is endless, eternity
is the false cause
The knot is other wise, each topological corner
presents itself, and no sword
cuts it, each knot is itself its ire
each knot of which the net is made
is for the hand to untake
the knot’s making. And touch alone
can turn the knot into its own lame
Unlike the dead, the knot is there for use – it is the accessible (‘presents 
itself’) counterpart to the oppressive but unrecoverable dead. Its use, 
however, is as fuel for ire, and Olson’s self-relexive metaphor of the 
knot as its ‘own lame’ combines a sense in which the dead can both be 
consigned to their rightful place of non-existence and, in being so con-
sumed, provide sustenance for vital existence. For though we are briely, 
once again, returned to the mother, distracting Olson in a squabble with 
a neighbour, the poet gradually build up to this conclusion: ‘We have 
only one course: / the nets which entangle us are lames.’ The lesson 
is that the net cannot be externalised and must be taken as ourselves, 
living now: ‘O souls, burn / alive, burn now // that you may forever / 
have peace, have // what you crave.’ With a double meaning on ‘comes 
through’, Olson expresses both the provenance and the continuance 
of the net: ‘let not any they tell you / you must sleep as the net / comes 
through your authentic hands’. It is inally the possibility and necessity 
of doing that provides the ‘vent’ of the poem:
   all knots are a wall ready
to be shot open by you
          the nets of being
are only eternal if you sleep as your hands
ought to be busy. Method, method
I too call on you to come
to the aid of all men, to women most
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men to awake. Awake, men,
awake
In this, the poem’s crucial statement, the parameters of existence are 
only unchangeable if self-determination is allowed to sleep ‘as your 
hands / ought to be busy’. This agency cannot simply be directed in 
any manner: it must have ‘method’ appropriate to its responsibility for 
awakening man to his sovereignty. This method must itself ‘slip the cog’, 
repudiate the deterministic sway of the past on the present, and func-
tion as more than ‘an ability – a machine’, to quote the title of a later 
Olson piece.59 Though ‘As the Dead Prey Upon Us’ ends by returning us 
to the poet’s personal frailties, these are presented within a framework 
of qualiied success, in contrast to the poem’s beginning: by the end the 
mother may ‘sit in happiness’, and the ‘automobile / has been hauled 
away’.
Olson’s ambitious ‘hauling away’ had an urgency of its own in 1956, 
when the dominant poetry of the US was ixated on ruins, as the likes of 
Robert Lowell and Randall Jarrell used the past to construct historical 
scrapheaps, developing Eliot’s reactionary ‘historical sense’ into a mood 
of full resignation at the absurdity of human history. Such glibness 
is not directly attacked in ‘As the Dead Prey Upon Us’, but the poem 
does intend to ‘disentangle’ the individual from the dead family, and to 
articulate the present outside of deterministic vocabularies dependent 
on the past, offers an alternative response to the ironic and defeatist 
mourning so prevalent in ‘Middle Generation’ verse, as well as, more 
generally, the 1950s’ increasingly petriied sense of ‘Americanness’ that 
set its own constraining nets around what was historically authentic in 
the land of the free. I want now to deine the ‘method’ of such ‘venting’ 
as we encounter it in Olson’s speculative prose essays, and inally in its 
practical manifestations in Olson’s cultural activism.
That Olson began this project by looking to a non-Western past is 
well-known. His thoughts on the Maya in his 1951 essay, ‘Human 
Universe’, though tinged with a peculiar kind of orientalism, give rise to 
a crucial methodological conviction:
[A] people different from himself – they will be the subject of historians’ 
studies or tourists’ curiosity, and be let go at that, no matter how much they 
may disclose values he and his kind, you would think, could make use of. I 
have found, for example, that the hieroglyphs of the Maya disclose a place-
ment of themselves toward nature of enormous contradiction to ourselves, 
and yet I am not aware that any of the possible usages of this difference 
has been allowed to seep into present society . . . [Such history is offered] as 
decoration of knowledge upon some Christian and therefore eternal and holy 
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Creeley distinguished Olson from a defeatist sense of history in which 
‘you’re stuck in some inexorable manner and it grinds you out, you’re 
always too late because it all happened last year’.61 Here, Olson con-
tends that we must look beyond the temporal imperialism of absorbing 
all past culture into the familiar categories of our own. Rather than 
opening self-knowledge through the recognition of different ways of 
thinking, the ‘tourists’ curiosity’ hangs the past on an ‘eternal and 
holy neck’. History’s ‘use’ as difference, therefore, is lost in favour of a 
decoration to reinforce existing values. Olson’s underlying conviction, 
of course, is that the US itself must strive to be radically different from 
what has gone before, to resist continuing a tradition that to him seemed 
intent on re-living the Roman Empire, European colonialism and the 
Second World War all in one. In a letter of the same year, Olson tells 
Vincent Ferrini: ‘when traditions go, the DISCONTINUOUS becomes 
the greener place’.62 Olson’s most important prose work, The Special 
View of History (1956), would systematise these attacks on continu-
ity. Though, as we will see shortly, Olson’s discontinuous is most fully 
expressed in his own concrete acts of cultural intervention and commu-
nal constitution at Black Mountain, where he wrote the essay as a series 
of talks, his effort to ‘repossess [man] of his dynamic’ at the conceptual 
level forms a useful distillation of the wider project’s motivations. The 
Special View of History, though itself an event that Olson performed at 
Black Mountain and around California, is Olson’s most abstract and 
speculative meditation on the nature of the subject, alive in the becom-
ing of history.
The work bases its notion of the discontinuous ‘event’ on a reading 
of A. N. Whitehead, whose ‘cell-theory of actuality’63 rested on the idea 
that continuity was something achieved by entities after their existence 
had irst been secured in discontinuity – the idea of a ‘next occasion’ in 
a supposed continuum being only meaningful as such by the ‘produc-
tion of novelty’.64 Olson develops this notion politically in Special View, 
where it is summed up in the essay’s central but paradoxical statement, 
‘MAN IS A CONTINUOUS CHANGE IN TIME’.65 In effect, Olson 
poses a sense of agency in continual discontinuity: ‘the irresistible is 
usually only that which hasn’t been resisted’.66 Asking ‘What are we to 
do but break the egg of history, and get outside’, Olson answers with the 
‘act’ of humans, with a distinct sense that continuity is an issue for man, 
against an unchanging ‘history’ that merely grinds him down.67 Here 
we are returned explicitly to the question of constitutive power. Olson’s 
contention is that history is ‘what [man] does’. Olson terms such action 
the ‘actual’, which is alone ‘determinative’.68 ‘History,’ he asserts, ‘is the 
































 82    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
Olson’s special view.69 ‘Man has the context of his own species for his 
self or he is a pseudo creature,’ Olson writes, and within his notion of 
the human subject is an acknowledged post-humanism which allies his 
thought with more contemporary theories of revolutionary politics.70
The French philosopher Alain Badiou can help translate some of 
Olson’s only apparently vague assertions regarding history into the 
vocabulary of ‘social action’ Olson had announced as a poetic concern 
at the very start of his career. Badiou’s theory of the subject is tied up 
with his theory of the Event, which closely echoes Olson’s ‘act’ as radi-
cally discontinuous. Indeed, for Badiou the event is an event because of 
its ‘impossibility’71 within the logics it displaces; it is a ‘totally ab-nor-
mal’ void in the structure of being.72 Being absent, the Event is uniquely 
that which exists by being chosen by subjects, who in the act of this 
decision are constituted as such. For Badiou the subject is not given, but 
‘becomes’ through the act of choosing and instituting the Event. Thus in 
his attempt to renew the notion of agency in the wake of poststructural-
ism, Badiou denies the category of subjecthood to any human lacking 
a precise, and probably revolutionary, social agency. Olson’s notion of 
man as ‘[a]n active’, opposed in Special View to rationalism’s ‘counsel of 
despair’ in which ‘Man is simply illing an empty space’, likewise opens 
the notion of the human up to a future beyond what is made to seem 
necessary and consummate by the past.73 The being of the subject for 
Olson is what he does (though not, as we shall see, without limit). ‘Man 
is, He acts.’ The two are identical and cannot, one suspects, exist apart 
for Olson: ‘Actual wilful man,’ he writes, ‘has to do something about 
himself.’74
The immediate objection to such assertive self-determination is that 
it simply repeats Romantic ideals of the transcendent ego. To break the 
‘egg of history’ could be taken to imply an escape from it entirely. That 
such a reading would be a mistake can be shown in two ways: irstly, 
by reading Special View back into the context from which it emerges, 
and secondly, by reading Olson’s own counter to such Romantic soul-
making in his concept of the ‘limit’. For the former, we can trace Olson’s 
conception of action as social participation back to his earliest essays. 
‘Human Universe’ bemoans how
The notion of fun comes to displace work as what we are here for . . . 
Spectatorism crowds out participation as the condition of culture. All indi-
vidual energy is bought off—at a suggestion box or the cinema. Passivity 
conquers all. Even war and peace die (to be displaced by world government?) 
































Charles Olson and Cold War History     83
Spectatorism and passivity are equated with representative and indeed 
global totalitarian government, where work and energy are ‘bought off’. 
The consequence of inaction, he suggests, is domination, as in this later 
Origin letter:
the spectatorism which both capitalism and communism breed—breed it as 
surely as absentee ownership . . . doth breed it, separating men from action 
surely as—as a leadership—these two identities limit production, or regulate 
it, in that monstrous phrase which turns all things toward creation’s oppo-
site, destruction.76
Absentee ownership is an issue for Olson for many reasons, not least of 
which is its role in destroying the link between community and place, 
but here it represents the absence of power in the people who are subject 
to it. The important 1953 Maximus poem, ‘Letter 23’, would more par-
ticularly pit itself ‘against nascent capitalism except as it stays the indi-
vidual adventurer and the worker on share – against all sliding statism, 
ownership getting in to, the community as, Chamber of Commerce, or 
theocracy; or City Manager’ – an announcement that explicitly ties the 
acting subject (‘individual adventurer’) with the communal constituency 
(‘worker on share’).77
Charles Bernstein has criticised ‘Olson’s refusal to accept the limits of 
knowledge’.78 As a post-humanist of sorts, Olson is rightly suspicious of 
such limits as a conservative naturalisation of the political status quo. 
There are other limits in Olson, however. Creeley speaks of his mistake 
in once taking Olsonian limits ‘to be a frustration of possibility rather 
than the literal possibility they in fact must provoke’.79 The limit is dia-
lectical in Olson, as in Special View’s key distinction between two types 
of action:
one gets two sorts of will, a will of power or a will of achievement. The irst 
one is the one in which the will collapses back to the subjective understand-
ing – tries to make it by asserting the self as character. The second makes it 
by non-asserting the self as self. In other words the riddle is that the true self 
is not the asserting function but an obeying one, that the actionable is larger 
than the individual and so can be obeyed to.80
Stephen Fredman has claimed that the Olsonian limit serves as a means 
to ‘combat the pervasive American belief in unlimited possibilities’ – 
this needs serious qualiication, however, since Fredman also ties this 
combat with a resistance to change in Olson.81 The American belief in 
unlimited possibilities is emphatically personiied for Olson at the start 
of his career in the igure of Ahab. Olson’s Ahab, the pure subjectiv-
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ungrounded igure: without origin, without community, without place, 
without limit. His anti-social egotism, however, is itself a limit in histori-
cal terms: as Olson grandly declares in Call Me Ishmael, Ahab is the end 
of the project of Western Man, of humanism, of ‘what we have had’.82
The true action or will, on the other hand, acknowledges the limits of 
‘the self as character’, obeying a wider context of what is ‘actionable’. 
This igure moves from a conventional humanist conception of freedom 
from to the Hegelian notion of freedom to, as Creeley recognised: in 
attending to the larger grounding and limits of the individual, one 
achieves a true self, and truly acts. There must be an ‘END of individual 
responsible only to himself’ represented by Ahab.83 Only then is man 
responsible to ‘history’ conceived as ‘the conidence of limit as a man 
is caught in the assumption and power of change’ – a richly ambiguous 
statement akin to Marx’s ‘Men make their own history, but they do not 
make it as they please’.84 Man is caught in the power of change but he 
must also assume that power and institute change through action. This 
action is neither the negation of history nor resignation to determinism; 
it is, as ‘As the Dead Prey Upon Us’ tells us, the application of ‘method’, 
of a special view of history in which we awaken ourselves and historical 
processes simultaneously. The ‘nets of being’ are limits, but they need not 
be escaped or transcended, but rather ired up, transformed and made 
transformative. In itself a performance in how we might ‘slip the cog’, 
Olson’s poem is the enactment of this transformation. Its dramatisation 
of a mind thinking itself simultaneously through, out of and awake from 
the deadening effects of a culture obsessed with repeating its past repre-
sents one of the key articulations of Olson’s radical projective poetics.
3 A live society
‘As the Dead Prey Upon Us’ and The Special View of History are both 
important episodes in a wider practice that had Black Mountain College 
at its centre. Though Olson initially came to the unique creative envi-
ronment as a stranger, its symbiotic relation to his thinking during his 
years as Rector (1951–6), both informing and eventually informed by 
intellectual concerns worked out in the mid-ifties, is remarkable. ‘It 
was a polis,’ as Olson records in The Maximus Poems, placing Black 
Mountain at the centre of his thinking about poetics and history. The 
college was both a spur for Olson’s writing, as his early letters from 
North Carolina demonstrate, and a stage for its dissemination. The 
link between expressing change and instituting constitutive forms must 
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characteristics of Olson’s rectorship that can be considered as concrete 
attempts to ‘break the egg’ and ‘slip the cog’ of history and changeless-
ness. These qualities at once retain a continuity with Olson’s ideas about 
history and action and represent their projection beyond the abstract.
At the centre of Olson’s pedagogy was the notion of ritual. As we 
have seen, Olson rejects the view of myth as text, as a system of symbol-
ism transporting the reader back to the originary moment or divinity. 
Through Cambridge Ritualist Jane Harrison, Olson understood myth as 
something done or performed, as existing in the low of history rather 
than before its adulterations. For Harrison and the other Cambridge 
Ritualists who redeined the study of myth, myth is part of an activity: 
‘The primary meaning of myth . . . is the spoken correlative of the acted 
rite, the thing done.’85 For Harrison, the meaning of myth is not only 
tied to its role in ‘the thing done’, however: it is also incantatory, having 
in its proper context an agency, an ability to do in itself. Far from an 
originary tale before history, myth has the ability, through ‘collective 
sanction and solemn purpose’, to act in the present as ‘practically a story 
of magical intent and potency’.86 For Olson, likewise, ‘The mythological 
was the way I had come, inally, to put the sense I had that each of us 
obeyed and acted in.’87 This conception of myth expands into a practice 
of knowledge or learning in action generally. That is, just as the truth 
of myth was only to be found in its communal enactment, so learning 
in its fullest sense was to be seen as a continuing process of collabora-
tive doing. If Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Studies was ‘a kind of 
assembly point of ideas’, Olson claimed, Black Mountain would stand 
as ‘an assembly point of acts’.88 At Black Mountain, Olson recalled, 
‘the air was full of the droplets of events’.89 The claim is obviously 
borne out in the activity for which Black Mountain was to become 
most famous: events involving Olson alone include the ‘irst ever hap-
pening’, Theatre Piece no.1 (1952), involving John Cage, David Tudor, 
Robert Rauschenberg, Olson and others; the performance of Olson’s 
Apollonius of Tyana; dance-plays and dance enactments of Olson’s own 
works; and the ‘glyph gifts’ episode in which faculty exchanged various 
artistic interpretations of Olson’s poem, ‘The Glyph’. There was much 
else Olson was indirectly responsible for besides.
Olson’s sense of transmission is deined by the conviction that ‘[t]here 
is only one thing you can do about kinetic, re-enact it’.90 Understanding 
this, Olson claimed, we arrive at the conviction, ‘he who possesses 
rhythm possesses the universe’.91 Movement and luidity are central to 
Olson’s ambition at Black Mountain, and return us to the concerns of 
‘The Kingishers’: Olson later recalled ‘the enormous gracefulness, and 
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I mean the total insecurity, founded, built in, created in its origin’.92 
This liberated self-constitution is the concomitant of myth as knowl-
edge constantly reinvented and performed in a present, rather than the 
comfort and safety of an unchanging foundation of being. Olson also 
allies it with Mao’s long march, and the medieval Chinese novel he says 
inspired Mao, All Men Are Brothers, which sees all the experts of the 
kingdom (dancers, scholars, swordsmen) turn itinerant after dismissal 
from their monarch.93 Olson felt the outlaw status was preferable as a 
state in which a community moved, in which the polis was constantly 
self-constituting, self-employed and self-inventing. Black Mountain, he 
likewise claimed:
was that kind of place where you could call – you announced concerts within 
three minutes, I would say, because it was one spot. You announced a coup 
d’état, you counteracted a coup d’état in two minutes. You equally, of course, 
were teaching in two minutes, you were painting or doing other things at the 
other end of the lake within two minutes. It was about a two minute walk 
from the dining hall to the studies building . . .94
It is this characteristic of quick luidity, of a perpetually open process 
of social constitution in which coups d’état were a constant possibility, 
that made Black Mountain ‘a live society, not something proposed – 
 something that was done and was there’.95
There is a risk of marginality at the heart of Olson’s Black Mountain. 
Ritual would take on disreputable, indeed dangerous forms in the 
1960s, associated exclusively with underground or so-called alternative 
forms of community. Black Mountain can often appear as a retreat, and 
is in danger of being retrospectively deined as a place where society’s 
discontents could ‘opt out’ of conventionality. This would be an error, 
but it informs an understandable uncertainty many have had with 
Olson’s political poetics: whether he might not have been exactly the 
type of person the world could use inside the Democratic party machine 
or even government. Anne Waldman says:
had he stayed, he could have been player . . . It’s unfortunate [that he didn’t] 
in a way because you want people like that ‘inside’. I feel like this myself—
sort of clamouring at the gates and wanting to be more effective. How do 
you become more effective . . . How do you get opportunities to make that 
radical shift?96
The question at this point becomes one of the nature of withdrawal: was 
Olson’s move, as it were, from the Democratic party to Black Mountain, 

































Charles Olson and Cold War History     87
Olson himself semi-facetiously thought of Black Mountain as ‘the 
predecessor of the nation . . . the mute show before the main show’. For 
him, Black Mountain was not a commune but a ‘city’. The distinction is 
crucial and precise. ‘A city,’ he said, in relation to Black Mountain, ‘is a 
wonderful thing because you can walk in and out of it, yes? At the same 
time, it is a unit.’97 There are two connected qualities, then, that keep 
Black Mountain from being cut off or merely ‘self-suficient’: something 
is always coming in from the outside, and something is always going 
out. Managing what came in meant ‘facing social fact’ for Olson. In 
general terms, ‘Black Mountain was always being fought for’ in the 
shape of a constant battle to recruit students in competition with more 
conventional, accrediting schools (the issue of whether the college could 
or should award degrees was a constant one under Olson’s leadership).98 
The ‘social fact’ extended, however, far beyond Black Mountain’s place 
in the educational economy of the US. The phrase is used by Olson 
in a faculty meeting on 21 November 1951, where he discusses his 
visits to black schools, which are ‘alert’ and sympathetic to what Black 
Mountain has to say but nonetheless do not send students to the insti-
tution.99 As the detailed minutes show, this problem leads to a lengthy 
discussion of Black Mountain’s entire curriculum, teaching method, 
admissions policy and public image. Olson’s point, almost unanimously 
repudiated by others according to the minutes, was that it is a virtue to 
cater to the ‘marginal area’ since such areas are often at the centre of 
a nation’s hidden history. The question of ‘breaking the egg of history’ 
here literally means getting outsiders in in a clear political sense.100 It 
hardly needs mentioning that the admission, let alone the active solicita-
tion, of black students was no small gesture to make in a Southern state 
at the time. The college, that is, may have sealed itself in a different time 
zone to the rest of North Carolina,101 but the marginal constituencies to 
which it often appealed were part of a wider struggle and a wider ‘trafic 
of human society’ to which it was uniquely open. The active engage-
ment with this trafic is what Olson has in mind when he says, again 
distinguishing the college from other institutions, ‘Black Mountain was 
always being fought for’.102
How Olson looked outward from Black Mountain’s 600-acre plot of 
land, or the ‘struggle to make Black Mountain a community in the social, 
purposeful sense’, is in some ways much simpler.103 For its tiny enrol-
ment Black Mountain produced a truly prodigious quantity of talent in 
the arts, with students including Robert Rauschenberg, Cy Twombly, 
John Wieners, Jonathan Williams and Ed Dorn. Black Mountain’s ema-
nations cannot, however, be accounted for by merely what individual 
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at the time is more instructive. When Olson was writing ‘As the Dead 
Prey Upon Us’ and The Special View of History Black Mountain was 
in serious inancial straits, and would very soon close, leaving Olson 
responsible for winding up the institution. It is oddly at this point that 
Olson proposes a monumental expansion the ‘spontaneous, irregular, 
guerrilla forms’ he had recommended to Cid Corman in 1950 at the 
college.105 Going far beyond previous public faces of the college (Black 
Mountain Review, Corman’s Origin and Olson’s lecture tours, as well 
as abortive attempts to put Black Mountain on TV, to create a Black 
Mountain Theatre in San Francisco, and publish anthologies such as 
Black Mountain Poems), Olson has two plans.106
The irst is for a Black Mountain ‘caravan’, where Olson would use 
money from the sale of the college’s remaining assets (estimated at 
$45,000) for a travelling road show, surely inspired by All Men Are 
Brothers, bringing an ‘Institute in Pre-Homeric Texts and Literature’ to 
people around the nation. These plans were shot down by the lawyer in 
charge of the college’s winding up. Olson had a second, even more ambi-
tious plan, however, which sought to rescue the college by making it ten 
times bigger and more ambitious. ‘The Corporation of Black Mountain 
College’ is at once a transliteration of Olson’s intellectual concerns into 
an educational organisation and an explosion, graphically conveyed 
in Figure 1, of the college itself. The proposed corporation would not 
only have extended Black Mountain’s activities to incorporate the 
breadth of the US, with operations in New York, San Francisco, Boston, 
Philadelphia and North Carolina: it would have turned the college into 
a fully ledged machine of liberal arts education with its own theatre, 
magazine, multiple academies, publishing house and celebrity advisory 
council encompassing almost all disciplines bar mathematics. If Olson’s 
life work was ‘to centralise cultural expression from an institutionally 
peripheral position’, as Robert von Hallberg’s study of Olson asserts, 
this is the diagram that reveals it.107 The project attempts to break 
the egg of history, disciplinarity and indeed Black Mountain itself. Its 
goals, snuffed out because of the near-insanity of the project at a time 
the college was all but insolvent, would ultimately be realised in The 
Maximus Poems, for which Olson might have drawn a similar diagram. 
What is decisive, and distinctive about Olson as a poet, is the concern 
that cultural activity, and writing speciically, go beyond the word, 
become extra-literary. This was the observation Michael Boughn made, 
learning under Olson at Buffalo in 1963:
All this work was implicated in a move away from what we think of as the 
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. . . The literary . . . as an institution, as institutionalized practices. Crucial to 
Olson’s sense of a move beyond or around the literary is his notion that it’s 
possible to reconnect with or recover energies that pre-exist their historical 
institutionalization into a speciic, ixed grammar of social practices. And 
even more importantly, that to do that, to push one’s self toward that connec-
tion, is to disrupt or alter that grammar, a profoundly political act.108
What Black Mountain and the texts Olson produced were marginal to 
was the institution of literariness, in its most quotidian sense, because 
Olson saw that celebrated institution as in itself marginal to political 
constitution and real knowledge.
Black Mountain was ‘a live society’ because it was self-constituted and 
self-constituting, a radical present in which institution and community 
were commensurate, in contradistinction to the ‘absentee ownership’ 
Olson felt was eroding political agency everywhere. It was also, more 
than this, a polis able to project beyond itself, to operate as a catalyst 
constituencies might pass through and into ‘the nation’. Undoubtedly in 
both interrelated projects Olson becomes something quite different to 
Figure 1 Charles Olson, ‘Plan for the Corporation of Black Mountain 
College After 1956’, c. 1954, Charles Olson Research Collection, 
Archives & Special Collections at the Thomas J. Dodd Research 
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the ‘ward and precinct man’ he had been in his previous career, and this 
was undoubtedly a loss to electoral politics. Equally, however, to ‘break 
of the egg’ of history was never an attempt to transcend social forces, 
and Olson never became the opposite of the political man he once was. 
His was rather an ambitious negation of a particular kind of history, 
mechanical and cog-like, a negation that afirmed and projected – in 
poems, in ideas, in institutions – into a future, imagining a polis where 
society might be constituted by its subjects. As Olson himself put it, the 
issue was always ‘the degree to which the projective involves a stance 
toward reality outside a poem as well as a new stance toward the reality 

































Husky phlegm and spoken 
lonesomeness: poetry against the 
Vietnam War
Olson’s positioning as a political poet was rare in the 1950s, even 
within the burgeoning avant-garde renaissance that became known as 
the New American Poetry. Events in Vietnam in the 1960s, however, at 
once a culmination of post-war foreign policy and a shock to the system 
of the body politic, would soon change attitudes to artistic political 
commitment. Olson’s convictions on these issues would turn out to be 
prescient of what many Americans came to feel Vietnam represented: 
that US post-war internationalism was an imperial force all along. 
Nonetheless, the attempt by poets to work out a relationship with US 
imperialism in the wake of the war was a famously troubled episode. 
On the one hand, the uncritical patriotism implicit in Donald Allen’s 
description in The New American Poetry of ‘our avant-garde’ no longer 
held water, but on the other the nature of the distance from the nation 
threatened to alienate poets from politics altogether. The late sixties’ 
various enthusiasms for and disillusionments with politically detached 
and politically committed poetry raised questions about the priorities 
of the only recently rebegun experimental project in American poetry, 
making the event central for evaluating the post-war response of avant-
garde aesthetics to political crisis. Evaluations of the period have tended 
to focus on the splitting effect the war had on poetics, and the damage 
a polarised poetic community did to poets’ critical thinking about 
poetry’s public function. Though antagonism was undoubtedly keenly 
felt, and a dominant note in arguments as they unfolded, I want also to 
explore here how apparently irreconcilable differences were exacerbated 
by agreement. That is, avant-garde poetry’s response to Vietnam can 
show us the often uninterrogated premises on which argument about 
political poetry took place, such as the opposition between individual 
conscience and realpolitik, at a certain point in the history of vanguard 
poetics (and possibly its endpoint). I will begin by setting the scene of 
































 92    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
understanding their  limitations and possibilities, Denise Levertov and 
Allen Ginsberg.
1 Inside the psyche: some trends in poetry against the war
By the late sixties, poetry had a readership it had not seen since the 
Depression and was increasingly audible in public life. James Sullivan 
claims that ‘the proliferation of poetry in all formats’ showed a popu-
lation ‘writing and reading poems [as] an appropriate way to explore 
their own relation to the historical moment’ – a claim supported by the 
concordant growth of poetry book and magazine sales and the explo-
sion of anti-war poetry production, publicity and grassroots dissemi-
nation.1 Audiences for poetry ‘increased astonishingly’ in the period, 
according to Robert von Hallberg.2 Subscriptions to Poetry increased 
by 50 per cent from 1961 to 1969, as Robert Lowell adorned the cover 
of Time magazine and Allen Ginsberg appeared on prime-time network 
TV. Winning Hearts and Minds, meanwhile, an anthology of anti-war 
verse among dozens of others, inding itself rejected by major publishing 
irms, sold 20,000 copies at rallies and meetings under an independent 
imprint before being picked up by McGraw-Hill in 1972.3 This atmos-
phere, combined with the fact that American poets were almost univer-
sally opposed to the war, fostered a new conidence in poetry’s power as 
a radical force. ‘Poetry is a matter of life and death,’ announced Daryl 
Hine, editor of Poetry, in his 1972 call for poems for a special Vietnam 
issue of the magazine.4
If individual igures did not agree on the particular tactics by which 
the power of poetry was to be exploited, almost all poets were convinced 
that poetry was opposed to the war by its very nature. In 1966–7, for 
example, when John Ashbery and Louis Simpson argued vehemently 
about committed writing in the pages of The Nation, they were in agree-
ment on the essentially emancipatory nature of poetry ‘itself’. Ashbery, 
writing of Frank O’Hara shortly after his death, lauded his friend’s 
poetry for its uncommitted power. Though requiring ‘no further justii-
cation’, O’Hara’s work ‘incites one to all the programs of commitment 
as well as to every other form of self-realization’ for Ashbery.5 Simpson 
attacked such ‘commitment’ as vacant and a betrayal of poetry’s politi-
cal capacities, but Ashbery exonerates himself in equally politicised 
terms in reply: ‘All poetry is against war and in favour of life, or else it 
isn’t poetry.’6 Many poets were of Ashbery’s mind regarding these innate 
qualities. Denise Levertov claimed the poetic was ‘inherently revolution-
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is the bearer of Eros and love and freedom and thus the natural born 
non-violent enemy of the State.’8 Robert Bly rejected a $5,000 grant 
from the Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities because it repre-
sented an unholy alliance of poetry with war: ‘Since the Administration 
is maiming an entire nation merely to advance our national interest, I 
think it is insensitive, even indecent, for that Administration to come 
forward with money for poetry.’9 The idea of poetry as the natural 
nemesis of state power may seem quaint, and even wilfully ignorant of 
literary history, but it should be noted that poetry’s apparent natural 
energy for ighting the good ight imputed responsibility as well as 
bestowing laurels.10 The sense of the imagination’s unlimited potential 
also protected the period’s most oppositional writers from despondency 
at their cultural marginality.11 As Ashbery’s description of O’Hara sug-
gests, the New American Poetry’s strength lay in its faith in poetry as 
public expression, a faith that galvanised opposition to the moribund 
autonomous poem the post-war years had otherwise entrenched.
Before Vietnam, most poets of the avant-garde, and certainly most 
included in The New American Poetry, wrote under the sign of what 
Charles Altieri has called an ‘aesthetic of immanence’ in his study of 
sixties poetry, Enlarging the Temple. There, outlining how the avant-
garde predominantly conceived of poetry as ‘the action of disclosure 
rather than of creating order’ in opposition to the symbolist heirs of 
T. S. Eliot, Altieri typiies the philosophical convictions of the decade’s 
experimental poetry as ‘the insistence that the moment immediately and 
intensely experienced can restore one to harmony with the world and 
provide ethical and psychological renewal’.12 However, Altieri suggests 
that this aesthetic radicalism, while a challenge to the synthesising and 
orderly imagination of Middle Generation verse at the level of form, 
was as a fundamental barrier to the articulation of political content. The 
immanent aesthetic, he writes,
whose only ethical corollary is the command to let be and to recognize the 
fullness of what lies before one . . . might provide the goal for a transformed 
society, but it will not give much help in determining or propounding the 
means for creating such a society.13
The utopian poetics inherited by anti-war verse, that is, had invested in 
a certain impassiveness before the world, and as such raised problems 
for the human subject who would change rather than merely disclose it.
The dominant solution to these problems for anti-war poets was 
the igure of conscience, which carried an immanent form over to the 
ight against evil in the igure of inherent human goodness. By con-
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visions of the good behind the apparent evil of the current crisis would 
simultaneously assert moral strength. This inner light of righteousness, 
conscience, though it is religious for most writers in the 1960s, should 
not be conceived as blissfully hermitic, as in Thomas à Kempis’s ‘quiet 
conscience’ that ‘remains joyful in all troubles’: poems responding to 
Vietnam insistently present a bad conscience in the grip of guilt and psy-
chological suffering.14 Conscience does, however, assume a sovereignty 
of self that is crucial to the particular modes of political poetry the 1960s 
produced. The historical reasons for the move selfward, as it were, are 
linked to Altieri’s claims: realignments of radical politics toward self-
awareness, free thinking, and the New Left discovery that ‘the personal 
is the political’, meant that poetry came to seem uniquely suited to poli-
tics, since it had the natural ability to publicly express the private. ‘Our 
perception of politics,’ the inluential New Left organisation Students 
for a Democratic Society announced, ‘is that personal liberation is an 
integral part of the revolutionary process in twentieth century America 
–  personal liberation expressed in poetry, graphics, photography and joy 
in media.’15 The public expression of conscience was often an announce-
ment of the personal effects the very public war was having. The guilt 
felt at the private level, that is, became poetry’s domain, with the 
implicit hope that sharing guilt would lead to a collective decision to act. 
The urge to turn ‘politically’ inward, therefore, permeates the poetics of 
the era. Simpson attacked Ashbery’s position as ‘sneering at other poets’ 
consciences’, for example, and privileged self-examination as the proper 
politics of poetry: ‘[the war] may serve to change the poet profoundly, 
so that in the future their poems will be political in the way that really 
counts’.16 Bly makes similar remarks in his short essay, ‘On Political 
Poetry’ (1967), claiming: ‘what is needed to write true poems about the 
outward world is inwardness’.17 He urges poets to ‘penetrate the husk 
around their own personalities’, so that ‘once inside the psyche’ they 
may ‘speak of inward and political things with the same assurance’.18 
Denise Levertov and Robert Duncan’s famous argument about political 
poetry was constructed entirely around issues of conscience, simply of 
two different kinds, as Duncan neatly identiies: ‘the conscience to take 
up arms against the war . . . as against the conscience to stand by the 
individual life’.19
From here, the question for most poets regarded the proper way to 
project the inner light of conscience outward to actual political opposi-
tion. Expressions of conscience alone will never be a suficient condition 
for political change – as Samuel Johnson once warned: ‘No man’s con-
science can tell him the right of another man.’20 Basil Bunting’s impetu-
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at this focus on individual conscience, as though all that mattered was 
the poet’s opinion: ‘There’s not a soul who cares twopence what I or 
any other poet thinks about the war, Nixon, Wallace . . . We are entitled 
to the same voice as anybody else with a vote, no more. To claim more 
is arrogant.’21 Anti-war poetry did, however, have imaginative ways of 
extending or pushing conscience into political agency that went beyond 
a poetics of opinion. Central to these was the manoeuvre to make the 
fact of having conscience in itself an oppositional gesture that took a 
stand against in the State, near-universally portrayed as an inhuman 
machine impervious to the feelings and actions of individuals. The 
government’s own language production around Vietnam undoubtedly 
contributed to the popularity and enthusiasm for the personal qualities 
of poetry: in reaction to both sanitised oficial language and the numbed 
psychological distance it created, poetry was seen to reconnect words 
to actions and directly express emotional response, however ambitious 
and problematic these aims were. The implicit link here between the 
crisis of individual liberty and Vietnam itself, that both the noncon-
forming citizen or the non-aligned decolonising nation were opposed 
to the hegemon, should be noted but by no means taken on its own 
terms. Ambitions of interiority were in reality motivated by forces that 
preceded the war: the turn inward is also a turn away from the totalised 
State the US had become by the early sixties. The accelerated rises of the 
military–industrial complex, powerful mass media outlets like televi-
sion and the unelected professional ‘expert’ represented for many an 
increasingly centralised, non-participatory, and alienating social order.22 
Globally, increased perception of what the darling of the New Left 
Herbert Marcuse termed the ‘totally administered society’ prompted, 
among other things, a shift in the focus of radical politics away from 
wresting the power of the State and toward the immediate enactment 
of ‘alternative’ political spaces.23 Such enactments could challenge the 
fundamental forms of bourgeois politics, as was the case in France in 
1968, but they could equally seek to transcend the forces of the State 
rather than confront them.24 As far as poetry was concerned, the over-
whelming tendency was to present the nation as a monolithic and total 
force, the Other of the humane and sensitive conscience. In Bly’s poetry, 
for example, the US is the dangerous unconscious of which he and his 
fellow poets are the conscientious foil. Since the nation is the daimon 
of destructive and unbridled desire, the poet’s function is to express the 
‘more or less hidden impulses in the American psyche’.25
One danger, then, with what Philip Metres has called a poetry ‘pre-
senting itself as an oppositional image for the Big Other’ is that the poet 
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might be open to change.26 Though Bly is surely right to challenge 
the supposed novelty of the Vietnam War, he does so by lattening all 
US history into a single death drive. (Such gestures are not dissimilar 
to Vietnam ilms like Platoon and Apocalypse Now, where history is 
equally in the shadow of metaphysics.) That the Vietnam War repre-
sented a legitimation crisis for US political forms was generally unno-
ticed by poets constructing apocalyptic visions of the nation itself as 
mad, violent and bent on destruction. The two are not, of course, nec-
essarily mutually exclusive, and often prophecies of American destiny, 
such as Bly’s ‘The Mother Teeth Naked At Last’ (1970), are coupled 
with the imaginative analysis of actual political actions.27 Aggregating 
an irresistible, supernatural force is always a danger for political poetry, 
however, creating a conlict between what needs to be done and what 
can be done in response. Duncan’s poem ‘Up/Rising’ (1968), a Jeremiad 
he describes as ‘visionary’, is remarkable for holding these tensions in 
balance:
. . . the omnipotent wings, the all-American boy in the cock-pit
    loosing his low of napalm, below in the jungles
    ‘any life at all or sign of life’ his target, drawing now
        not with crayons in his secret room
the burning of homes and the torture of mothers and fathers and children,
    their hair a-lame, screaming in agony, but
in the line of duty, for the might and enduring fame
    of Johnson, for the victory of American will over its victims,
    releasing his store of destruction over the enemy . . .28
The rhetoric here disintegrates as it echoes contemporary political false-
hood, with long lines accumulating frustration and hysteria through 
rhythmic breathlessness. The disintegration of the form, the visionary 
excess, emerges from the poem’s destructive content. Duncan, however, 
conceives of this disjunction as manifesting a universal state of being, 
as he tells Levertov: ‘“Up/Rising” is not [your] kind of witness; for it 
ultimately belongs to the reality of that poem and a vision of Man.’29 
Read as a vision of man’s dualistic forces of contention, the ‘black bile 
of old evils’ versus ‘our sense of our common humanity’, the poem 
hardly allows for the possibility of change.30 In other words, the ‘crises 
of meaning’ Duncan’s poem so powerfully stages are presented as an 
eternal and universal state of being.31 Duncan’s three-phase schema for 
the poem outlines this dynamic in detail: ‘actual experience of the war 
. . .; projective level] the deep lying inner need to destroy the world by 
ire; myth] Jehovah’s destruction of cities by ire. The destruction of 
the Egyptians . . .’.32 The self-destructive rhetoric of the poem, that is, 
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latent force in mankind or even the universe itself. Those who would 
stop the war have little place in such a narrative, as Duncan notes else-
where: ‘I feel that revolution, politics, making history is one of the great 
falsehoods.’33 (In this, Duncan rightly notes ‘crucial incompatibilities 
between Olson’s poetics and view of myth and cosmos and my own’.34) 
Crises in speech, therefore, though singularly brought to the fore by 
Duncan’s détournement of government rhetoric, are a window onto a 
timeless cosmos. As Duncan put it in the preface to Bending the Bow: 
‘In the War now I make / a Celestial Cave.’35 Disjunction is itself the 
spiritual essence, and so Duncan’s realisation of crisis, one of the most 
compelling of the war, is of its inevitability. One can obviously look 
beyond Duncan’s intentions in reading his anti-war poems, which are 
extraordinary admonishments to change: my point is that conceptions 
of the nation as evil but irresistable inform an important strain in poetry 
against the war.
Without Duncan’s ability to articulate strife in poetic form, some of 
the worst anti-war poetry can seem to be against power itself, oppos-
ing the war through a kind of paciism of the mind. In such work, if 
the whole nation is marching into the ire, the best the poet and reader 
can do is prepare a clear conscience. More generally, the tendency of 
poetry against US foreign policy in the 1960s is toward rejection rather 
than confrontation. Again, the two are not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive, but they do require work to resolve their natural tensions. In what 
follows I will explore Levertov as exemplary of the attempt to maintain 
conscience through visionary imagination as the war was undermining 
poetic vision itself, before analysing Ginsberg’s 1966 poem Wichita 
Vortex Sutra as a quite different, prophetic performance of the vision-
ary, in which transcendent fantasy and the will to change weld.
2 ‘In the service of the transcendent’: Denise Levertov’s 
vision
Before the Vietnam War, Denise Levertov was a well-known poet of the 
visionary. Her deft but revelatory poems depended for their success on 
lyric completion and wonderment in repose. Levertov’s early lyrics were, 
as James Mersmann put it, ‘balanced and whole’ because their vision 
found ‘a stable centre’ beneath impermanent surfaces: ‘the eye that 
inds the poetry inside the lux is sane and conident’.36 Levertov thinks 
through the visionary in her conception of ‘organic form’, in which the 
poet seeks out the ‘inherent, though not immediately apparent, form’ 
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encompass a process of revelation, of the poet’s consciousness of imma-
nent value being disclosed. Indeed, her revision of the Creeley/Olson 
mantra that ‘Form is never more than an extension of content’ with 
‘Form is never more than a revelation of content’, makes the visionary 
function of her work explicit.38 The extent to which revelation is at odds 
with a transformative political programme deines Levertov’s struggle to 
bring this aesthetic to a political poetry. She would eventually reconcile 
the two in a religious sensibility, as she claimed later:
an avowal of Christian faith is not incompatible with my aesthetic nor with 
my political stance, since as an artist I was already in the service of the trans-
cendent, and since Christian ethics (however betrayed in past and present 
history) uphold the same values I seek in a political of racial and economic 
justice and nonviolence.39
Such a resolution was easier to formulate after Vietnam, and for the 
most part wrongly implies a visionary inality in her responses to the 
war. However, the structure of transcendence, of the poem as a vehicle 
for another world, is at the centre of Levertov’s ‘political stances’ in 
poetry. I want to claim the war disintegrates Levertov’s organic form, 
as political crisis is dramatised through the very attempt to attain 
transcendence.
At times Levertov’s political visionary mode, her ‘response to crisis . . . 
unparalleled in all history’ as she called it, is maudlin and self- defeating, 
and supports Ron Silliman’s claim that she ‘sabotaged her writing and 
her political credibility simultaneously’ in poetry fundamentally at 
odds with the radical political action she pursued outside of it.40 ‘What 
Were They Like?’, for example, is a classic of idealised and impassive 
Vietnamese victimhood. In dialogic form, the poem asks and answers 
six questions – below are the replies to ‘4) Did they use bone and ivory, / 
jade and silver, for ornament?’, ‘5) Had they an epic poem?’ and ‘6) Did 
they distinguish between speech and singing?’:
4) A dream ago, perhaps, Ornament is for joy.
All the bones were charred.
5) It is not remembered. Remember,
most were peasants; their life
was in rice and bamboo.
When peaceful clouds were relected in the paddies
and the water buffalo stepped surely along terraces,
maybe fathers told their sons old tales.
When bombs smashed those mirrors
there was time only to scream.
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of their speech which was like a song.
It was reported their singing resembled
the light of moths in moonlight.
Who can say? It is silent now.41
The Vietnamese are a simple specimen here: pastoral, idyllic and 
without history, agency or subjecthood. Since ‘fathers told their sons old 
tales’, ‘their life / was in rice and bamboo’, and ‘their singing resembled 
/ the light of moths in moonlight’, these Vietnamese are ‘peaceful’ but 
helplessly doomed to oblivion. Both the inhuman force of the imperial 
war machine and the Vietnamese non-subject are opposed to the poet’s 
subjectivity. Only Levertov’s voice rises from a landscape devoid of 
agency, where passive verbs dominate: ‘the children were killed’, ‘the 
bones were charred’. The political objective of such a poem is unclear at 
best. Readers are to mourn the demise of this culture, but in order to do 
so must resign themselves to its inevitability. ‘What Were They Like?’ is 
prophetic in a Calvinistic sense, imagining a predetermined misfortune 
that can only be elegised. Levertov’s hope may be that mourning will 
give rise to opposition, but the fundamental naturalness and indeed 
natural beauty the poem celebrates can only represent the Vietnamese 
and what they endure into manifestations of an immanent order in 
which their self-determination is denied.
‘What Were They Like?’ is notable, however, as an attempt to break 
free, formally, of the moorings of the short, epiphanic lyric. Levertov’s 
clunky Q&A necessarily fragments an otherwise meditational form. 
The poem fails in this case because its answers are so clear-voiced and 
patronising: there is no tension qualifying the poet’s authority, which 
conducts a catechism for the reader rather than any self-interrogation. 
Levertov’s most compelling work sees the poet questioning herself and 
the form of her expression. The starting point of her much-maligned 
‘personal’ focus is a conception of political activism as a disruption of 
the self, a painful sacriice of individuality. Echoing the period’s direc-
tives for an inward-looking political poetry, Levertov repeatedly quotes 
Ibsen in these years: ‘The task of the poet is to make clear to himself, 
and thereby to others, the temporal and eternal questions.’42 The politi-
cal agent for Levertov is sovereign but compromised, vulnerable and in 
pain; the private individual is ‘smashed’ in political struggle, occasioning 
panicked attempts to reconstruct the self. Duncan felt Levertov needed 
reconstruction as a result of her damaging political commitment because 
his internalising of the war demanded poise: ‘We are not reacting to 
the war,’ Duncan wrote to her, ‘but mining images the war arouses in 
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‘mine’ and bring to light what she called ‘man’s potential, his capacity 
for goodness . . . however fallen into corruption’, but that what her best 
anti-war poetry actually reveals is the unavailability of the grounding 
necessary to access such foundational energies, a still place from which 
to look behind political actions in which she felt herself responsible and 
called upon to act.44 Levertov, I want to claim, seeks but openly fails 
to attain the grounding required for ‘mining’. This fact may occasion 
failures on the poetry’s own terms, but nonetheless accounts for the 
considerable interest readers concerned with political poetry have taken 
in her work.
What Levertov stages, then, is the attempt of the subject, straining at 
full stretch, to maintain poise and balance, and its failure to do so – the 
poet, as it were, constantly struggling against a limbo state. Describing 
Levertov’s work as Romantic in these respects is correct but insuf-
icient. If ‘the task of the poet is to make clear to himself, and thereby 
to others, the temporal and eternal questions’, then Levertov’s poetry 
failed, but the evidence in the poetry is that she was acutely conscious of 
this failure. Hers is an experiment testifying the truth of Cary Nelson’s 
description of unsuccessful anti-war poetry that ‘tends to delect all 
attention from the external event back to the poet’s essentially romantic 
imagination [when] what the war called into question, for poetry, was 
precisely the ability of language to transcend anything’.45 Levertov’s best 
anti-war poetry shows a Romantic imagination denied transcendence in 
what Laura Quinney has called a ‘poetics of disappointment’: a ‘bleak 
version of Romanticism’ in which the poet’s subjectivity demands unity 
but incessantly loats unredeemed.46 Unlike what Quinney calls disillu-
sionment, which ‘still harbors some degree of pride and a respect for the 
intellect’, disappointment is indeterminate, unmoored. Disillusionment, 
in ‘proceeding rather than progressing’, is tied up with a certain accept-
ance of an otherwise irresolvable disappointment, an ability to move 
on and accommodate ‘a newfound acquaintance with the truth’.47 
Disillusionment is Levertov’s ambition, and what Duncan arrived at in 
conining his anti-war politics to wearing a black armband, but disap-
pointment is the fact of her poems.48
The war constantly introduces disequilibrium to Levertov’s habitual 
poetic form, the short lyric of revelation and completion. ‘Life at War’ 
is an example of a Levertov poem that earnestly seeks, and indeed 
demands in its poetic form, ‘a newfound acquaintance with the truth’ 
that it is nonetheless unable to attain. Here, behind the ‘gray ilth’ of the 

































Poetry Against the Vietnam War     101
the knowledge that humankind,
delicate Man, whose lesh
responds to a caress, whose eyes
are lowers that perceive the stars,
whose music excels the music of birds,
whose laughter matches the laughter of dogs,
whose understanding manifests designs
fairer than the spider’s most intricate web,
still turns without surprise, with mere regret
to the scheduled breaking open of breasts . . .49
Here, in the middle of the poem, lies the danger Levertov constantly 
lirts with in her anti-war verse, as formal clarity and stillness threaten 
to undermine the conviction that Vietnam, ‘rolling in the brain like 
pebbles’, has made expression and understanding problematic. The 
discovery of innate human virtue is intended to show that redemption 
is possible from the war, but the danger is that it redeems the war itself. 
The poised tone in these lines can seem unreconstructed from her early 
work’s wonderment at the natural world. The difference, however, is 
that ‘the knowledge’ here is constantly interrupted by the horror of the 
war. The poem’s ending proves that Levertov only temporarily bars dis-
composure from the poetic form, whatever the tenacity with which the 
poem tries to keep it permanently at bay.
In this ending Levertov contends with the fact that the poem’s func-
tion as revelation relies on the now doubtful belief in goodness behind 
evil. Committed to a poetics of unveiling, that is, the poem nonetheless 
confronts the war as the ‘mucous membrane of our dreams’ and a fun-
damental violence to language and lyric vision:
Yes, this is the knowledge that jostles for space
in our bodies along with all we
go on knowing of joy, of love;
our nerve ilaments twitch with its presence
day and night,
nothing we say has not the husky phlegm of it in the saying,
nothing we do has the quickness, the sureness,
the deep intelligence living at peace would have.
Revelation in epiphany, the central motif of her work, is the weapon 
Levertov wields here – but how can we read this in the context of oppo-
sition to the war? An unsympathetic reading would assert that Levertov 
may speak of a universal ‘husky phlegm’, but her own voice is above it 
































 102    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
1969 essay, ‘War and the Crisis of Language’, that ‘the language of the 
war maker is self-enclosed in inality’, and these lines come close to sug-
gesting repose in well-made form, even as they distance themselves from 
‘sureness’.50 In this reading, ‘Life at War’ fraudulently resolves political 
complexity by overcoming ambivalent feelings in poetic form. There 
is evidence for this interpretation, but a more sympathetic reading can 
be also be proposed that would attribute value to the tensions between 
open wounds and closure, confusion and inality. The failure of the 
poem, that is, can be seen as acknowledged by the poet as it unfolds. 
The focus of the lines on absence and conditionality intimates doubt, 
for example; the ending can be read as intentionally anti-climactic, 
especially in its arrhythmic and prosaic last line; the overcompensating 
insistence on decision (‘Yes, this is . . . nothing we say . . . nothing we 
do . . .’) suggests both hesitance and the need for determination. Most 
importantly, ‘Life at War’ plays on an oscillation between the expecta-
tion of rhythmic climax and the failure of the poem to fulil this expecta-
tion. The strength of the poem is that it neither surrenders to impotence 
nor assumes transcendent power. To me these inal lines know they fail, 
and represent a poem that ends in exhaustion rather than rest – that 
expresses, as it were, the form reacting against itself. In Levertov’s strug-
gle with her earlier lyric form, disappointment reigns in a manner akin 
to the crise de vers described by Giorgio Agamben:
[Some] poets seem conscious of the fact that there lies something like a 
decisive crisis for the poem, a genuine crise de vers in which the poem’s very 
identity is at stake.
Hence the often cheap and even abject quality of the end of the poem. Proust 
once observed, with reference to the last poems of Les Fleurs du Mal, that the 
poem seems to be suddenly ruined and to lose its breath (‘it stops short,’ he 
writes, ‘almost falls lat . . . despite everything, it seems that something has 
been shortened, is out of breath’).51
‘Life at War’ not only lacks the clinch of completion typical of Levertov’s 
earlier poems, it ends cheaply, ruined, expiring, enacting the crisis of 
Vietnam as a crisis of the poem itself.
That Levertov herself realised the limitations of the lyric for political 
art is clear from what she would subsequently write, the long journalistic 
suite Staying Alive (1971), her largest statement on the war. The diary 
form of the work, developed from a much shorter poem, ‘An Interim’, 
allowed Levertov ‘the opportunity to swing between extremes in diction 
. . . which short lyrics don’t give’, as she told Duncan.52 The poem raises 
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here on these extremes of diction and their role in Levertov’s reclaim-
ing of the poetic from the war, as it were. At root, then, Staying Alive is 
an attempt to consciously adulterate the lyric with externalities so that 
the poet may consciously encompass them, rather than, as in ‘Life at 
War’, articulating them in the poem’s unconscious. This is primarily an 
attempt to work through conceptually what the lyrical anti-war poems 
had demonstrated formally: the usurpation of the poem, and even 
thought and subjectivity, by the war. To this end Staying Alive includes 
slogans and other activist material, letters and accounts of historical 
events. Here the poem gestures toward a collage form, but one in which 
Levertov seeks to ‘pick out [her] own song from the uproar’ by including 
a totally different kind of material in addition.53 Alongside documentary 
passages, that is, half the work is made up of lyrics.
Compartmentalised in this way, Levertov’s lyricism ceases to question 
its own value or adapt its form to crisis. The documentary sections, that 
is, simply give Levertov more rein for relection and lights of fancy in 
the lyrics. Levertov brackets history from her lyric sensibility in order to 
rediscover the poise necessary for its epiphanies. Here is a full section, 
the last of Part I:
Again to hold—‘capture’ they say—
moments and their processions in palm
of mind’s hand.
       Have you ever,
in stream or sea
       felt the silver of ish
pass through your hand-hold? not to stop it,
block it from going onward, but feel it
move in its wave-road?
          To make
        of song a chalice
          of time,
        a communion wine.54
This is certainly more ‘poetic’ than the anti-climactic, strained quality 
of her individual anti-war lyrics, but it is also a great deal more irritat-
ing. The tone is triumphant, with victory comfortably achieved within 
the poem. The war’s tensions are resolved through poetic language as 
the poem implicitly becomes the chalice of stillness it whispers of. The 
maudlin self-satisfaction on evidence here dominates the lyrical sections 
of Staying Alive, given licence as they are to soar by the apparent com-
pensation of prosaic and ‘didactic’ verse placed around them.
Poetry and revolution, the relation between which the poem makes its 
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interdependent. This is an understanding many readers have enthusiasti-
cally come to, like José Rodríguez Herrera: ‘The poem was the place in 
and through which revolutionary convictions could be tested and fully 
realised.’55 A revolution that can be fully realised in poetry is unlikely to 
stop napalm, however, no matter how many italics you use. What this 
reading, and the poem itself, really testiies to is the separation of politics 
and poetry, compartmentalised into two ‘extremes of diction’. In the 
struggle between ‘history’ and ‘song’ that the poem stages, the inal note 
is of the triumph of poetry. Levertov’s self, ‘smashed’ in political strug-
gle, is reconstructed in poetic language: ‘Without a terrain in which, to 
which, I belong, / language itself is my one home, my Jerusalem.’56 The 
metaphor of home, of a space in which to belong, was inally neces-
sary for Levertov’s visionary transcendence. ‘To contemplate,’ Levertov 
states, ‘comes from “templum, temple, a place, a space for observation, 
marked out by an augur.” It means, not simply to observe, to regard, 
but to do these things in the presence of a god.’57 In this sense the work’s 
conception of the famous public/private dichotomy is more Robert 
Lowell than Muriel Rukeyser, to whom Levertov’s poem is surely 
indebted but whose conception of self was energised by political strug-
gle rather than suffering beneath its contingencies. The result is to divest 
Staying Alive’s otherwise interesting political thinking of potency, as in 
the inal lines of its long ‘Entr’acte’:
‘We must not be angry, we must
L-O-O-O-V-E!’ Judy Collins
bleats loud and long into the P. A. system,
but hardly anyone claps, and no one
shouts Right On.
       That silence cheers me.
Judy, understand:
there comes a time when only anger
is love.58
Too concerned with poetic balance to perform the anger they speak of, 
these lines fall a long way short of the ‘poetry of political anguish . . . 
both didactic and lyrical’ that Levertov aspired to.59 The phrase ‘Judy, 
understand’, the precious line breaks, the portentous manner in which 
the lines close a whole section, mannered verbs like ‘bleats’ and ‘cheers’ 
– all, quite intentionally, sacriice anger for lyric deftness. Set against, 
for example, the self-help didacticism and ruthless charisma of her con-
temporary Diane DiPrima’s Revolutionary Letters (1971), Levertov’s 
sloganeering sounds apologetic and weak. In light of such lines, the idea 
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of such activist traditions of expression as lealets, broadsides and rally 
chants’, as one critic suggests, is patently absurd.60
The dominant tone of Staying Alive, as Levertov concedes, is elegy. 
Bly praised the work as a set of ‘private poems’, indeed as ‘more private 
than her personalist poems’.61 Levertov herself said: ‘My emphasis was 
on asking oneself the questions, internalizing them, on coming to realize 
how much the apparently external problems have their parallels within 
us.’62 In Staying Alive such an emphasis reduces historical events to The 
Human Condition and cuts conscience off from the non-poetic ener-
gies required to intervene in those events. The result is an anti-political 
poem. Indeed, Staying Alive seems the exemplary work itting the minor 
poet R. D. Rosen’s 1973 description of the ‘disengagement’ that had 
overtaken American poetry by that time:
We used to be simply against American politics; but after so much unsuccess-
ful counter-movement, we are paralyzed and forced to live outside of those 
politics. We used to write directly against the war. Now we can only get at 
the war by writing about everything else . . . A couple of years ago, poetry 
was still being exercised as a polemic against America; but now we content 
ourselves with the fact that poetry proves that at least the poet is still alive.63
The individual visionary lyric was not, then, abandoned by Levertov 
because it distorted the American citizen’s experience of the war and 
the anger it provoked, but because it was a constraint on personal tran-
scendence. If some of Levertov’s best failed lyrics of the period – ‘Life 
at War’, ‘Advent 1966’, the ‘Olga Poems’ – are her constantly disturbed 
‘Residence in France’, Staying Alive is her return to Grasmere, saddened 
perhaps, but home.
3 Spoken lonesomeness is prophecy: Ginsberg’s 
agitational elegy
Contempoary with Levertov was a quite different poetics of the vision-
ary. The writing and other activities of Allen Ginsberg do much to 
rehabilitate the visionary imagination for political ends, though in doing 
so they pose questions of the avant-garde project the 1950s had only 
recently rebegun. Since its appearance, Ginsberg’s work has been read 
in one of two ways, both unable to fully encompass its power. One half 
of Ginsberg’s commentators, both admiring and detracting, read his 
prophetic manner straight, taking the apparent ‘function of the poet 
as priestly legislator’, in Paul Carroll’s phrase, at face value.64 Here 
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reservations about his poetry, such as Altieri’s misgivings that ‘intense 
and dramatic religious emotion’ comes ‘at the cost of a considerable 
sacriice of secular intelligence’, and Paul Breslin’s worries about reli-
gious ‘surrender’ in the work and therefore ‘fatalism’ in its outlook.65 
However, another group of commentators as various as Cary Nelson, 
Helen Vendler and Marjorie Perloff have sought to recognise the ambi-
guity and irony of the Ginsberg rôle. In general these readers have found 
less to value in Ginsberg’s work of the 1960s, and have run the risk of 
emptying any afirmative statement from the work. In Perloff’s opinion, 
for example, the ‘touch of the Jewish clown in the makeup of this poet-
prophet’ sits uneasily alongside the ‘on the whole, lesser’ works of the 
1960s, since these are more directly political.66 Vendler was disappointed 
by this work because, unlike the ‘naturally elegiac’ mode of Kaddish, she 
found it to be ‘pure will power’, concluding: ‘Sadness, and not his inter-
mittent hysteria, underlies Ginsberg’s most eloquent poems.’67 Nelson, 
more thoughtfully, also overstates the anti-war work’s dramatic irony, 
asserting that Ginsberg ‘manages a gesture whose political signiicance 
is precisely its powerlessness’.68 There is some important truth in this 
claim, but it limits too much: there equally is an enthusiasm in Ginsberg, 
a belief in and demonstration of the power of the individual will that 
stands in welcome contrast to the defeatist lament that came to domi-
nate poetry about Vietnam.
Taking these two positions as starting points to explore Wichita 
Vortex Sutra we can consider anti-war poetry’s tensions of irony and 
conviction, failure and ambition, elegy and transcendence at their most 
compelling. Wichita Vortex Sutra was written in February 1966, and 
stood therefore in the vanguard of the mass anti-war movement that 
would later emerge. We can see the link between the two in the nature 
of the poem’s dissemination. Unlike Levertov’s anti-war poetry, Wichita 
Vortex Sutra was published immediately, widely and in a number of 
forms. Ginsberg performed the work in his extensive reading pro-
gramme of 1966, including a mass ‘Read-in for Peace’ at the University 
of Pennylvania in 1967, but in print the poem was disseminated even 
more rapidly. Before appearing as a City Lights pamphlet in the July of 
that year, the irst poem came out ‘to great fanfare’ in the Village Voice 
in the April, and in a variety of publications shortly after, including the 
British paciist newspaper Peace News; the widely distributed under-
ground Californian weeklies, Los Angeles Free Press and Berkeley Barb; 
Grist magazine; and the anarchist periodical Fifth Estate.69 Alongside 
this underground dissemination the poem appeared in the left-wing 
political monthly Ramparts and, excerpted, in Life magazine alongside 
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anthology Where Is Vietnam? The work also existed as a poster in more 
than one form, including as a mimeograph insert in the poetry quarterly 
Scrip. Eventually it was included in Ginsberg’s 1969 collection, Planet 
News, but had perhaps as much exposure as any poem of the 1960s even 
before this point. This publication history is important as a relection 
of what I will go on to to discuss as the poem’s mixed communicative 
modes.
Wichita Vortex Sutra is an account of driving through Kansas with 
the war from the car radio as an ideological background. Ginsberg alter-
nates between transcribing broadcasts and responding to the changing 
landscape they effectively narrate.70 In the course of this movement, 
the poem enacts a dialectical struggle between lament and triumph. 
Regarding the former, failure is implicit in the poet’s ‘lonesomeness’ 
amid the continued carnage being waged in his name in Vietnam. The 
poem grieves over how, in the face of manifest wrong, guilt has led to 
atomised impotence rather than collective opposition. The poem begins 
by contrasting the vulnerable individual to the mass machine of America: 
Ginsberg’s ‘PERSON appearing in Kansas’ inds itself in a vortex of ‘tel-
ephone radio aircraft assembly frame ammunition /  petroleum nightclub 
Newspaper streets illuminated by Bright EMPTINESS’.71 At this regis-
ter, the poem is elegiac, with the poet a ‘lone man from the void’ no less 
lonesome for the multiplicity of voices encircling him. From the jaws of 
isolation, however, Ginsberg claims communion. As the poet’s vulner-
ability and desperation for sociability build, an address of sentimental 
openness emerges:
 As Babes need the chemical touch of lesh in pink infancy
   lest they die Idiot returning to Inhuman—
                 Nothing—
So, tender lipt adolescent girl, pale youth,
            give me back my soft kiss
    Hold me in your innocent arms,
      accept my tears as yours to harvest
      equal in nature to the Wheat
     that made your bodies’ muscular bones
       broad shouldered, boy bicept—
      from leaning on cows & drinking Milk
             in Midwest Solitude—
No more fear of tenderness, much delight in weeping, ecstasy
   in singing, laughter rises that confounds72
The ‘Inhuman’ here can be triumphed over by recognising its existence 
and seeking refuge, in a gesture self-exposure and need, in the ‘innocent 
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that such weeping can be turned to singing and laughter. From here 
Ginsberg’s goes onto speculate ‘how big’ the prick of the president may 
be, a facetious attack on the logic of media images insisting on the noble 
masculinity of the war, but one that has its background in Ginsberg’s 
own vulnerable yearning to be held. Perloff’s comments are apt here: 
‘On the one hand, his sexual otherness calls into question the compla-
cent “masculinity” of the straight men who are in power. On the other, 
it is a source of vulnerability, bringing the “famous poet” down to the 
reader’s level.’73 Fears of isolation create a connection with ‘tender 
fellows’ who all have such loneliness in common: ‘What if I sang, and 
loosed the chords of fear brow? / What exquisite noise wd / shiver my 
car companions?’74 In this, the poem predicts George Oppen’s seminal 
1968 poem, Of Being Numerous, which likewise clings to the paradoxi-
cally ‘bright light of shipwreck’ for its sense of community.75
The poem does not stop at sorrow and vulnerability, however. At its 
point of most despondency, Wichita Vortex Sutra starts to accumulate 
potency in spite of itself:
I’m an old man now, and a lonesome man in Kansas
   but not afraid
       to speak my lonesomeness in a car,
       because not only my lonesomeness
          it’s Ours, all over America,
                O tender fellows—
          & spoken lonesomeness is Prophecy
          in the moon 100 years ago or in
            the middle of Kansas now.
It’s not the vast plains mute our mouths
          that ill at midnite with ecstatic language
       when our trembling bodies hold each other
          breast to breast on a mattress—
   Not the empty sky that hides
           the feeling from our faces
   nor our skirts and trousers that conceal
       the bodylove emanating in a glow of beloved skin,
          white smooth abdomen down to the hair
                 between our legs,
   It’s not a God that bore us that forbid
       our Being, like a sunny rose
           all red with naked joy
       between our eyes & bellies, yes
All we do is for this frightened thing
       we call Love, want and lack—
   fear that we aren’t the one whose body could be
       beloved of all the brides of Kansas City,
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   O but how many in their solitude weep aloud like me—
       On the bridge over Republican River
          almost in tears to know
             how to speak the right language—76
At its simplest, the poem’s rhetoric of naked sincerity is intended as an 
alternative for the relexive duplicity of politicians ‘speaking language’. 
Why, though, does Ginsberg claim that such ‘spoken lonesomeness’ is 
also an act of ‘Prophecy’? Relevant here is Ginsberg’s ‘frightened thing / 
we call Love, want and lack’, which carries an uneasy double meaning: 
we call on Love because we want and lack it, but also want and lack 
have become synonymous with Love in the current ‘frightened’ state 
of affairs. Spoken lonesomeness is prophecy because it invites us to ill 
this lack, and therefore opens into a future collective project. Ginsberg 
does not fall back on the comfortable thought that alienation, like the 
war itself, is an irrevocable consequence of modern social life. It is not, 
he writes, ‘the empty sky that hides / the feeling from our faces’ – ‘not 
a God’ that is to blame, but ourselves. Wichita Vortex Sutra persuades 
through the beauty of its enthusiasm, not the resignation of its elegy. 
‘[L]ike a sunny rose / all red with naked joy’, the poem strains in full view 
to transcend the lonesomeness of current political violence into a shared 
beauty. What is remarkable about these utopian imaginings is how they 
remain in suspension, held at arm’s length, as it were between poet and 
audience as a possibility and invitation to realise them. Insisting on these 
images as fantasies, the poem refuses to allow its own suficiency as a 
political act: Ginsberg is still, even as he proclaims his work as prophecy, 
‘almost in tears to know / how to speak the right language’. The poem 
strains toward visionary potency only to erase itself as a speech act, 
becoming in the failure but beauty of its dreams a motivational form 
agitating for their realisation outside the poem. As Ginsberg’s friend 
Richard Howard wrote, his are ‘prophetic books, then, in that they will 
attain the existence they seek only after the poet leaves off’.77
It is this utopian suspension that should frame the most famous part 
of the poem, Ginsberg’s announcement of the end of the war. Here, 
having called ‘all Powers of imagination’, Ginsberg concludes a lengthy 
run of clauses awaiting syntactic completion with this ecstatic release of 
energy:
Sacred Heart my Christ acceptable
      Allah the Compassionate One
            Jaweh Righteous One
        all Knowledge-Princes of Earth-man, all
































 110    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
        & holymen I chant to—
           Come to my lone presence
             into this Vortex named Kansas,
I lift my voice aloud,
   make Mantra of American language now,
       I here declare the end of the War!
          Ancient days’ Illusion!—
     and pronounce words beginning my own millennium.
Let the States tremble,
   let the Nation weep,
      let Congress execute its own delight—
this Act done by my own voice,
            nameless Mystery—
published to my own senses,
          blissfully received by my own form
   approved with pleasure by my sensations
      manifestation of my very thought
      accomplished in my own imagination
          all realms within my consciousness fulilled
   60 miles from Wichita78
Taken literally, these lines might be construed as the escapist bombast 
many readers feel Ginsberg typiies. The total music of the poem, 
however, of which this announcement is the crescendo, tells quite a dif-
ferent story. These lines are palpably not a declaration of the end of the 
war, but an indication that such a declaration might be possible if we 
take proper responsibility. Admitting that our ‘own Being’ as Americans 
is of a ‘land which gave right of way / to the massing of metal meant 
for explosion in Indochina’, the poem is not a plea to those in power or 
our better Christian selves, but a manifestation of self-suficiency latent 
not in the poem but the constituency that hears or reads it: this is the 
site where Ginsberg’s fragile utopian imaginings may be brought into 
being. The gamble of Wichita Vortex Sutra is to fantasise an alternate 
reality in the face of the war. Ginsberg performs in language what might 
be made to happen in fact, but this transcendence is never presented as 
a victory, only a possibility. Ginsberg’s ‘declaration’ is, in its obvious 
excess, essentially a test of oneself – as he claimed:
[The government’s] mantras are black mantras, so to speak. They pronounce 
[war] and then they sign a piece of paper, of other words, and a hundred 
thousand soldiers go across the ocean. So I pronounce my word, and so the 
point is how strong is my word.79
For Ginsberg, the poet’s job is to test alternatives, not alone with his 
lyric conscience or in a temple of contemplation, but with those to 
































Poetry Against the Vietnam War     111
ernmental speech acts.80 His poem lacks the tone of homily dominant in 
Levertov’s Staying Alive because it has the daring to propose.
Though going beyond an elegiac mode that has already admitted defeat, 
Ginsberg’s utopian imagining of other orders is nonetheless rooted in the 
‘Vietnam vortex’ of its emergence. In this sense, his Vietnam sutra echoes 
perhaps his most beautiful short poem, ‘Sunlower Sutra’ (1955), where 
the eponymous lower emerges from the ‘smut and smog’ of the tincan 
banana dock in a transcendent vision that is not a transport to an other-
worldly bliss but an intensiication of dirty social reality. This is a state 
of affairs even the harshest critics of Ginsberg’s quasi-religiosity observe, 
as in Theodore Roszak’s description of ‘a mysticism neither escapist nor 
ascetic’.81 Ginsberg does not merely dramatise defeat, but neither does he 
congratulate himself in an easy poetic transcendence of political struggle. 
As Michael Davidson says of Wichita Vortex Sutra: ‘Prophecy no longer 
emanates from some inner visionary moment but from a voice that has 
recognized its inscription within an electronic environment, a voice that 
has seized the means of reproduction and adapted it to oppositional 
ends.’82 Signiicantly, the poem does not end at his famous ‘declaration’, 
but continues to play off utopian imaginings against the grim reality of 
the ‘military fear factory’ for some pages. Indeed, insistences that ‘The 
war was over several hours ago!’ are made to sound desperate as they 
are heard alongside news that ‘the Marines killed 256 Vietcong captured 
31’.83 To the end of the poem, the war rightly overshadows the utopian 
possibilities that are a response to it.
Wichita Vortex Sutra can help us mark the watershed moment the 
late sixties was for the concept of a post-war American avant-garde. An 
inluential strain of critique posits Ginsberg as a writer whose avant-
garde credentials hid a politics complicit with the system it opposed. For 
Mark Silverberg Ginsberg is, in effect, only quixotically avant-garde, 
since he fought ‘black mantras’ on the same ground as the establish-
ment, a position he opposes to the ‘neo-avant-gardism’ of the New York 
School:
[M]ostly, all Ginsberg’s howlings made were more promotional opportuni-
ties, more money for Moloch, more meat for the pavement . . . This dynamic, 
the spectacle of Ginsberg’s recuperation, puts paid to the delusion . . . In fact, 
Ginsberg’s giving his all, sticking it to America, is what made him something 
and someone: a celebrated posterboy for radical hip. In place of avant-gardist 
or modernist antagonism, the New York School poets produced what I have 
called a poetics of indifference.84
I cannot agree. Silverberg is quite right to claim that avant-garde strate-
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on any oppositional stance in post-war culture at all. The neo-avant-
garde, according to him, more meaningfully negates the entire terms 
of the argument with indifference, but this was precisely the argument 
Ashbery made in 1966 when, even in that period’s enthusiasm for the 
unaligned imagination, its unsatisfying equation of artistic and political 
freedom was recognised. It seems correct that Ginsberg’s activities in the 
1960s cannot qualify as avant-garde, entering the culture’s realpolitik 
as they do. What Ginsberg shows, however, is that it is Silverberg’s 
political apolitical, the mid-century politics of refusal, that represents 
the true attempt to apply a modernist sense of vanguardism to a social 
world to which its gestures are no longer effective. I want to argue inally 
that Ginsberg, putting his queer shoulder to the wheel, to quote his 
great poem ‘America’ (1956), creates a poetic space in which language 
can serve a purpose, instituting an anti-modernist instrumentalism and 
inhabiting a queer space of radical alterity.
A key aspect of Ginsberg’s queer shouldering concerns address, and 
within this a rejection of the coterie poetics dominant in the 1950s. 
Paul Goodman’s 1951 essay, ‘Advance-Guard Writing, 1900–1950’, 
had inluentially promoted the notion of an avant-garde grouping as ‘a 
small community’ in which the alienation of American Cold War culture 
might be evaded:
The essential present-day advance-guard is the physical re-establishment of 
community. This is to solve the crisis of alienation in the simple way: the 
persons are estranged from themselves, from one another, and from their 
artist; he takes the initiative precisely by putting his arms around them and 
drawing them together. In literary terms this means: to write for them about 
them personally . . .85
In the ifties, of course, such literary avant-gardes were already bur-
geoning in Berkeley, Black Mountain, New York and elsewhere. There 
can be no doubt that a key success of these avant-gardes was the 
way their mutual support structures, collaborative atmospheres and 
self- publishing activities fostered a robust and dynamic set of artistic 
practices. Goodman, however, saw such community as only a irst 
step toward universal forms of liberation. The process toward a more 
‘intimate’ society, he said, should only be seen as ‘starting with the art-
ist’s primary friends’.86 One did not create a coterie merely to ensconce 
oneself from the hostile outside world, but as a grounding from which 
to overcome hostility in society. Many groupings of the New American 
Poetry vary in their placing between these two positions. As I have 
mentioned, Black Mountain under Olson had precisely the projective 
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on the other hand, was more insular and protective of its existing group 
identity, making up what Michael Davidson, quoting Duncan, has aptly 
called a ‘fraternity of despair’.87
What coterie meant for aesthetics is complex, but it can be sketched 
here. The death of the avant-garde had been heralded by American cul-
tural commentators before Vietnam.88 The absorption of avant-garde 
art into institutions, commodity culture and indeed Cold War policy in 
the 1960s, along with the burgeoning respectability of the word (being 
‘avant-garde’, however misunderstood, become a corporate buzzword), 
is by now well known. However, the term continued to frame the prac-
tice of many artists, especially those who saw in avant-garde ubiquity 
further evidence of its power. Coterie was responsive to this in that it 
made no attempt to attack institutions that the avant-garde had taken 
over and had in turn been taken over by. It was, rather, better suited to 
extend the other half of the avant-garde project, the subsumption of art 
into life. In this, an emphasis was placed on accepting the world as it 
was, instituting an organic art moulded around the world as it existed 
rather than constructing symbolic orders to constrain it. This strategy 
was political in different ways: in Susan Sontag’s anti-hermeneutical 
‘Against Interpretation’ it aimed to release the sensuality and energy 
inhering in aesthetic form; in John Cage’s insistence on a shift ‘from 
making to accepting’ the priority was a heightened attention to the 
everyday world.89 By the time of the Vietnam War, however, in their 
diffuseness and emphasis on acceptance, such projects were inadequate 
as a response to the repressions of increasingly concrete and identiiable 
political enemies. Exercises in sensual liberation, simply translated to 
anti-war activity, became the equally personal and nebulous ‘conscious-
ness raising’ of the counterculture. The central conclusion of anti-war 
verse was that politics could no longer rely on avant-garde immanence. 
A society that had absorbed avant-garde’s historically subversive ges-
tures but that nonetheless continued to pursue the imperialist goals 
of the pre-war period could hardly be responded to with more urinals 
dressed up as ine artworks. A new source of political expression was 
required and, in the event, sought.
Ginsberg’s position within anti-war poetry’s twin inheritances, coterie 
aesthetics and art’s reintegration into life – must be sought in an aban-
donment of core avant-garde principles – an abandonment Wichita 
Vortex Sutra has in common with the other great political poems of 
the late sixties by George Oppen, Adrienne Rich and Amiri Baraka, 
the last of whom I will examine in the next chapter. My reading of the 
poem has described a poetic form at once porous, in the tradition of 
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 appreciating the world as it is. I have positioned Ginsberg at the centre 
of a sensibility moving from the self-defence of conscience to the projec-
tive art of political agitation. As the crisis of the Vietnam War brought 
the relevance of merely speaking to one’s friends into question, Ginsberg 
wrote Wichita Vortex Sutra in an adulterated form open to ‘life’ and the 
mediated discourses of the present, exploiting political rhetoric to seek 
an alternative future.90 These moves are all manifestations of a hybridity 
that went against the grain of an increasing tendency to specialisation in 
American avant-garde poetry, its growing desire to see politics as inher-
ing in poeticness itself. (This is a trend, I will suggest in Chapter 6, that 
comes to fulilment in Language writing.) Ginsberg institutes a hybrid 
aesthetic that ensures lyric imagination and political utterance coexist: 
where we overhear Levertov’s private thoughts, Ginsberg institutes a 
properly public address. The triumph of that address is that it at once 
secures political commitment and denies itself domineering authority. 
Ginsberg’s ‘lonesomeness’, and the vulnerability of his political state-
ments, make sure of this. Wichita Vortex Sutra’s question, ‘How little 
the prince of the FBI, unmarried all these years!’, would sound like 
homophobic political mudslinging from the mouth of a politician; from 
the homosexual Ginsberg it is an attack but also an invitation into the 
fold of honesty and love, extended even to J. Edgar Hoover. Both nee-
dling and tender, the form here and throughout Wichita Vortex Sutra 
uniies subjective concerns regarding the limitations of lyric voice with 
the rhetorical expression of public desire. With the religious and occult 
inlection such a move assumes in Ginsberg’s later career, the poetry 
becomes less compelling, and less vatic. For the crisis Americans faced in 
the course of the Vietnam War, however, Ginsberg’s politicised lament 

































‘You can be the music yourself’:  
Amiri Baraka’s attitudes, 1974–80
After Amiri Baraka died at the age of seventy-nine in January 2014 
he was lauded or attacked for his output in the 1960s – variously for 
that work’s wholly original conjoining of poetic voice and political 
expression, for its black potency in an era of increased persecution and 
dispossession, for its supposed inverted racism, for its male chauvin-
ism and anti-Semitism. What is remarkable about the post-mortem on 
Baraka’s career is that it paid no attention to the subsequent forty years 
of work that revised these positions and processes but mark an equally 
radical contribution to the power of poetry in the late twentieth century. 
All obituaries of Baraka effectively stop in 1974, the moment Baraka 
announced his turn to Marxism and moved away from the black cultural 
nationalism that had made him famous. The Poetry Foundation biogra-
phy’s ratio of 147 words on Baraka’s output after 1974 in a 2,500-word 
article is typical, and mirrored in the focus of criticism on Baraka gen-
erally. Ignoring three-quarters of Baraka’s considerable achievement is 
especially lamentable since his work from the  mid-seventies onwards 
represents one of the irst Marxist poetic responses to the post-war 
economic crisis, and one of the earliest projects for a vanguard art 
that explicitly rejected the claims of the traditional avant-garde. This 
chapter will explore these two related matters, suggesting we see both 
projects as developing Baraka’s constant use of musical performance in 
poetic process, and the complex sense of audience related to it. The best 
commentary on Baraka’s poetry has placed music at its centre, employ-
ing tropes in music to repudiate readings of the poet as didactic and 
dogmatic.1 This is an important perspective on Baraka, best shown in 
work by Nathaniel Mackey and Kimberly Benston, who demonstrate 
how a musical, improvisatory cast of thought deines the restless energy 
of Baraka’s poems, informing a poetic voice that is ‘centrally an agon 
for utterance itself’ in Benston’s words, or preoccupied with ‘resist-
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writers, Baraka’s rhythms are built on incompletion and becoming. 
These readings are a necessary corrective to dismissals of the poetry 
as  anti-intellectual aggression or straightforward agitprop. They are, 
however, in Benston easily extended to celebrate ‘a process of constant 
self-negation’ in Baraka’s work that rings less true:
Baraka would reverse the process, endlessly repeated in post-Renaissance 
metaphysics of the text, by which representational abstraction detaches itself 
from communicative purpose . . . [D]esacralizing the word’s relation to the 
truth its seeks [Baraka seeks a] self-consuming artefact that none the less 
presses the cause of an empowered, if migratory presence . . .3
This would make a Language poet of Baraka. I do not think reversing the 
‘metaphysics’ outlined here is ever Baraka’s intention, and the Language 
poets these claims best describe would never admit Baraka to their 
ranks. Benston never bridges the lacuna of her throwaway ‘none the 
less’ with anything but literary metaphors for real politics, subversions 
of literary convention becoming ‘resistance’ to ‘oppressive “systems”’. 
This Baraka seems in danger of endless self-defeat, asserting nothing but 
the impossibility of commitment. My discussion here will centre around 
music as a foil to Baraka’s initial poetic statements of Marxist certain-
ties in a similar manner, but it will not ignore how he is, throughout his 
career, fundamentally a poet of conviction. My aim here is to chart how 
conviction is communicated in the early Marxist work, from the initial 
project of non-musical ‘statement’ in the mid-seventies to a reimagin-
ing of the role music might play in the Marxist poetics Baraka had irst 
thought was incompatible with it. The result of this process, I will claim, 
is a regenerated committed poetics.
1 Music against hard facts
Music in Baraka needs to be thought through questions of audience. 
Baraka’s writings about music constitute his theory of art; the earliest 
and most vital of these outline an aesthetic that is at once expression-
ist and anti-expressionist. This 1965 summative theory of black music, 
using terms borrowed from Olson, describes a complex emancipation 
from the self through expression, a liberatory art that inds political 
agency in the exhaustion of the desiring subject:
The black rhythm energy blues feeling (sensibility) is projected into the area 
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Projection over sustained periods (more time given, and time proposes a 
history for expression, hence it becomes relective projection).
Arbitrariness of form (variety in nature).
Intention of performance as a learning experience.
These are categories which make relection separate from expression . . . 
Expression does not set out to instruct, but it does anyway . . . if the objects 
of this mind-energy are so placed that they do receive. Relection intends to 
change, is a formal learning situation.4
Baraka describes black music as ‘An expression of culture at its most 
unself- (therefore showing the larger consciousness of a one self, 
immune to bullshit) conscious’.5 Here, the osmotic relation of expressed 
desire and mimesis gives rise to projective representation, a species of art 
that can call for action at the same time it describes. In music the expres-
sive source, the self, is articulated as the ‘mind-energy’ of agency, but 
then diffused among the various intelligences that are its object (irst the 
other performers, then the audience). As Baraka concludes in this essay, 
again in terms again borrowed from Olson: ‘New Black Music is this: 
Find the self, then kill it.’6 The process of this search initiates a learning 
experience for performer and audience alike.
On the surface, Baraka’s description of musical projection predicts 
James Baldwin’s more lyrical statement on music in the 1970s:
Music is our witness, and our ally. The beat is the confession which recog-
nises, changes and conquers time. Then, history becomes a garment we can 
wear and share, and not a cloak in which to hide; and time becomes a friend.7
For both Baldwin and Baraka, black music is essentially a collectivis-
ing form that moves outward from expression to history. However, 
collectivity for Baraka is never merely a ritual of sharing and utopian 
hand-holding. The ‘we’ Baldwin takes for granted is complicated in 
Baraka’s work. Witness Clay’s memorable description of Bessie Smith 
in Dutchman: ‘Before love, suffering, desire, anything you can explain, 
she’s saying, and very plainly, “Kiss my black ass.” And if you don’t 
know that, it’s you that’s doing the kissing.’8 There is always something 
fascinating about Baraka’s use of the word you. Throughout his career 
it has a strangeness resistant to the often easy dismissal of his poetry as 
didactic. Here it is a complex and combative thing: this is supposedly 
advice, but hardly friendly; we are told Smith addresses you, but you 
cannot answer back since her speech is ‘before . . . anything you can 
explain’; she speaks ‘very plainly’, and yet there seems to be a strong 
chance you won’t get it. She says to you, ‘“Kiss my black ass”’, and 
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saying it to you; but if you miss it, ‘it’s you that’s doing the kissing’. 
Smith, who was a key igure in Baraka’s 1960s histories of black music, 
is something stranger than a witness and an ally. In Baraka’s central 
term for black music in the period, Bessie Smith has an attitude that only 
those in the know will be able to engage.
Baraka sometimes provokes his hearers in a similar way to Smith, 
but he also works estrangement in other ways. I will examine the work 
of the 1970s in a moment, but for perspective I want to briely survey 
one of Baraka’s most confrontational poems of the sixties, ‘Poem for 
HalfWhite College Students’ from Black Magic (1967). In early work 
like ‘Notes of a Speech’ or ‘An Agony. As Now’ address is introspective: 
even the word ‘you’ stands for an alienated self, expressing the double 
consciousness of black experience described by W. E. B. Du Bois, ‘this 
sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others’.9 We are 
closer to a kiss my black ass in the nationalist period, where other blacks 
are addressed. Accusation co-exists, however, with the earlier gestures 
of self-examination, which are developed rather than abandoned. ‘Poem 
for HalfWhite College Students’ is especially instructive because most 
readings single it out as an example of Baraka’s supposed tendency 
to Manichean exclusions.10 Its attitude or tone is far more complex. 
Opposition is central to the poem, but is not necessarily the opposition 
of the enlightened speaker against the feckless multitude. While ‘Poem 
for HalfWhite College Students’ has a clear sense of cultural authentic-
ity and political commitment, it does not place the poet on one side of 
the fence and the audience on the other in any straightforward way. The 
poem’s ‘you’ is both exhorted as an audience and addressed as the poet’s 
self. This doubling is set out from the start: ‘Who are you, listening to me, 
who are you / listening to yourself?’ A poem wishing to simply ‘contrast’ 
the I with the you is unlikely to allow such slippage in its opening sen-
tence.11 The focus is undeniably on attacking young blacks’ pretensions 
to white dilettantism, but this is a position Baraka was as likely to have 
been self-critical about in 1965, when he wrote the poem.12 The poem 
bears this out: the ‘I’ is split and bleeds into the you: ‘The ghost you see 
in the mirror, is it really / you. . .?’, ‘How do you sound, your words, are 
they / yours?’ The line breaks here rhythmically suspend the addressee 
between audience and self. The poem, indeed, continues the self-listen-
ing project of Baraka’s 1959 essay ‘How You Sound??’: ‘“HOW YOU 
SOUND??” is what we recent fellows are up to. How we sound . . .’.13 
The question of how Baraka sounds becomes important when listening 
to recordings of him reading the poem, where the delivery is restrained 
rather than aggressive. All this said, unlike in Baraka’s earlier work, the 
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to speak a political desire. The ‘you’ of half-white college students and 
the relexive you representing part of the poet’s consciousness are both 
urged to fulil that ambition and potential. The needling address is partly 
self-motivating: the relation between the ‘me’ and ‘you’ is reciprocal in 
this sense, and the message to ‘check yourself’ is universal to half-white 
college students, the speaker himself and those already inclined to sym-
pathise with his position. The poem may plainly say, ‘Kiss my black ass’, 
but by hearing it the reader can avoid doing the kissing – as Baraka puts 
it elsewhere in the collection, ‘these are songs if you have the / music’.14 
The charisma of the poem lies in the salutary effect of a politics that 
has found a means of expression, of a  self-searching that goes beyond 
introversion. There is an ideal striven for, a route out of self-division, a 
ground cleared for the articulation of conviction in which speaker and 
audience are given the potential to change.
In 1974, Baraka made a ‘public notice to the world’ of his conversion 
to Marxism, the culmination of ‘a steady march in quick time to the 
left’ he dates from 1972.15 Readings of Third World socialists such as 
Kwame Nkrumah and Amilcar Cabral and a Marxist speech at the Sixth 
Pan African Congress in Nyerere’s Tanzania followed the global reces-
sion of 1973 for Baraka, culminating in the withdrawal of his Congress 
of Afrikan People from the Kawaida ideology of black nationalism, 
and a programmatic commitment to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. The 
political reasons for the shift are complex, and I will only address them 
here as they directly impact the poetry. In general terms, the conluence 
of a global economic crisis directly implicating imperialism in the falling 
living standards of working people, combined with the willingness of 
imperialism’s ‘black agents’ in Africa to place the burden of this crisis 
on the poor, produced a reading of imperialism and racism that increas-
ingly turned to class as its major interpretative tool.16 Baraka’s move 
from a cultural nationalism invested in essentialist solidarities and nos-
talgic cultural identity toward an ideology whose historical subjects are 
luid and future-oriented, but whose cultural traditions were compara-
tively non-existent, required a major shift in artistic practice.
Though almost all academic criticism of Baraka dates from the mid-
1970s, it is impossible to ind any serious analysis of the poetry of 
the period. The work of the seventies has been variously dismissed as 
‘embarrassing . . . social realism’, ‘overshadowed by hammering political 
slogans’, and ‘hampered by the weight of ideological content for which 
they’ve had to efface themselves’.17 Hard Facts, Baraka’s irst Marxist 
collection, cannot be reduced to this, though it does fail in important 
ways. The shift in poetic form is more pronounced than at any other 
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for a style. ‘A New Reality Is Better than a New Movie!’ is exemplary 
of such a search:
If you dont like it, what you gonna do about it. That was the question 
we asked each other, & still right regularly need to ask. You dont like it? 
Whatcha gonna do, about it??
The real terror of nature is humanity enraged, the true technicolor spectacle 
that Hollywood cant record. They cant even show you how you look when 
you go to work, or when you come back.
They cant even show you thinking or demanding the new socialist reality, its 
the ultimate tidal wave. When all over the planet, men and women, with heat 
in their hands, demand that society be planned to include the lives and self 
determination of all the people ever to live. That is the scalding scenario with 
a cast of just under two billion that they dare not even whisper. Its called, ‘We 
Want It All . . . The Whole World!’18
The poem shows continuities with Baraka’s earlier work. As always, the 
speaker’s authenticity is achieved through self-identiication with the 
audience addressed: motivation is infectious as well as pedagogical, and 
the speaker’s authenticity depends on his own inclusion in the poem’s 
address. Poetry ‘relects the sayers [sic] place’, according to the collec-
tion’s introductory essay – a relection Baraka is careful to stress as the 
interdependence of an explicitly educational poetry and the poet’s own 
education:
we aim at an art that serves the great majority of the people, the working 
masses of people . . . that praises what helps the people and puts down merci-
lessly what oppresses or exploits them. That is why we should make a poetry, 
and art that speaks to, after irst learning from, those same dynamic working 
masses . . .19
The revolutionary poet, Baraka says, gets his education from ‘the 
inspired worker’ only to ‘give it back to inspire, educate, mobilise, per-
suade, involve, the people . . . but to do that we must start where they 
are which is on a much higher level than the majority of intellectuals and 
artists’. Within this, ‘The question of the audience is key, is central to the 
work. “For Whom” is the problem as Mao Tse Tung sounded it.’20 The 
essay does suggest, however, that Baraka has already learned from the 
working masses. For all their dynamism, that is, the poet does not learn 
from the people as he writes or speaks.
In the case of ‘A New Reality Is Better than a New Movie!’ the 
doubled ‘you’ is resolved in a way obscured by reprintings of poems 
from Hard Facts. In the Revolutionary Communist League edition the 
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tinuation of ‘A New Reality’ rather than the separate poem it appears as 
subsequently, ‘The Dictatorship of the Proletariat’:
The dictatorship
of the proletariat
       you need to say that
       need to hear that
       not be scared of that
       cause that’s gonna save your life21
Here we seem to get the answer to ‘If you dont like it, what you 
gonna do about it’, so excitingly left open in ‘A New Reality’. In ‘The 
Dictatorship of the Proletariat’, that is, explosive answers to this ques-
tion are narrowed to a single political idea. There is a move away 
from the rhythmic framing important to ‘Poem for HalfWhite College 
Students’, which encouraged speaker and audience to ‘check out’ how 
they sound, together. Most poems in Hard Facts do not rhythmically 
suspend the poet between speaker and listener. ‘A New Reality Is Better 
than a New Movie!’, in its varied rhythm and dynamic tone, is the 
exception that proves the rule. There are many examples of quite differ-
ent, latter inlections:
                     The proletariat in modern
dress. Who must lead the masses of us, with a revolutionary vanguard party 
at the helm
guided by science, guided by the science, the science of marxism-leninism-
mao tse-tung
thought.22
Lines like these, assaulting poetic decorum with unwieldy Leninist jargon, 
often have their own incantatory, Whitmanian self-consciousness, but it 
does not undercut the sense of the poetry as knowledge imparted rather 
than rhythm experienced. The key to this distinction is in the conscious 
turn Baraka makes away from music to the essay in the period. Baraka 
said in the sixties, ‘Poetry, irst of all, was and still must be a musical 
form . . . poetry [is] supposed to be as musical as it [can] be.’23 By the 
mid-seventies this had changed. In 1977, asked in interview whether his 
current poetry has similarities with ‘the musician’s craft’, Baraka is clear:
I think it’s less interested in the overall sound of words and more interested in 
what it’s saying . . . You mean trying to infuse my poetry with some particu-
lar sound? Well, at this particular time, I’m not focused on that as much.24
Undoubtedly, global politics informs this shift. Outlining his theory 
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music are intellectuals or mystics or both.’25 For Baraka in 1965, the 
difference between intellectuals and mystics was perhaps not important. 
By the mid-seventies, the horrifying anti-intellectualism of many African 
ruling elites made a distinction urgent. African magician-rulers such as 
Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, Bokassa in the Central African Republic, 
and perhaps most importantly Mubutu and his Africanisation of Zaire, 
all cloaked tyranny and mass murder in the garb (often literally) of an 
African cultural identity that often simply stood against democracy, 
human rights and other ‘Western’ corruptions.
The effect of Baraka’s focus on the ‘what’ of expression is to deine 
art as an act of ‘impression’ where the poet exchanges mystic ambiguity 
for clear-cut statement: ‘it affects you, it im-presses or stamps its image 
upon you’.26 Baraka’s turn to visual metaphors is in itself a sign that 
the poet is seeking artistic forms allowing for stillness and clarity rather 
than imposing rhythmic metamorphoses. Baraka would ind the form 
for such impressive statement in the essay. The turn to the essay comes, 
as Baraka explains, from a reading of the Chinese writer Lu Hsun 
(1881–1936), especially his ‘short essay form’ (usually known as zawen) 
that ‘combined poetry and revolutionary observation’:
Benston: Would you say that Hard Facts, and other of your works in the last 
few years, searches for that kind of form?
Baraka: Yes, right, I think so. I think my own feeling now is closer to the 
short essay form, and reading about Lu Hsun made me realise why I felt more 
comfortable using it. . . . you can do a lot of things in it . . . it’s wider than a 
poem, as far as I’m concerned. Because in poetry you usually have a rhythmic 
dynamic that you either try to force, if you don’t have it with you, or, if you 
have it with you, it lows and has a life of its own. But in the short essay form 
the rhythm follows from what you want to say . . .27
The essay is ‘a kind of struggle form’. Essays are perfect for ‘daily strug-
gle’, Baraka says, because they can be written quickly and are immedi-
ately intellectually accessible, easily absorbed without the complications 
of a ‘rhythmic dynamic’ that adds nothing to the content of the ‘revo-
lutionary observation’. The formal welding of poem and essay is easily 
seen in Hard Facts. The resemblances of the poems above with Baraka’s 
most important essay of the 1970s, ‘Why I Changed My Ideology’ 
(1975), are obvious:
[W]e are determined . . . to liberate Black people and oppressed people all 
over this land, as part of the liberation struggles of oppressed people world-
wide. Guided by the science of Marxism-Leninism-Mao-Tse-Tung Thought.
 Speed the coming of the Vanguard Party!
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 Expose the illusion of bourgeois democracy and rip the covers off their 
lackeys!
 Let the people ind out armed struggle is inevitable!
 Victory to Black people!
 Victory to the strugglers!
 Victory to all oppressed people!28
If anything, these words seem positively expressive compared with the 
weakest poem of Hard Facts, ‘Red Autumn’:
winter is yet ahead, we are readying to go to a women’s conference and ind 
ways
    to bring Marxism-leninism-mao tse-tung thought to black women. 
Some sisters
pushing a proposal to call a multinational women’s front together, by 
spring. That’s
    good, from the tactical to the strategic, build the whole structure 
that will
change the century, change the social system, change the way we live, 
change the peoples
lives and the future of the world.29
Baraka claims that such work can have a rhythm that ‘follows from 
what you want to say’, but if rhythm is in these poems, it is not the 
‘energy blues feeling’ intent on its own transformation that Baraka had 
described in 1965. On the other hand, if ‘now the essay is the most 
relevant form’, as Baraka says, it is not scholarly expository prose that 
is meant, but the ‘daggers and javelins’ of short, pithy and commit-
ted statement – and stronger poems, such as ‘Disorder’, ‘When We’ll 
Worship Jesus’, ‘A New Reality’ all contain a singular energy even 
though their rhythms are predetermined rather than exploratory.30
Hard Facts has to be positioned as an experimental work in the strict 
sense: it is consciously the beginning of a project to ind a poetic language 
for the mass communication of Marxism. Baraka deines the period 
after the collection as a ‘critical point’: ‘I have to try and develop my 
own work so I can become more clearly and irmly a Marxist writer.’31 
If the right form has not quite been found at this stage, what can we say 
about its ambitions? In Baraka’s cultural nationalist period, there is a 
clear sense that to subvert artistic form is to subvert enemy institutions – 
Black cultural forms are automatically an assault on White politics. This 
is avant-gardism in Peter Bürger’s sense, conlating as it does hegemonic 
artistic traditions with institutions, and so non-traditional aesthetic form 
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separate political practice, as a cultural nationalist, he felt an organic tie 
between new (or Black) artistic forms and political (Black) liberation. 
The aggressive resistance and anarchy of, for example, the recording of 
Baraka’s ‘Black Art’ as a jazz track released on Baraka’s Jihad Records 
summons much of its immense power from this belief. The experiment 
of Hard Facts is not of the same order. Baraka, as his interviews show, 
witnessed the co-optation of Black Art in the Blaxploitation of the 1970s, 
and this was his particular experience of the ‘mainstream’ hegemonic 
appropriation of avant-garde style felt by many artists of the period in 
different ways.32 More generally, Baraka’s shift represents a dissatisfac-
tion with the political eficacy of a predominantly formal practice: as his 
comments on the essay show, his focus now is on content of art, being 
‘more interested in what it’s saying’. How a poem can stress the what of 
its being is no simple question, of course, and this is why Baraka’s forms, 
as we will see, are luid and experimental in this period. There is, though, 
a move away from the idea that culture can be politics in its very form, 
an avant-garde inheritance Baraka never had felt comfortable with. The 
interest of Baraka’s 1970s art is in how it continues to assert itself as 
vanguard but pointedly rejects the avant-garde, now called ‘bourgeois 
art’. This process should at no point be equated with the social realism of 
the 1930s, however: Baraka still positions himself as culturally vanguard 
in the broad sense, still inventing new forms, and his call for a ‘mass art’ 
is not part of an oficial line on aesthetic form exploiting what people 
already know. I will argue below that Baraka’s continued attempts to 
link directness with ‘advanced understanding’ do come to fruition. That 
is, his search for ‘a kind of struggle form’ exploiting direct address, when 
combined with an ‘other kind of skill’ only gestured to above, occasions 
some of his most important poetry.33 Music, I think, is at the heart of this 
‘other kind of skill’. In Hard Facts, as Baraka himself admits, simplicity 
and directness have been established, but without the accompanying sub-
tlety needed to engage audiences. The turn to the model of the essay as a 
way to ‘combine the advanced and the popular’ is in this sense a cul-de-
sac: though it helps Baraka to conceptualise the aims of a black Marxist 
poetry in the 1970s, it does not in the end provide a compelling form for 
agitational poetry.34 As we see Baraka reintroduce musicality, however, 
his aims and executions coalesce in compelling and unpredictable ways.
2 The return of music: Poetry for the Advanced
‘Afro American Lyric’, a poem eventually included as part of Poetry for 
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ous efforts to directly communicate political content, but moves away 
from the essay mode in obvious ways:
The ugliest ugly is the social ugly
the horriblest horrible terriblest terrible








   society’s ugly is the graspingclass
   its simple
   shit uh
   see-imm-pull
   see-impull
   Seeeeeeeeeee-immmmmmmmmm
      pull
  Some See - im - pull
   shit
Society’s ugly, the ugliest ugly
caused by the grasping
class, exploiting
class36
The poem’s constant deconstruction of words like simple and need 
creates a simultaneous dissonance and clarity expressive of its subject: 
exploitation that hides in plain sight. The formal device is not political 
in itself but explicitly tied to a content: counterintuitively perhaps, the 
formal disjunction is there to make the poem ‘simpler’, to spell out its 
already obvious content, the straightforward violence of capital. Put 
another way, the argument has a music. Introducing the poem at a 
reading at Naropa Institute in July 1978, Baraka says it is ‘inluenced 
by Stevie Wonder and Al Green’.37 The exact importance of the two 
musicians is not clear, but the materiality of Baraka’s strained voice is 
decisive, making the poem very different from the potentially detached, 
declarative essay-poems of Hard Facts. The music is the opposite of 
eloquence: it is, as in Baraka’s description of John Coltrane, ‘like watch-
ing a grown man learning to speak’.38 Baraka’s stuttering and guttural 
recitation stages his attempts to articulate a subject that is irmly in his 
sights but that can only be enunciated at considerable effort. The ‘uh’ 
above, on Baraka’s reading, is not merely a hesitation, but the cry of a 
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The alternation of concentrated staccato and crescendos of self-belief 
make up the rhythm of the poem, which performs the classic Marxist-
Hegelian dialectic of the marginal subject ‘always on the point of revolt’, 
the transparency of economic injustice versus the frustrations in over-
coming it, the maddening convergences and divergences of simplicity 
and struggle.39 In ‘Afro American Lyric’ the charisma, or indeed the 
aural pleasure of Baraka’s highest achievements in the period do not 
register fully, but a key conviction has begun to assert itself: ‘You can be 
the music yourself. You don’t have to have a band.’40
Most followers of Baraka’s career have felt the power of his perfor-
mance, but describing that power, analysing how the aural qualities of 
the work acquire a political valence, is another matter. Even the most 
sensitive work on how Baraka sounds has fallen back on tired identiica-
tions of performance with action: ‘Dancing is synonymous with political 
activism,’ writes William Harris, because ‘Marxism is a political mani-
festation of the jazz aesthetic process.’41 Charles Bernstein, similarly, 
claims that Barakan performance ‘works to spur the (silent, atomized) 
reader into performance – it insists on action; the page’s apparent 
textual “lack” is the motor of its form’ – another reading of Baraka as 
a Language poet based on the assumption that mere lacunas in meaning 
are motivating in themselves.42 Baraka’s performances clearly have a 
compelling relation to political action, but we do not need to collapse 
that into identity. A more helpful guide here is Paul Gilroy’s notion of a 
black ‘politics of fulillment’, a position he differentiates from a merely 
oppositional anti-capitalism and links to musical performance. This 
politics, he says, focuses attention on ‘the notion that a future society 
will be able to realize the social and political promise that present society 
has left unaccomplished’:
Though by no means literal, it can be grasped through what is said, shouted, 
screamed or sung . . . it strives continually to move beyond the grasp of 
the merely linguistic, textual, and discursive. The invocation of utopia . . . 
emphasizes the emergence of qualitatively new desires, social relations and 
modes of association within the racial community of interpretation and 
resistance and between that group and its erstwhile oppressors. It points 
speciically to the formation of a community of needs and solidarity which is 
magically made audible in the music itself and palpable in the social relations 
of its cultural utility and reproduction.43
For Gilroy, profoundly inspired by Baraka’s own writing on music,44 
the ‘content’ of black consciousness may challenge capitalist social 
relations, but ‘more complex’ utopian desires are only invoked in extra-
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the demands of slavery. Words in this tradition, Gilroy states, ‘will never 
be enough to communicate its unsayable claims to truth’: its politics, 
rather, ‘must be played, danced and acted, as well as sung about’. Music 
is therefore afirmative and embryonically political, enacting in minia-
ture ‘the formation of needs and solidarity’ and exciting the utopian 
desire for its implementation en masse. In this sense the now of music 
is far more readily connected to a ‘future society’ than the ‘normative 
content’ of more discursive modes like the essay, which may speak of 
the future directly but are formally, as it were, atemporal. Music, on the 
other hand, as in Baraka’s description of John Tchicai’s music, ‘slides 
away from the proposed’ since it is it extemporary, inventing itself as it 
goes.45 We have glimpsed the complex temporality of such expression 
in ‘Afro American Lyric’. The tension in Baraka’s work between spon-
taneity and struggle, between self-constitution and vanguard projection, 
is embodied in these moments of visionary power that at once imagi-
natively overcome an enemy and stress that such victory is only imagi-
nary. The strength of his performance is to spur real action – keeping in 
view Gilroy’s ‘politics of fulillment’, its achievement is to suggest that 
destruction, revolution, redemption are absent but imminent.46
‘Dope’ dramatises these potentialities, and goes beyond both Hard 
Facts and ‘Poem for HalfWhite College Students’ in its exploitation of 
sound. Baraka’s irst great poem of the seventies, ‘Dope’ is ostensibly 
a satirical monologue spoken by an exhortative preacher typical of the 
then emergent televangelism, with the beatiic responses of an imagined 
audience intermixed. In the tradition of Blake’s ‘The Chimney Sweeper’, 
the poem rehearses the capitulation to suffering and injustice in this 
life for consolation and redress in the next, drawing the conclusion of 
Marx: religion is the dope of the masses. The poem’s content, then, 
seems simple, but its form is hugely complex: it relies on its own musical 
charisma throughout, but also it seeks to refute the equally charismatic 
style it mimics, to assault evangelism’s ideological form as well as its 
well-known meaning. The aural pleasures of the poem, that is, cannot 
stray too close to the excitements of ‘evangelical sanctify in heat’, as 
‘Dope’ has it. How are we to describe this distance? Can we speak of a 
shadowing, an inversion, pastiche? Where is the poet’s point of view, the 
position from which he is able to critique, as he does so ruthlessly and 
bluntly? I want to suggest in the reading that follows that Baraka steps 
outside of the sermon as he steps into his audience – that the audience is 
the perspective, the place of observation and the launch pad of attack.
There are a number of recordings of Baraka performing the poem, 
most alike, but the most powerful is the reading with Ed Dorn at the Just 
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In this and most other performances, ‘Dope’ is read after both broad-
side attacks on the ‘fragmentation’ of ‘bourgeois art’ (either in opening 
remarks or in the poem, ‘Against Bourgeois Art’) and experimental 
vocalisation, such as imitations of radio interference (‘Caution 3’) or 
avant-garde saxophone (‘I Love Music’). ‘Dope’ sits somewhere between 
these poles, its ‘babbling, and wailing, jerking in pathocrazy grin stupor’ 




uuuuuuuuuu uuu ray light morning ire lynch yet
  uuuuuuu, yester-pain in dreams
  comes again. race-pain, people our people
  our people
  everywhere . . . yeh . . . uuuuu, yeh
  uuuuu. Yeh
  our people
  yes people
  every people
  most people
  uuuuu, yeh uuuuu, most people
  in pain
  yester-pain, and pain today48
‘uuuuu’ is voiced ‘ooh-ooh-ooh-ooh-ooh’ – a noise that simultaneously 
signiies impetuous religious enthusiasm, drug-induced stupor and 
the primate sound used for racial insult. At this point the evangelist’s 
thoughts are disjointed, but he does recognise the key characteristics of 
Afro-American life (lynch, race-pain, pain). This recognition is precisely 
what makes the words dangerous: the preacher knows the suffering he 
assuages. In performance Baraka speaks these lines in a restrained, low 
voice – the uuuuu seems to enunciate an answer on the tip of the tongue 
but not yet available to the speaker. When the poem, as it were, awakes 
to interpret these phenomena, Baraka’s voice assumes the fullness of 
exhortation:
ooowow! oooowow! It must be the devil
oooowow! oooowow!
It must be the devil
It must be the devil
It must be the devil
At this point we are introduced to the dominant rhythm of the poem. 
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begins each hypothetical section with a straightforward, if heavily laid 
on, imitation of gullible Christianity – here, for example, ‘It must be the 
devil’ is said with the excitement of revelation. As the repetitions build 
and expand to account for other social reality, however, Baraka’s voice 
changes to shout the lines with contempt for what is spoken as even as 
he continues to say it: ‘i seed on channel 7, i seed it on channel 9 i seed / 
it on channel 4 and 2 and 5. Rich folks / good to us / poor folks aint shit, 
hallelujah, hallelujah’. After this the rhythm builds again from the start. 
We hear this transition from the voice of the believer to, as it were, the 
voice of Baraka in full here:
 it aint capitalism,
naw it aint that, jimmy carter wdnt lie,
 ‘lifes unfair’ but it aint capitalism
must be the devil, owow! it ain the police,
 jimmy carter wdnt lie, you
know rosalynn wdnt not lillian his
 drunken racist brother aint no relection
on jimmy, must be the devil got in im, i tell
 you, the devil killed malcolm
and dr king too, even killed both kennedies,
 and pablo neruda and overthrew
allende’s govt. killed lumumba, and is
 negotiating with step and fetchit,
sleep n eat and birmingham, over there in
 ‘Rhodesia’, goin’ under the name
ian smith, must be the devil, caint be vortser,
 caint be apartheid, caint
be imperialism, jimmy carter wdnt lie, didn’t
 you hear him say in his state
of the union message, i swear on rosalynn’s
 face-lifted catatonia, i wdnt lie . . .
It is as if the evidence of hypocrisy builds to such a point that the pre-
tence of another voice must be dropped. The conviction and emotion of 
Baraka’s own sounding suggests he can no longer contain himself, with 
the lines ‘caint be vorster, / caint be apartheid, caint / be imperialism’ 
shouted with such acerbic determination that the poem seems to appro-
priate the sermon at the same time as destroying it.
Within these rhythms, however, or rather outside of them, is the 
audience. The poem recited alone in a recording room is unthinkable, 
and when read with music rather than having its own, the poem loses a 
good deal of its power. Unable to feed off an audience and generate its 
own rhythms, in the accompanied performance on New Poetry, New 
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monologue. In the unaccompanied Buffalo performance, however, it is 
clear that the changing tone and volume of Baraka’s voice responds to a 
galvanising audience. Baraka’s voice changes, rising in conviction as the 
audience laughs at the imitations of religious meekness, beginning the 
cycle again at intermittent applause. These two movements both accom-
modate and challenge the audience: Baraka accommodates in the sense 
of allowing his listeners to partly deine the sections and rhythm of his 
poem, but challenges in that his response to audience reactions is often 
to move away from what has just won approval. And so, for example, 
when the audience laugh at the send-up of Roots where ‘lazy niggers 
chained theyselves and threw / they own black asses in the bottom / of 
the boat’, he tells how black Africans also helped, also sending away ‘yo 
mamma, wife, and / you never seed em no more’. The laughter dissipates 
with this introduction of the ‘yo’ or you. The poem will not rest in the 
detached satisfactions of satire.
These observations are intended to show the effect of a renewed music 
on the ‘struggle form’ Baraka had been seeking since the mid-seventies. I 
will look at the more afirmative gestures in this mode with ‘AM/TRAK’ 
and ‘In the Tradition’ in a moment, but even functioning as pure opposi-
tion in ‘Dope’, rhythmic dynamism blurs the division between speaker 
and receiver. Where in Hard Facts a political education is passed down 
from the poet, in ‘Dope’ poetic form is fundamentally shared between 
writer and audience. This is Gilroy’s ‘emergence of qualitatively new 
desires, social relations and modes of association within the racial com-
munity of interpretation and resistance’ in action. However, it would 
be a mistake to suggest Baraka does not know what he wants to say, 
however collaborative his manner may be. ‘Dope’, in the words of Hard 
Facts, ‘puts down mercilessly what oppresses or exploits’ the working 
masses. Put simply: ‘Dope’ is vanguard writing with a pedagogical func-
tion, looking to speak for others in a way the American avant-garde had 
increasingly refused to. On the other hand, the Third World Barakan 
rhythm also introduces feeling to this position. In this sense, Baraka does 
appropriate a kind of ‘sermonic mode’: unlike the ecstatic resignation 
of the preacher, however, this feeling is one of outrage, interrogation, 
determination. This is a shared feeling that evolves in performance, that 
moves with the audience. It is therefore fundamentally different from 
the agitprop verse of the 1930s, whose messages were so obligated and 
prefabricated that they had none of the emotional qualities necessary 
for poetry. A lack of music, of call-and-response rhythm means Baraka’s 
essays continue to resemble these more authoritative speech-acts. In the 
poetry, however, the you includes an I: it shares feeling, and feels as it 
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3 Screams against reality course through him as sound: 
‘AM/TRAK’ and In the Tradition
‘AM/TRAK’, issued as a sixteen-page pamphlet in 1979, continues this 
process of sharing.49 At its most basic, the poem is similar to the dozens 
of poems elegising Coltrane written before it,50 following the musi-
cian’s career from its beginnings with Dizzy Gillespie, Miles Davis and 
others to the legendary sessions with Thelonious Monk at the 5 Spot, 
the achievements with ‘the inimitable 4’ (the John Coltrane Quartet), 
and the music’s afterlife. The poem cannot be reduced to storytelling 
or hagiography, however: ‘AM/TRAK’, the culmination of Baraka’s 
twenty years of writing and thinking about Coltrane, brings together a 
host of dichotomies Baraka had been trying to weld throughout his own 
career. On this occasion, Baraka lets someone else do the talking. His 
constant calls in the sixties to ‘ind the self, then kill it’ were, as they had 
been in Olson, partly a ig-leaf for an expansive and imposing authority, 
or at least a symptom of that authority. In both ‘AM/TRAK’ and, later, 
In the Tradition, self-assertion is exchanged for the improvised expres-
sion of collective will. In ‘AM/TRAK’, the vehicle for this is Coltrane. 
The urgent question Baraka asks his listeners is ‘are we gathered to dig 
this?’, as he becomes just another witness to Coltrane’s ‘Convulsive 
multi orgasmic / Art / Protest’ among them:
   hot vowels escaped the metal clone of his soul
fucking saxophone
tell us shit tell us tell us!
The poem’s constant call and response is itself a reiguring of Coltrane, 
whose ‘collective improvisation’ Baraka had praised in the mid-sixties.51 
‘AM/TRAK’ demonstrates how the openness of Coltrane’s music allows 




Be reality alive in motion in lame to change (You Knew It!)
                to change!!
That such demands on the music can at the same time sonically imitate 
its sound embodies the organic linkage between audience and performer 
Baraka had always attributed to Coltrane’s work: ‘it reaches a point 
where it’s very close, where it comes from the people, then goes into a 
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comes together’.52 Coltrane’s music is poetry for the advanced, drawn 
from the main guard.
Coltrane also forces a synthesis between another dialectic central to 
Baraka: expression and action. As the phrase ‘multi orgasmic / Art / 
Protest’ implies, Coltrane is a igure transcending the usual opposition 
of struggle and ecstasy. Though ‘super-sane screams against reality / 
course through him’, Coltrane is able to ‘Be reality . . . in lame’, and the 
poem makes the two positions complementary. Such multi-tasking is an 
effect of aesthetic form. In Coltrane’s work we hear ‘all of it in it aire 
alame talking saying being doing meaning’: his music straddles onto-
logical states in such a way that Baraka’s earlier instrumental notion 
of art in Hard Facts no longer holds. The key igure for the poem’s 
dialectic of form and content, ‘doing’ and ‘meaning’, is the scream. 
The word is standard both for the many poems written on Coltrane 
before ‘AM/TRAK’, and in Baraka’s own thinking about the ‘attitude’ 
of contemporary black music. In Baraka’s poem, however, the word 
encapsulates an entire aesthetics in dialogue with avant-garde art 
itself.
The scream returns us to Baraka’s earlier description of Coltrane as ‘a 
grown man learning to speak’:
But Trane clawed at the limits of cool
slandered sanity
with his tryin to be born
raging
shit
   Oh
   blow,
yeh go do it
honk, scream
uhuh yeh—history
     love
     blue clipped moments
     of intense feeling
Here the scream is the counter of Davis’s ‘cool’, an anarchic force that 
‘slandered sanity’. It is also a metaphor for birth, with Coltrane igured 
as an unborn child, in his painful developmental phase playing for other 
musicians. The scream as signiier of both pain and rebirth is central to 
the poem generally. As pain, the scream is a relex to ‘reality’:
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this is now in you screaming
recognize the truth
recognize reality
The scream of Coltrane screams in his audience, as igured in the triply 
ambiguous phrase ‘in you screaming’. This is the scream as an automatic 
reaction, relex response, pained spontaneous noise. We hear the other 
sense of the scream, as ‘raging’ birth, when Baraka gives a summary of 
the career:
      Trane was the spirit of the 60’s
   He was Malcolm X is New Super Bop Fire
   Baaahhhhh
   Wheeeeeee . . . Black Art!!!
Love
History
 On The Bar Tops of Philly
in the Monkish College of Express




Be reality alive in motion in lame to change (You Knew It!)
                to change!!
       (All you reactionaries listening
       Fuck you, Kill you
       get outta here!!!)
Jimmy Garrison, bass, McCoy Tyner, piano, Captain Marvel Elvin
on drums, the number itself, the precise saying
all of it in it aire alame talking saying being doing meaning
The scream here is a ‘precise saying’ because it at once undermines the 
present order as an irreducibly singular sound form and rails against it 
in emotional content. In form, then, the scream is disruptive, breaking 
the order of the referential system, but it nonetheless, in content, holds 
powerful political emotions. The closeness of form and content here, 
the way in which the form of a scream is in some sense its content, is 
what attracts Baraka to the igure: the dualities of change and reality, 
hope and pain, protest and orgasm can coexist in it. The scream at once 
rejects and engages ‘reality’, with a utopian impulse tied organically to 
the reality from which it emerges.
In essence, the scream expresses a reality that is ‘alame’. Reality, 
through the scream, is transformed to energy so that its lame may 
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(I lay in solitary coninement, July 67
 Tanks rolling thru Newark
 & whistled all I knew of Trane
 my knowledge heartbeat
 & he was dead
 they
 said.
And yet last night I played Meditations
& it told me what to do







The burning scream is both a form that can tell (it has an instrumental 
quality that can hold and convey a content) and a telling form (the atti-
tude, tone and sheer noise of the utterance is itself a message). Compared 
with the often practical communications of Hard Facts, the exhortation 
of Coltrane and ‘AM/TRAK’ is more abstract, but also more energetic. 
It is a call to carry the spirit of the music itself, to do what it does, simul-
taneously recognising reality and screaming against it, meaning and 
doing, burning and organising.
Coltrane is one among many igures in perhaps Baraka’s greatest 
achievement, In the Tradition. First published in 1980, the poem writes 
large and ‘in’ an international tradition of ‘america’ populated by black 
poets, basketball players, musicians, political igures and others. In the 
Tradition is the culmination of Baraka’s previous styles: the Poundian 
epic ‘poem containing history’, the incendiary racial ‘shout’, the revolu-
tionary ‘struggle form’. The poem, again, uses music to synthesise afir-
mation and opposition – Baraka’s introduction to a reading of it on the 
album New Music, New Poetry (1982) sets out what the work will think 
through poetically and express with extraordinary power:
I have a bunch of kids, and in the present period of America’s move to the 
right, one of the manifestations of that is a programme called The White 
Shadow, so the negative inspiration for this poem is The White Shadow. The 
positive inspiration is Arthur Blythe, particularly a record he made called In 
the Tradition.
In The White Shadow, which sees a white basketball coach lead a mainly 
black inner-city school to glory, Baraka sees a denial of agency to black 
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dialectic in the poem, inverts and throws back at the white patriarch. 
The ‘positive inspiration’ that informs this riposte, Arthur Blythe’s 1979 
album revisiting earlier jazz styles, is not simply ‘the tradition’ of black 
culture, but the state of being ‘in the tradition’. Blythe, Baraka implies, 
does not simply present the achievements of the past, but inhabits black 
culture to renew its ‘changing same’. The poem makes this last distinc-
tion clear:
   in the tradition thank you Arthur for playing & saying
   reminding us how deep how old how black how sweet how
we is and bees
when we remember
when we are our memory as the projection
of what is evolving
in struggle
in passion and pain
we become our sweet black
selves53
Such a reminder is needed, the poem claims, because of white culture’s 
insistence on ‘denying with lying images / our strength & African / funky 
beauty’.
This dialectic of strength and beauty is central to the poem. Like 
‘AM/TRAK’, In the Tradition strives to bring together ‘sweetness’ and 
‘struggle’, and again the latter always folds into the former, with sweet-
ness always inally an expression of struggle. If the poem is a ‘tradition 
/ poem, poem us together’, then it must also speak of ‘the tradition of 
those klanned and chained / & lynched and shocklyed and naacped’. 
The tradition may produce culture ‘elegant as / skywriting’, but it will 
always be grounded in history:
      In the Tradition
   of life
   & dying
centuries of beautiful
   women
   crying
In the tradition
   of screamed
   ape music
   coon hollers
   shouts
   even more profound
   than its gorgeous
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Here, ‘screamed / ape music’ is a form whose meaning both is and goes 
beyond the ‘beautiful’ – indeed, its beauty only exists in the ‘more pro-
found’ tradition of suffering. As we have seen, Baraka’s word for this 
profundity in his earlier musical writings was attitude: music takes up a 
relationship with its historical moment, stands toward it in a certain way, 
has a certain itness for it. In the Tradition’s attitude is akin to Bessie 
Smith’s, whose suffering provides access to strength and knowledge. In 
the poem, since the ‘laming hatchet motion’ of history is the preserve 
of those who work, be they Black, Latino, Irish, even Appalachian coal 
miners, so also is song, the poem’s vital force. The White Shadow, who 
‘must coach / cannot shoot’, is therefore in the humiliating position of 
holding black music as his only music: his reliance on servitude is so 
absolute, his distance from the sites of action such that, Baraka claims, 
he has not been able to ‘come out of Europe’ and create his own new 
artistic forms. The racist, therefore, is uniquely vulnerable to invitations 
to ‘Kiss my black ass’.
The poem does not merely celebrate an aesthetic victory over such 
‘imperial dogs’, however. The tradition is ‘Basied on’ (Baraka’s pun on 
the jazz pianist Count Basie) the fact that, still, ‘we Blue Black Wards 
struggle / against a Big White Fog’. As a ‘struggle form’, the poem still 
wants to galvanise its audience, renewing ‘the tradition of gorgeous 
Africa blackness / [that] says to us ight’. Celebration is clearly part of 
this, since one of the poem’s aims is to show that America is already 
African:
                   our ingerprints are everywhere
on you America, our ingerprints are everywhere, Cesaire told you
that, our family strewn around the world has made more parts of that 
world
blue and funky, cooler, lashier, hotter, afro-cuban james brownier
       a wide panafrican
       world
Such lines are in the blues tradition of the boast, but the fact that 
America is still addressed as a ‘you’ shows a gap in the expressions of 
black culture and their fulilment politically. The poem’s means for 
addressing this, for linking the ‘strength’ of black culture to political 
empowerment, is music.
Music is both a vehicle of culture memory and a catalyst for resist-
ance for In the Tradition. The musical technique of the poem has been 
described in Daniel Won-gu Kim’s excellent essay, and it would be dif-
icult to improve on this account. Kim describes the poem as improvi-
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rips off something real mean,” and then returns to the riff only to bridge 
from that into the next run.’54 What is obvious about such a procedure, 
but that Kim does not draw attention to, is that it extends Baraka’s what 
into how he sounds: ‘the tradition’ is returned to as a kind of launch pad 
for fresh creativity in the very rhythmic form of the poem. The tradition 
often literally manifests sound, made up as it is of names that Baraka 
combines into new musical forms:
          Musical screaming
          Niggers
          yeh
      tradition
          of Brown Welles
          & Brown Sterling
          & Brown Clifford
          of H Rap & H Box
Black Baltimore sister blues antislavery singers
The improvisational model is clear on hearing Baraka read the poem, 
but is also evident on the page: the running together of long one-syllable 
words with faster multisyllabic clusters, the disordered but constantly 
interacting assonance and alliteration, the anaphora allowing extem-
porisation – all combine to give the impression of a freeform solo. That 
these names are able to co-exist within Baraka’s loose, improvisational 
creativity is his testament to a tradition ‘always new and centuries old’. 
Were it not for the music of the poem its subject would read like the 
same grand narrative of canonicity that typiies Eurocentric ‘tradition’. 
But here, as Baraka wrote in 1966, ‘music . . . summons and describes 
where its energies were gotten’.55
It is in these energies that we ind the political power of the poem. In 
the Tradition’s music, that is, is capable of the incessant movement and 
responsiveness required of proper political action. The poem enacts the 
continuing potency of that tradition as a weapon in struggle at the same 
time as it insists on the continuing necessity of struggle itself. ‘Hah, you 
bloody & dazed, screaming at me to stop yet, / NO, hah, you think its 
over’ – Baraka’s harangue of the white Eurocentric apologist here runs 
three meanings together in its ‘it’ to prove this point: what is not ‘over’ 
is simultaneously the continuing repression of white culture, the tradi-
tion that ights against it and Baraka’s own explosive poem, the embodi-
ment of that tradition now. The tradition, the black energy of the poem, 
encompasses all three at once. In the Tradition is a ‘struggle form’, at 
base responding to, humiliating and chasing out of town the continuing 
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We are the artists
Dont tell me shit about a tradition of deadness & capitulation
of slavemasters sipping tea in the parlor
while we bleed to death in ields
tradition of cc rider
see what you done done
don’t tell me shit about the tradition of slavemasters
The music of these lines is simply compelling. Sudden tonal changes 
emphasise the dynamic nature of the tradition Baraka is moving 
through: the shift from the staccato swiftness of the third line is deftly 
followed by the long monosyllables of the fourth, while the cc rider line 
(which Baraka loudly sings in performance) is a strident response to 
both. The slavemaster tradition is not comfortably in the past, however 
much it may be dead: the ‘southernagrarians / academic aryans’ of today 
demand Baraka’s response.
It is the poem’s responsiveness, premised on its tradition’s dynamic 
ability to struggle with ‘what is evolving’ that best describes its immense 
charisma. At the end of the poem, In the Tradition attacks its greatest 
target, responding to the November 1979 Greensboro killings in North 
Carolina, which saw the death of ive demonstrators on an anti-KKK 
march at the hands of Klan members:




in the tradition, always clarifying, always new and centuries old
says
   Sing!
   Fight!
     Sing!
     Fight!
        Sing!
        Fight! &c. &c.
               Booshee dooooo doo doooo dee doooo
               doooooooooo!
               DEATH TO THE KLAN!
The poem ends on this note, it seems, because only now has its music 
built to the appropriate pitch. This is Baraka’s earlier sloganeering 
brought to a compelling relation with poetic form. Here Baraka neither 
consigns political aesthetics to avant-garde formal disjunction nor col-
lapses art into an instrumental vehicle for content: both rhythmic form 
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vanguard poetics has its medium as its message in a manner resembling 
but strongly diverging from his new contemporaries, the Language 
poets. In the Tradition, like ‘Dope’ and ‘AM/TRAK’, is fundamentally 
an attitude that, as the word itself does, conlates form and content, 
demanding response to both. Through the ‘collective improvisation’ 
Baraka admired in Coltrane, his ‘poem for us together’ summons a col-


































Figures of inward: Language poetry 
and the end of the avant-garde
Language poetry was the irst example of a self-professed Marxist 
avant-garde in the US since Objectivism, and the country’s irst nation-
ally organised movement to overrun the institutions of poetry it assailed 
from its inception. Language writing continues to dominate Anglophone 
discourse around the politics of poetry, and its inluence on the major 
current in political poetry today, the New Conceptualism, is direct and 
thorough. Its central igures (Charles Bernstein, Lyn Hejinian, Susan 
Howe, Ron Silliman, Bruce Andrews, Bob Perelman) have shaped 
poetic taste and practice, while its central ideas (the politics of poetic 
form, the materiality of language, the readerly production of meaning) 
remain important in the writing, reading and scholarship of poetry, 
in some cases becoming its naturalised doxa. But why did the 1970s 
give rise to a Marx-inlected, experimental poetics of Language? Why 
was Language the irst example of a movement since the war, at a time 
when the idea of avant-garde grouping seemed moribund? Why has 
its effect on American poetry been so great? There are various keys to 
answering these questions: here I intend to examine the movement at 
its beginnings in the mid-seventies to its full emergence in Andrews and 
Bernstein’s L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E magazine, exploring why commodi-
ication was so important to the movement’s avant-garde positioning, 
its strategies for countering commodiication and, within this, its atti-
tude to audience. I will inally detail how Language eventually, into the 
mid-eighties and nineties, extricated itself from projects of direct politi-
cal activism and avant-gardism, and how its formal discoveries were 
put to their fullest use outside of such projects. This will, of necessity, 
involve generalising the commitments of individual writers and placing 
them in a grouping many now deny ever existed. As a movement that 
constantly declared its political and avant-garde credentials, however, 
it will brook no other approach. If the achievements and interest of 
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throw the character of the wider phenomenon of ‘Language poetry’ into 
relief.
1 Commodities, vanguards and avant-gardes
In 1974–5 the US faced its worst recession since the Depression. Unlike 
the Depression, however, this economic downturn was accompanied by 
a crisis in the kind of left organisations that, in various guises, had been 
a potent force in shaping political upheaval since the 1930s. This double-
edged crisis is crucial to Language poetry’s self-positioning. The way in 
which recession in the 1970s was capitulated to and retrenched by the 
usual opponents of capitalism’s worst effects makes the decade unique. 
The apparently permanent failure of mass labour organisations, mixed 
with the disappearance or decline of other previously mass political 
groupings like Students for a Democratic Society (split in 1969, dissolved 
in 1974), the decline of the anti-war movements against Vietnam in the 
early to mid-seventies, even the inal dissolution of the once-president-
running Socialist Party of America (1972) and many smaller social 
movements meant the 1970s saw a crisis in which, it seemed, substantial 
opposition and therefore meaningful opportunity for change was absent.
As Language poetry was establishing its group identity from about 
1975,1 the use of economic crises to assault working conditions and 
democratic freedoms – what would become known as neoliberal-
ism – had just begun. The State had repeatedly abdicated to corporate 
and business forces throughout the 1970s, unemployment had nearly 
reached 10 per cent in 1975, and the preparations for the full restora-
tion of class power and inequality in the 1980s were starting to be seen 
in attacks on trade union rights, enforced wage freezes, dismantlings of 
the welfare state, and other smaller but insidious measures to increase 
inequality. In New York, the centre of Language poetry’s public forma-
tion through L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E magazine (1978–81), a state of 
emergency had been installed in the wake of the city’s iscal crisis of 
1975–8. The Emergency Act of September 1975 read:
This situation is a disaster and creates a state of emergency. To end this dis-
aster, to bring the emergency under control and to respond to the overriding 
state concern described above, the state must undertake an extraordinary 
exercise of its police and emergency powers under the state constitution, 
and exercise controls and supervision over the inancial affairs of the city of 
New York, but in a manner intended to preserve the ability of city oficials 
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Crucially, this state of exception, which ensured an effective coup 
of elected government by a business elite (the Emergency Financial 
Control Board, EFCB), saw muted opposition from the organisations 
of the working class it attacked, and inally secured the collusion of 
these organisations’ leadership. Such bodies were already weakening: 
in terms of numbers alone, national union membership had gone from 
a ‘relative’ decline since 1945 to an ‘absolute’ decline in the 1970s 
according to one economist, with membership falling from 35.5 per 
cent of the non-farm labour force to 23.6 per cent in 1978, the year 
of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E’s irst issue.3 Most important, however, was 
the assistance these traditional working-class organisations offered in 
establishing the political power of business and inance, and their capitu-
lation to swingeing attacks on their members. In New York unions 
agreed to wage freezes, mass layoffs and attacks on welfare and other 
public services (including the introduction of tuition fees at CUNY), as 
well as committing to purchase city bonds with pension funds, thereby 
tying members to the inancial security of the city and automatically 
curbing any demands on the public purse. By one historian’s account, 
the agreement ‘was a turning point for the unions – away from potential 
opposition to one of cooperation, a stance that would affect collective 
bargaining for years’.4 That ‘[w]ithin a few years, many of the historic 
achievements of working class New York were undone’ resulted from 
the explicit consent, and in some cases the enthusiastic sacriice, of 
union leaderships, some of whom became personal friends with EFCB 
members.5 The result was the immiseration of not only large swathes of 
the working population, but anyone who used public services: daily life 
in New York, according to one commentator, ‘became grueling and the 
civic atmosphere turned mean’.6 David Harvey places the events of New 
York, along with the overthrow of Allende in Chile, at the beginning of 
the US-led neoliberal assault on working classes the world over.7
Language poetry set out to ill this political vacuum, and to ight a 
now one-sided political crisis with a cultural formation. Put simply, the 
Language aesthetic aimed to do political activism through the writing of 
poetry and the creation of avant-garde poetic community, informed by 
the belief, in Oren Izenberg’s words, ‘that the reconstitution of “society” 
was a task not for politics but for poetics’.8 Language poetry was an 
attempt by a group of experimental poets to, in Leon Trotsky’s terms, 
‘substitute itself for the working classes’.9 The core rationale behind this 
shift in the locus of political struggle was the conviction that society’s 
primary oppressions occur in language: ‘language control = thought 
control = reality control’, in Bernstein’s equation.10 The most distinc-
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issues onto economic and political ones, as in Steve McCaffery’s claim 
that ‘conventional grammatical structure can be likened to proit in 
capitalism’, or the movement’s constant attacks on ‘the tyranny of the 
signiied’, variously and imaginatively labelled.11 Against this backdrop, 
as Douglas Messerli stated in his introduction to ‘Language’ Poetries 
(1987), ‘writing becomes for most of [the Language poets] political 
action’.12 For accompanying the suggestion that conventional or ‘main-
stream’ language works like capital is the sense that language, differ-
ently used, can directly attack the creation of surplus value: ‘A language 
centred writing . . . diminishes the proit rate and lowers investment 
drives just as a productive need is increased.’13 Furthermore, Language 
writing’s conception of oppositional language was not posed as one 
political activity among others, but as the political action of its time. The 
label used in the movement’s early days, ‘language-centred writing’, may 
be to understate the importance of language here, which often seems 
less central than it does absolute. Bernstein’s send-up of the notion that 
‘language itself – everywhere conditioning our way of seeing & meaning 
– is an illusion’, for example, in his important essay ‘Stray Straws and 
Straw Men’, is followed immediately by the sarcastic afterthought ‘(as 
if there were some thing outside language!)’.14 These echoes of post-
structuralism are not, of course, incidental: French ‘Theory’ itself, can 
be considered, in one of its dimensions, as a vanguard that removed 
political struggle to the realm of language in the wake of 1968’s failures. 
The upshot is that Language poetry was very much to contain its politics 
within itself.
Crucial to this attempt to enfold realpolitik into avant-garde aesthetics 
was Marx’s theory of the commodity fetish. It is strange that Language 
poetry is only ever read in the context the anti-war movement’s demise 
rather than the collapse of anti-capitalism, since Language writing 
rarely engages with US imperialism but has a great deal to say about 
economics. The central tenet of early Language poetry, invoked inces-
santly in the pages of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, is that the use of words 
to signify other things (representation) perpetuates, through its elision 
of the processes and materiality of language itself, the deceit at the heart 
of capitalism – that its products are discrete and pristine commodities 
rather than the result of labour and exploitation. As Silliman elegantly 
puts it: ‘The repression of the product (labour) nature of things is called 
the commodity fetish. In language it is a fetish of description’; or as 
Steve McCaffery states more strongly: ‘the structural support of both 
literacy and capitalist economy is reference’.15 The attack on the com-
modity quite readily translates into resistance to neoliberalism, at whose 
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is not new to the 1970s, that is, it is perfecting its colonisation of the 
social totality, and Language writing is uniquely responsive to this state 
of affairs. The nature of its response, however, is not to make the com-
modity poetry’s subject-matter, but rather to enact the processes of 
commodiication and the linguistic resources of opposition to it in the 
very fabric of the de-commodiied poem. The ways in which this enact-
ment took place, and the techniques put to its service, were various, but 
for now I am interested in how this attack on the commodity allowed 
Language poetry as a movement to pose as political activism and avant-
gardism simultaneously.
Regarding political activism, the project of decommodifying the poem 
is crucial for equating writing with labour, an equation in turn decisive 
in conirming Language poetry’s direct social force. That is, if language 
is a form of labour under the pressure of capital and commodifying 
processes, working in language to ight commodiication is a form of 
industrial action. Language poetry can at once, according to Bruce 
Andrews, install a ‘carnival atmosphere, therefore . . . workers’ control 
. . .  self-management’, and, for McCaffery, ‘reveal the human relation-
ships involved within the labour process of language’.16 The problems 
with identifying artistic praxis with other forms of labour have been 
constantly noted by readers of Language writing.17 On Language writ-
ing’s own terms, however, the claim is that poetry can be class struggle 
– a claim that, as we shall see, informs all of the movement’s technical 
priorities. By this equation, the manoeuvre of substitution is hidden: if 
poetic labour is already labour, the formation of a trade union of mili-
tant poetry workers may shed suspicions of elitism and even political 
representation generally. Poetic labour nonetheless assumes a strategic 
importance, since it inds itself working in the same medium as society’s 
dominant forms of ‘reality control’. Poetry is, then, at once a form of 
labour in the world of economic relations like any other and at the van-
guard of those relations by dint of its particular productive mode, lan-
guage. In sum, Language poetry’s solution to the problematic relation of 
poetry and politics is to equate the two. The two areas are so conlated 
by Barrett Watten, for example, that he uses the term ‘avant-garde’ for 
both, hoping by this sleight of hand to imply that the death of the avant-
garde is the death of revolutionary politics. Describing the Bolsheviks as 
an ‘avant-garde party’ as though Lenin (though he used the French term 
himself from 1902, it has an utterly different meaning and context) were 
just another contemporary of Marcel Duchamp, Watten implies an easy 
continuity between artistic practice and political action.18
The other aim of resisting commodiication is to renew avant-garde 
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form of political vanguardism, that is, had to address the fact that the 
avant-garde had itself been aggressively commoditised in the 1960s, a 
process I outlined in Chapter 4. Seeking to continue a radical politics 
in an artistic sphere, the movement’s earliest theorising in the pages 
of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E is preoccupied with the construction of an 
avant-garde tradition for use, but central to it is the recognition that 
the historical avant-garde has itself been ‘absorbed and commoditized’, 
and that Language poetry itself must respond to the problem of ‘Avant-
garde as Commodity’.19 (In some cases, such as Watten’s, the defence of 
a living avant-garde would continue into the twenty-irst century, again 
based on the initial recognition that ‘[t]he avant-garde dies . . . when its 
radical forms are reduced to commodities and collected by museums’.20) 
The attack on the commodity also, then, functions as an attack on the 
commodiication of avant-garde practice, and the central refusal of 
Language writing to be a commodity claims to breathe new life into a 
project neutered by its absorption into mainstream culture. It can seem 
that saving avant-gardism is the primary motivation behind Language 
poetry’s attack on the commodity, and that the extension of this gesture 
to the commodity form itself is an opportunistic attempt to equate 
avant-garde practice with class struggle. The extent to which this is the 
case will determine whether we see Language poetry as conforming to 
Peter Bürger’s view of a post-avant-garde movement, as clariied some 
years after his Theory of the Avant-Garde in 2010. Continuing the thesis 
of his 1974 study, Bürger contends that movements posing as avant-
garde today cannot escape the contradiction of an avant-garde tradi-
tion: that it can only exist as an artistic tradition because of its historical 
failure to change the world. The upshot of this failure is that all revivals 
of the avant-garde project are only able to repeat its successes, which, 
for Bürger, are in the realm of the institution. Thus, the ‘neo-avant-
garde institutionalizes the avant-garde as art and thus negates genuinely 
avant-gardist intentions’ because it internalises historical avant-garde 
practice, bringing it back into the institution of Art it had once tried to 
transcend: ‘A practice that aimed to have an extra-artistic impact turned 
into a practice internal to the institution and to art.’21 In its revival, ‘the 
[historical] avant-garde becomes an internal aesthetic phenomenon’ 
since ‘the failure of the avant-garde’s aspirations to alter social reality 
and its internal aesthetic success (the artistic legitimation of avant-garde 
practices) are two sides of the same coin’.22 It would be a mistake, that 
is, to assume that works revisiting avant-garde practice necessarily have 
avant-garde ends simply because they are ‘in the tradition’.
I will discuss exactly how Language poetry adapts historical avant-
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engagement, however, is that it must operate as an internal practice. 
Such a practice is consciously employed by the movement, and central 
in how it deines its goals and methods. How precisely we read such 
inwardness, and how we relate it to what falls outside the poetic, is 
crucial to assessing Language poetry. The movement’s own sense of this 
relation, of a relexive and even relective relationship between inside 
and outside (in language, in form, in organisation, in universities) is at 
the centre of its attempt to stake claim to both political activism and 
vital avant-gardism, as we have seen already. To evaluate the success 
of this attempt and read Language writing’s inwardness fully, however, 
we must turn to its understanding of poetic form itself. In the main, I 
will argue, the assumption of an outside to every inside compromises 
the fundamentally projective and indeed representative qualities of real 
political action and the avant-garde proper.
2 The politics of poetic form
Metaphors of interiority dominate the essays of Language poetry. These 
essays, of course, champion not ‘the interior world of feeling’ but the 
notion of entering the rigid structures of language itself to force open-
ings, disjunctions and lacunae from within.23 Each of the four essays in 
the irst supplement of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E on The Politics of the 
Referent (published in 1980 from essays written in 1976), advocates 
a relexive move to the linguistic interior. This move is partly tied to 
Language poetry’s central attack on representation: ‘the arrow of refer-
ence implies’, according to McCaffery in ‘The Death of the Subject’, ‘a 
destination outside of the domain of the signiier’.24 This destination 
is a diversion away from the central fact of labour and toward the rei-
ication of the commodity fetish, whereas, by contrast, ‘the signiier, 
when devoid of its signiied (ie. cipher), is like an interiority without the 
drive to externalisation . . . no longer representing the world outside of 
itself’.25 In ‘Text and Context’, Andrews likewise speaks of a contem-
porary ‘phobia toward what is present’ in poems, when in fact ‘inward-
ness is the site of compression and density’. His advice is: ‘Stay inside. 
It is all here. The non-imperial state: without need for the expansion of 
externalisation that comes from the refusal to redistribute the surplus at 
home.’26 Silliman’s ‘For Open Letter’ touches on his lapsarian history 
of ‘the taking of the language out of the person’, whose ‘irst step’ was 
the invention of the book of poems in 1557.27 Bernstein, meanwhile, as 
we have seen, goes further at this stage and denies there is ‘some thing 
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of language from the inside’: ‘What is needed, now, is not the further 
dramatization of far-outness but the presence of far-inness.’28
The conviction underlying these metaphors, of course, is that lan-
guage is already outside – and that it is precisely this ‘fact of wordness’ 
that is obscured by uncritically representational language. Inside is not 
intended to imply withdrawal, the claim being that language does not 
need to be wilfully made political because it is always already social – 
and Language poetry therefore, despite its interiority, retains the politi-
cal ambition traditionally associated with avant-garde movements. ‘The 
ight for language is a political ight. The ight for language is also a ight 
inside language,’ as the pages of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E had it, because 
surface was precisely the commodity characteristic Language opposed 
politically and wanted to get inside of the better to disrupt.29 The 
Language project, therefore, ‘is inevitably a social and political activ-
ity as well as an aesthetic one’, according to L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E’s 
editors, because ‘language itself is a communality, a public domain’.30 
The ‘inevitably’ of this political aesthetics at times seems to conlate 
two quite different phenomena, however. Few would disagree that 
language is, in Bernstein’s words, ‘a matrix of social and historical 
relations’, but this does not automatically make it political in the activ-
ist sense Language intends.31 To be a social agent is not automatically 
to ‘undermine the bourgeoisie’, as Silliman so grandly declared in one 
essay for L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E.32 Formulations such as Jed Rasula’s, 
that ‘Language is a Trojan Horse’, or indeed Silliman’s metaphor of 
mining here, imply that anti-capitalist language must protect its inside 
or underground nature to have oppositional power, a power appar-
ently automatically secured by the exteriority of language at all times.33 
Indeed, according to Bernstein, ‘Poets don’t have to be read, any more 
than trees have to be sat under, to transform poisonous societal emis-
sions into something that can be breathed.’34 Where these metaphors of 
poetry’s power leave readers is the all-important question for Language. 
There are two conlicting impulses deining Language poetry’s attitude 
to reception, though the movement had a dynamic way of reconciling 
them. They concern, on the one hand, a desire to continue avant-garde 
practice in which, necessarily, the notion of artists as in front is deini-
tive, and on the other a dissatisfaction with the author igure and what it 
implies about language and power. I will take these in order.
In a throwaway observation in his now notorious critique of 
Language poetry, Fredric Jameson deemed Bob Perelman’s ‘China’ to be 
a political poem in ‘some curious or secret way’, before dismissing this 
aspect of the poem for what it really, perhaps unconsciously, reveals: 
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 fragmentation.35 The latter, for Jameson, is what distinguishes such 
poetry from the modernist fragment. Language writers and their sympa-
thetic critics have thoroughly rejected Jameson’s analysis, which admit-
tedly had little interest in the aims of such disjunction for the movement 
itself. Taken on its own terms, though, Language poetry still bears 
out Jameson’s irst observation that its politics is, in important ways, 
conceived as a sub rosa activity. I want to read such activity in relation 
to Surrealism as a tactical basis of Language writing’s group identity. 
This tactical element is worth stressing: attempts to locate Language 
poetry’s avant-gardism exclusively in its continuation of the historical 
avant-garde’s formal characteristics, as in George Hartley’s introductory 
chapter to the irst critical book on Language poetry, Textual Politics 
and the Language Poets, miss the point. Though Language writing 
undoubtedly constructs a technical tradition from such models, these 
are too various to determine any consistent aesthetic from. Rather, it 
is Language’s use of historical avant-garde strategies that characterises 
the movement. The difference between these two orders of poetics can 
be readily seen in the inluence of Surrealism, the avant-garde that most 
informs Language poetry’s theoretical positioning of poetry but least 
of all resembles it formally. In general terms, Language poetry is com-
mitted to characteristic avant-garde strategies: defamiliarisation, frag-
mentation, provocation, even a kind of primitivism. Such common or 
garden avant-gardism is sharpened when viewed through the Surrealist 
lens. David Arnold has detailed the Language debt to Surrealism at close 
quarters,36 but here I would like to draw attention to two broader, and I 
think decisive, linkages for Language poetry’s own avant-garde.
Firstly, then, Language borrows from Surrealism its poetics of crisis. 
Silliman’s important claim for Language poetry in ‘For Open Letter’ 
runs as follows: ‘The social role of the poem places it in an important 
position to carry the class struggle for consciousness to the level of 
consciousness’.37 Like Surrealism, Language poetry is a struggle for 
consciousness – here, though it may not be his intention, Silliman’s 
metaphor implies that the class struggle for consciousness is currently 
unconscious. Psychoanalytic terminology is also at the heart of the 
‘higher order of struggle’ by which Silliman seeks to raise it: ‘placing the 
issue of language, the repressed signiier, at the center of the program’. 
Like Surrealism’s dream work, Language poetry attempts to make 
visible what is ‘repressed’, though its conception of what that is obvi-
ously differs in important ways. In both, however, the repressed is 
thought to be accessible through a dérangement: what Surrealism calls a 
‘crisis in consciousness’ and Language a ‘crisis of the sign’.38 The will-to-
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poets to ‘undermine the bourgeoisie’, for example, is stated in a short 
essay establishing that Language poetry will be read by the bourgeoi-
sie.39 The reader is attacked from underneath. The formal devices used 
by the two movements clearly differ, but the aims are similar: the disrup-
tion of codiied meanings and the shock of recognition. Language poetry 
is undoubtedly uncomfortable in such a position, and ultimately takes 
steps to avoid power relations that are dificult to separate from the 
authority of the poet-genius or the psychoanalyst. I will discuss these in 
a moment, but the similarities of Surrealism and Language poetry raise 
questions concerning the historical status of crisis in the 1970s. That is, 
in Surrealism, as in most avant-garde practice, crisis is sought as a means 
to disturb the rigid institutions of bourgeois taste, a project in which, in 
the short term, it was successful. In Language, similarly, crisis is sought 
as a remedy to the commodity and its hypostatising tendencies. What is 
not mentioned, however, is the commodity’s own propensity, especially 
in Language’s context, to dislocation. It is not self-evident that the dyna-
mism of capital, the accelerating ‘mobility’ of labour, and the reduction 
of all value to that of luid exchange, can be opposed by a sabotage of 
language in the form of alienation and fragmentation.
Secondly, Language looks to the image of Surrealist practice as a 
model. This is obviously not a focus that is surprising or unique to 
Language writing; however, unlike most other American poets for 
whom the Surrealism image was an important inluence (John Ashbery, 
Charles Simic, Barbara Guest), Language writing ties the image directly 
to revolutionary politics. Surrealism is attractive to Language poetry as 
the twentieth century’s key example of a collective artistic opposition to 
the middle class. Surrealism itself, however, was far more than an artis-
tic opposition, and its activities extend well beyond the image – indeed, 
it seems that one reason the movement rarely used the term ‘avant-
garde’ itself was because of its connotation of a speciically aesthetic 
way of being. Surrealism, famously, conceived of itself as an avant-garde 
way of life, and its attempts to demolish the distinction between art 
and life, most famously in its haphazard and unsuccessful engagements 
with the French Communist Party, is central to its character. Statements 
like the 27 January 1925 declaration’s ‘We have nothing to do with 
literature’ may be primarily rhetorical and adversarial, but Surrealism 
showed a commitment to the non-artistic that was more than playful 
– advice on ‘How to catch the eye of a women you pass in the street’ 
and how ‘To make speeches’ are not merely facetious.40 For Language, 
however, Surrealism’s politics is most properly articulated through 
poetic technique. Watten, for example, conceding that in the beginning 
































 150    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
of the writing”’, inally praises a ‘private image [that] is revolutionary 
transformation in germ’: ‘The image travels endlessly; this is the sub-
stance of Surrealist internationalism, in fact.’41 (The substance? In fact?) 
With a similar emphasis, Bernstein brackets the lifeworld of Surrealism’s 
‘underlying psychologism’ so that the movement may be
credited with opening up new possibilities for images and perhaps more 
crucially for the transition from image to image (unit to unit) with the total 
organization of the poem – opening up, that is, the domain in which we now 
work.42
That Language poetry focuses on this ‘domain’ is surprising for a 
reading of the Surrealists as a political movement, but it gets to the 
heart of Language poetry’s belatedness on the avant-garde scene. At its 
core, it is a reading that is literary-historical, exemplifying Bürger’s neo-
avant-garde and its preoccupation with internal questions of technique, 
however it attempts to make them the ‘substance’ of practical politics.
Continuing Surrealism’s attempts to enforce crises in consciousness 
through fragmentation and unstable images, Language tries to repeat 
the historical avant-garde’s tendency to undermine the rigid determina-
tions of the status quo through non-rational and crisis-engendering tech-
nique. On the one hand, Language poetry wants to bring certain realities 
to ‘the level of consciousness’ by working at levels of unconsciousness, 
bypassing on a formal plane conventional argument, representation, 
and indeed any abstractions ‘repressing’ the signiier. On the other, 
however, because the death of the author and deconstruction of sub-
jectivity is at the centre of the movement’s convictions about language, 
such campaigns cannot be waged from the position of the enlightened 
vanguardist, dragging his audience into the future through shock and 
awe. Silliman’s comments above on the need to raise consciousness, for 
example, are tied to a literature that ‘provides [the reader] with experi-
ences of that dialectical consciousness in which subject and object, self 
and other, individual and group, unite’ and ‘does not impose “reality” 
by iat’.43 Language’s solution to the tensions of a poetics aiming at a 
hidden reality but not wanting to impose its conclusions, brings us back 
to the commodity in Language poetry. Both impulses can be satisied, 
that is, by turning the poem into a site of ongoing labour. By this, the 
reader is invited into the work as a ‘co-participant’ while ‘language 
itself’ acts as a focus on labour, deconstructing commoditised comple-
tion into linguistic work.44 This inclusive politics is also a potentially 
revolutionary one, according to Andrews: ‘Altering textual roles might 
bring us closer to altering the larger social roles of which textual ones 
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explicit, but the politics within the gesture are clear: it has a power to 
‘functionally dislocate the reader’, in McCaffery’s portentously italicised 
words, because, self-evidently, the reader is given a different function 
in such work.46 The invitation, by its novelty, is also intended to be an 
awakening: ‘Reference is no longer the promise at the end of the gram-
matical road, no longer the opiate of the reader.’47
I will forgo a reading of the success of such strategies to address the 
sincerity of the gesture. It can often seem in Language poetry’s essays 
as though what masquerades as an open invitation is an underhand 
attempt at coercion. The nature of the work to be done in language, 
after all, is still decided by the writer, as Watten writes: ‘technique is the 
principle of construction in writing . . . technique is predictive; that is, 
it is capable of producing new meaning out of a stockpile of resources 
into a future, possible world’.48 Michael Davidson’s rejoinder to such 
principles is shrewd:
If the terms for reading are already anticipated in the formal design of the 
poem, there is little room for the reader to interact with the actual pragmatics 
of literary discourse . . . The reader becomes a voyeur upon an artful attempt 
to seduce him or her into playing by the rules.49
In this sense, Language’s ‘readerly’ poetics merely moves the site of the 
poet’s authority to a higher ground. Linked to this shift in the site of 
authority is an unquestioned assumption that readers will automatically 
be drawn into the labour of the poem, that Language poetry’s magic 
will simply be irresistible. Labour, though, requires coercion or desire: 
if Language poetry rightly resists the former, it must make efforts to 
arouse the latter (the reader must want to engage the poem). Such desire 
on the part of the reader will hardly be accounted for by ‘technique’, 
however emphasised, which may mechanically produce poems as pre-
dictable and tedious as the workshop lyrics so tirelessly attacked by 
Language poets. The issue at this point is articulated in Rachel Blau 
DuPlessis’s question to the Language poets: ‘What do they do with 
pleasure?’50 Neither L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E magazine nor the earliest 
Language books (Watten’s Total Syntax and Perelman’s edited Writing/
Talks) have much to say about pleasure, but there is an answer implicit 
in Language’s very conception of reader–writer relations. The Language 
poem, that is, can make desirable production relations that are unavail-
able in life available in poetry. The pleasure is in the utopia. Again, 
the politics is in the poem in a formulation that is elegant but hardly 
satisfactory: the notion of the poem as the site of shared, freely chosen 
labour feels rather like letting readers eat cake. And yet the rhetoric is 
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that may work politically in more complex ways. DuPlessis’s subsequent 
question, ‘How do they negotiate speciic rises of passionate feeling?’ is 
therefore rendered moot – an agitation to act is not required, since the 
poem has already installed a utopia in language.51
The conlicting ambitions of working on and with the reader are 
determining for Language. What Language poetry assumes, in its assault 
on consciousness through the reconstruction of the reader, is a captive 
audience that the historical avant-garde, in the main, had, attacking 
bourgeois taste where it already lived. The effects of such an assumption 
are felt in the unfolding of these readerly relations into Language poet-
ry’s projection and establishment of itself in the culture at large, where 
a rhetoric of openness and collaboration often works in tension with 
an insistently marginal cultural status. I want to explore the effect of 
these tensions on the wider cultural transmission and effect of Language 
poetry, but also from this to investigate deviations in some of Language 
poetry’s key ‘avant-garde’ principles, and hopefully to show how some 
of the movement’s ideas were fulilled in quite different spheres of activ-
ity and understandings of purpose.
3 A more ‘general’ public
Ron Silliman, in response to a request to writers for ‘ive non-poetry 
books . . . that have had a signiicant inluence on their thinking or 
writing’, expresses an impatience with the magazine’s ixation on 
books.52 In claims that run counter to the core principles of linguistically 
determined consciousness that L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E contributors had 
put forward, including himself, Silliman replied:
Important as books are, it is being that determines consciousness. Books can 
& do serve mediationally, presenting possibilities of structure where they 
might not otherwise be perceived. But, unless one is so trapped by the disease 
of one-sided development, the proposition’s limits are its one truly interesting 
aspect. A political question wld have been: how has the necessity of earning 
a living (& perhaps supporting a family) affected the form and substance of 
your writing? Or: to what extent do writers functionally require a conceptual 
workplace, meaning not a room of one’s own, but other workers? & to what 
extent can correspondence substitute for one? But this idea does not, cannot, 
exist, at this present moment, outside of a beingness wch is not bourgeois 
. . .53
Silliman continues the Language motif of writing as labour, but also 
shows misgivings at the movement’s possible isolation from other sites 
































The End of the Avant-Garde     153
limits within the aesthetic, however ‘politically’ conceived, and its 
potentially ‘one-sided’ focus on written language, may be likened to the 
writer in ‘a room of one’s own’ who, not inding capitalism to his taste, 
goes underground, imagining he can merely escape it in language. How 
to negotiate a position that was not the mere fantasy of an alternative 
culture but a ‘political’ (Marxist) struggle to change, a position that 
could collaborate with other constituencies without compromising the 
group’s own avant-garde identity, became a key question of Language 
as the proile of the movement grew.
There were broadly two answers to this question, represented by 
Bernstein and Silliman respectively. Bernstein had become the most 
famous of all Language poets by the 1990s, appearing in primetime 
TV ads for the Yellow Pages and teaching at Buffalo, so his position on 
the matter of wider cultural impact is especially instructive.54 What is 
surprising is how Bernstein, despite having come in from the margins, 
advocates a sense of poetry as separation, running alongside rather than 
counter to the dominant forms of the culture. Here he is on the poetry 
reading, for example:
The reading is the site in which the audience of poetry constitutes and recon-
stitutes itself. It makes itself visible to itself. And while the most attention 
had been paid to those moments when the poetry reading has been a means 
for poetry to cross over to a wider audience . . . the fundamental, social 
signiicance of the reading, it seems to me, has to do with infrastructure not 
spectacle. For this reason I would turn around the familiar criticism that 
everyone at a poetry reading is a poet to say that this is just what is vital 
about a reading series, even the essence of the poetry reading . . . This is not 
to say that reading series geared to a more ‘general’ public or to students are 
not valuable. Of course they are. But such events resemble nonpoetry per-
formances in that their value is dissemination to an unknown audience more 
than creation and exchange. They are not the foundries of poetry that a more 
introverted reading series can be. Poetry, oddly romanticized as the activity 
of isolated individuals writing monological lyrics, is among the most social 
and socially responsive – dialogic – of contemporary art forms. The poetry 
reading is an ongoing convention of poetry, by poetry, for poetry. In this 
sense, the reading remains one of the most participatory forms in American 
cultural life. Indeed, the value of the poetry reading as a social and cultural 
form can be partly measured by its resistance, up to this point, to reiication 
or commodiication. It is a measure of its signiicance that it is ignored.55
For Bernstein, poetry’s attempts to address extra-literary matters and 
audiences reduce the art form to spectacle. A central metaphor of purity 
can be made out: poetry that looks outside itself, that is not ‘of poetry, by 
poetry, for poetry’, is effectively ‘nonpoetry’, and any poem directed to 
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of poetry. And yet, for Bernstein the reading is ‘the most social and 
socially responsive’ of all art forms, so long as everyone present is a poet. 
Doubtless responding to the rise in performance poetry, and increasing 
attempts from all quarters in the nineties to ind a new and wider public 
for poems, Bernstein’s comments are typical of a backlash ‘[s]peaking of 
poetry as a public event, which is to say as a commodity’, in the words 
of another Language advocate.56 Bernstein’s attitude toward the poetry 
reading is part of a wider sense of poetry itself as a parallel activity to 
the ‘reiication or commodiication’ listed above: it carries social force 
as an alternative world, and so being ‘ignored’ by the mainstream does 
not diminish it. The ‘social work’ of poetry is to set itself fundamentally 
outside, as an alternative, as Bernstein says elsewhere:
The power of our alternative institutions of poetry is their commitment to 
scales that allow for the lourishing of the artform, not the maximizing of 
the audience; to production and presentation not publicity; to exploring the 
known not manufacturing renown. These institutions continue, against all 
odds, to ind value in the local, the particular, the partisan, the committed, 
the tiny, the peripheral, the unpopular . . .57
Political commitment may not be so easily reduced to refusals of audi-
ence and publicity, but the position is clear: poetry is truly or effectively 
political once it extricates itself from the publicity-seeking, spectacle-
making and commodifying tendencies of the hegemonic mainstream. 
Poetry is ‘an alternative system of valuation’.58 Arguably Bernstein’s 
position has not markedly changed from his early aspirations for a 
poetry at once ‘exemplary’ and ‘broken off’:
So writing might be exemplary – an instance broken off from and hence not 
in the service of this economic and cultural – social – force called capital-
ism. A chip of uninfected substance; or else, a ‘glimpse’, a crack into what 
otherwise might . . .; or still, ‘the fact of its own activity’, autonomy, self-
suficiency, ‘in itself and for itself’ . . .59
Bernstein believes in a space for poetry, even if only a glimpse or crack, 
outside the rule of capitalism, and he believes this space constitutes the 
true agency of the art. It is for this reason that Bernstein was quicker 
than most to abandon and repudiate the notion of Language poetry as 
a movement or grouping: ‘alternative forms’ do not require organised 
schools, and indeed such organisation is likely to hamper the basic 
power of poetry as possibility.
Silliman’s case is far more complex and demanding. In 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Silliman said there were two things deining 
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they place their work directly into a program of conscious and active 
class struggle’.60 Silliman’s ‘program’ here is something outside of the 
work into which it can and must be inserted. The claim is again partly 
directed at the Language tendency to limit any political ‘program’ to 
its theories of language and poetry, which has little or nothing to say 
about class. Indeed, Silliman’s mini-manifesto is really a call to action, 
since there is precious little evidence of Language poets ‘plac[ing] their 
work directly’ into such class struggle. Silliman’s own early attempts to 
address issues of class are still limited to linguistic form, as in ‘The New 
Sentence’: ‘“Educated” speech imitates writing: the more “reined” the 
individual, the more likely their utterances will possess the characteris-
tics of expository prose. The sentence, hypotactic and complete, was and 
still is an index of class in society.’61 Even leaving aside the questionable 
veracity of Silliman’s ‘index’, to claim that ‘the new sentence’ is a poetry 
of class struggle because it does not speak in full sentences is unsatisfac-
tory to say the least. Silliman, however, more than any other igure in 
the movement, felt the need to go beyond such formal analogies, and 
to directly address the perception that Language poetry, in its focus 
on them, was an essentially hermetic collective whose claims to anti-
capitalist activism made disturbingly little effort to step outside either its 
poetics or its artistic fraternity.
Silliman’s famous statement regarding this problem, made in 1988, is 
partly consistent with Bernstein’s hope that poetry might be an ‘alterna-
tive’, but goes on to place this alternative within a wider ight against 
oppression:
Poetry . . . is a test case for the creation of alternate social formations. One 
political content of the poem is its constitution of a speciic social subject out 
of multiple discourses, a subject that may be decentralized, destabilized or 
even fragmented. The ways in which this content manifests itself differs dra-
matically according to the author’s (and the audience’s) location in the larger 
social body. Progressive poets who identify as members of groups that have 
been the subject of history – many white male heterosexuals, for example – 
are apt to challenge all that is supposedly ‘natural’ about the formation of 
their own subjectivity. That their writing today is apt to call into question, if 
not actually explode, such conventions as narrative, persona and even refer-
ence can hardly be surprising. At the other end of this spectrum are poets who 
do not identify as members of groups that have been the subject of history, 
for they instead have been its objects. The narrative of history has led not to 
their self-actualization, but to their exclusion and domination. These writers 
and readers – women, people of color, sexual minorities, the entire spectrum 
of the ‘marginal’ – have a manifest political need to have their stories told. 
That their writing should often appear much more conventional, with the 
notable difference as to whom is the subject of these conventions, illuminates 
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It is not simply, then, that Language poetry cordons itself off from the 
realpolitik of the social and cultural: it is, by its class, gender and racial 
make-up placed in a strategic position of undermining our assumptions 
about what is social and cultural. This division of labour into narrating 
and deconstructing narrative does not exactly create a complemen-
tary set of activities. Under the guise of self-deprecation and strate-
gic self-sacriice, Language poetry’s role is always the universal one. 
Silliman had made a similar argument about ‘black American poetry’ in 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E. He says black poetry ‘is not language writing’ 
simply because the two do different things in the struggle against capi-
talism – but since Language poetry’s own task was to ‘undermine the 
bourgeoisie’, they were hardly equal forms of activism. It is dificult to 
improve on Eleana Kim’s evaluation of this hierarchy:
Silliman’s statement could be construed as investing the white male hetero-
sexual with a more legitimate claim to ‘avant-garde’ practices, and with a 
monopoly on the ‘decentered’ subject . . . aesthetic categories spatialize and 
hierarchize the literary ield in which those ‘marginal’ constituencies are 
placed on a lower rung of the literary evolutionary ladder . . . In terms of the 
Language project, Silliman’s vocalization of these concerns could construe 
that project as an abstract high-brow aestheticism which has removed itself 
from any real possibilities of social transformation by discounting the inclu-
sion of so-called special interest groups.63
Ultimately, for both Bernstein and Silliman, the Language project could 
not brook being placed, despite its preoccupation with capitalism, 
‘directly into a program of conscious and active class struggle’, because 
its modernist and avant-garde commitments, coming mainly out of 
Adorno, naturally viewed the politicisation of poetry (as opposed to 
the creation of an always already political poetics) as a surrender of the 
power of artistic, post-representational language to the neutering struc-
tures of political representation and instrumentalist rhetoric.
Most histories of the movement written by its members have relected 
the simple fact that it was more successful at forging links with the 
academy it originally attacked than the forces of anti-capitalism it 
extolled.64 Silliman’s attitude, which still seeks a political locus for the 
poem beyond its poeticness even if it struggles to ind it, is inlected by, 
and in turn inlects, his attitude toward the academy, which he never 
professionally entered. Language poets that accommodated and were 
accommodated by universities, such as Bernstein and Perelman, have 
generally relaxed their commitment to avant-gardism as a going concern 
(Perelman wrote an essay in 2010, ‘My Avant-Garde Card’, that com-
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to be truer to the ambitions of Language poetry: an avant-garde in a 
university is a contradiction in terms. That said, those writers whose 
commitment to the avant-garde has moderated, or who never had such 
a commitment in the irst place, have produced the more historically 
pertinent writing. Put simply again, since the 1970s anti-capitalism has 
had no need of avant-gardes.65
This is not to label Language poetry a failure, but is an evaluation that 
goes against the movement’s own sense of itself as a political poetics of 
crisis. The other valences of Language writing are outside the subject of 
this book, but it is important to say that the most interesting, and inally 
the most politically meaningful Language poets were those not involved 
in its avant-garde insistences. That is, I do not want to claim that writers 
like Susan Howe, Lyn Hejinian and Rosemary Waldrop are the most 
important poets of their generation in spite of Language theory, but 
that they, in eliding the quixotic avant-garde rhetoric of poetic form as 
political activism, represent the true home of its key formal principles. 
Though all three of these writers, for example, write their most famous 
work outside of, and even at odds with, the classic forms of Language 
poetry (epic, biography and lyric respectively) from a perspective not 
explicitly allied with neo-avant-gardism, their work may be seen to 
employ the formal discoveries of Language poetry in a way that best 
fulils the underlying aesthetic.66
Howe’s work, for example, articulates the materiality of language 
through the written word’s fragility and contingency, in contrast to the 
muscular objectivity of the male poets who were more central early on. 
The relexive nature of Language process also takes on a different guise 
in line with this fragility. Howe’s preoccupation with the document is 
a concern for what language hides: where early Language poetry some-
times slipped from the discovery that language does not naturally mirror 
the world to the conviction that there is nothing outside the text, Howe’s 
great achievement is to leave this outside simultaneously unspoken and 
intimated, secret and manifest, expressing at once the continued inacces-
sibility of history’s suppressed agents and their agency beyond what may 
be made explicit. That this is a function of an certain kind of interior-
ity, a digging down inside of history, can be easily seen in comparison 
with her great inluence Charles Olson; where ’istorin’s projective turn 
at times led to a lack of awareness of the silenced voices of the archive, 
Howe questions the document, the language of history. In this, Howe’s 
work is related to the labour behind the commodity fetish of Language 
orthodoxy, but not identical with it: for her, what language hides is not 
simply itself again, in less polished form, but the real people of the past 
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history voices that are anonymous, slighted – inarticulate’ is partly an 
academic undertaking: the blurring between poetry and scholarship in 
much of her work gives the lie to the notion that Language poetry was 
appropriated by or sold out to the academy, since it was obviously there 
from the beginning.67 The reframing of literary canons has been central 
to Howe’s poetics, from retreatments of Jonathan Swift to hagiographic 
reconstructions of Emily Dickinson.68 Getting Language poetry out of 
the way to claim the New York School as ‘the last avant-garde’, David 
Lehman wrote in 1998 that ‘the Language School looks modern but 
smells of the museums. It could not exist outside the university’.69 This 
may be to dismiss the smell of museums too readily, since its phallogo-
centric underpinnings continue to shape our own practices and under-
standing of history, agency and cultural expression: Howe’s occupation 
of discursive sites within the academy does not preclude an attack on 
them, though it may limit the boundaries and terms of poetic opposition 
generally. Howe continues Language poetry’s attack on the institution, 
which in the event ensured the most signiicant reclamation and con-
tinued accommodation of women poets in the history of the American 
university. This is a more modest proposal than ‘undermining the bour-
geoisie’, to be sure, but it has been the most fruitful action for the formal 
relexivity and innerness that deined Language poetry from the start.
Attempts to undermine the bourgeoisie, however, have not been aban-
doned by American poets; rather, this bourgeoisie has been more pre-
cisely understood and less nostalgically invoked by other recent poets. 
The most persuasive of these writers have sought to open spaces for 
cultural formation and formal aesthetics outside of avant-garde models, 
from Language poetry’s contemporaries like Eileen Miles and Amiri 
Baraka, to more recent committed poets writing in response to neolib-
eral crisis today, as varied as Mark Nowak, Ammiel Alcalay, Jackqueline 
Frost, the Canadian Stephen Collis, and many others. Other ‘post-
Language’ poets, notably Peter Gizzi and Juliana Spahr, have turned to 
the more indirectly political poetics of the lyric. These are all poets for 
whom, directly or otherwise, Language poetry has been important. All 
show, however, especially when juxtaposed with the avant-garde carica-
ture that is Conceptualism, the beginnings of new imaginings of political 
art and a refusal to rest on the laurels of avant-gardism. Indeed, the title 
of a major international gathering of poets and readers at Berkeley in 
2013, Poetry and/or Revolution, provocatively shows an interest in the 
limits of poetry’s political eficacy for the irst time in decades. In line 
with this, the global recession since 2008/9 has seen responses to crisis 
less interested in Ezra Pound or Russian Futurism than the particular 
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the demands and possibilities of, say, taking up a writing residency 
at an urban occupation. The avant-garde is now increasingly provid-
ing lessons through its failures and historical distinctness, rather than 
imposing its technical and strategic models in the shape of a tradition to 
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of Commerce, trans. Sîn Reynolds [London: Collins, 1982], 229–30). 
Giovanni Arrighi’s epic study of ‘The Long Twentieth Century’ applies 
this claim to the US hegemonic period, which he describes, contrary to 
ideological preconceptions of the American enterprising spirit, as tending 
to world crisis precisely because of the increased (and increasingly threat-
ened) state control over the economy, global and domestic (Giovanni 
Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of 
Our Times [London: Verso, 2010]).
 13. André Breton, ‘What Is Surrealism?’, lecture delivered in Brussels, 1 June 
1934.
 14. Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, 
Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1987), 124.
 15. Peter Bürger, ‘Avant-Garde and Neo-Avant-Garde: An Attempt to Answer 
Certain Critics of Theory of the Avant-Garde’, New Literary History 41:4 
(Autumn 2010), 712.
 16. Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity, 140.
 17. Alain Badiou, ‘Destruction, Negation, Subtraction: On Pier Paolo 
Pasolini’, Seminar, Art Center College of Design, Pasadena, 6 February 
2007. Transcribed at <http://www.lacan.com/badpas.htm> (last accessed 
26 November 2014).
 18. See especially Marjorie Perloff, The Poetics of Indeterminacy: Rimbaud to 
Cage (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1983).
 19. Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity, 112. The conlict was most seen, of 
course, in those moments when the avant-garde tried hardest to overcome 
it in moves that were usually an abandonment of movements to political 
parties that often signalled the end of the original movements themselves, 
Surrealism being the classic case.
 20. See Virginia Woolf, ‘The New Biography’, in Granite and Rainbow: 
Essays (New York: Harvest, 1975), 149–55.
 21. Herman Spector, Bastard in the Ragged Suit: Writings of, with Drawings 
by, Herman Spector (Sacramento: Synergistic Press, 1977), 104.
 22. Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (London: Routledge, 1984), 196.
 23. Theodor W. Adorno, Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (Boston: 
MIT Press, 1997), 32.
 24. Joshua Clover, Chris Nealon and Juliana Spahr, ‘Poetry & Politics 
































 162    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
2011), 2, <http://www.thevolta.org/ewc6-politicsroundtable-p1.html> 
(last accessed 26 November 2014).
 25. Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Reconciliation Under Duress’, in Aesthetics and 
Politics: The Key Texts of the Classic Debate within German Marxism 
(London: Verso, 1980), 164.
 26. Bruce Andrews, ‘Text and Context’, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Supp. 1 (June 
1980), 24.
 27. Spirituality has hitherto dominated discussions of poetry and crisis, 
from Martin Turnell’s Poetry and Crisis (London: Sands, The Paladin 
Press, 1938) and M. H. Abrams’s Mirror and the Lamp (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1953), to Crisis and Confession: Studies in the 
Poetry of Theodore Roethke, Robert Lowell, and Sylvia Plath, by E. V. 
Ramakrishnan (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1988).
 28. Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens, the Poems of Our Climate (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1977), 404.
 29. Of course, in a longer view, and in reality, he does not. The restlessness 
of Wordsworth’s political wavering in The Prelude itself comes to be con-
tinued in Wordsworth’s rewritings of the poem, never satisied and with a 
poetic self still in a state of becoming.
 30. Robert Lowell, Collected Prose (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 
1987), 252; Jerome J. McGann, ‘The Cantos of Ezra Pound, the Truth in 
Contradiction’, in American Modernist Poets, ed. Harold Bloom (New 
York: Infobase Learning, 2011), 86.
 31. The Letters of Robert Duncan and Denise Levertov, ed. Robert J. Bertholf 
and Albert Gelpi (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 608.
 32. Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 
2004), 79.
 33. Lisa Robertson, Nilling (Toronto: BookThug, 2012), 84.
 34. Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 
1969), 255.
 35. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Knopf, 1995), 
30–1; The Order of Things (London: Tavistock, 1970), 157; Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 209.
 36. Foucault, Beyond Structuralism, 206.
 37. Wilfred Owen, The Complete Poems and Fragments, ed. Jon Stallworthy 
(London: Norton, 1984), 535.
Chapter 1
 1. Hugh Kenner, A Homemade World (London: Johns Hopkins, 1989), 169.
 2. To give a few examples: Kenneth Rexroth would become a founder-mem-
ber of Soviet-sponsored League of American Writers; John Wheelwright, 
editor of the self-consciously revolutionary pamphlets Poems for Two 
Bits and Poems for a Dime, would found the Trotskyist Socialist Workers 
Party; Harry Roskolenkier (real name Roskolenko) was a leftist poet and 
hack also associated with the SWP; Zukofsky’s later infamous university 
































Notes     163
by New Masses and on its staff by 1931, following his editorship of the 
Daily Worker; and Norman Macleod was the most published of all poets 
associated with the political vanguard, whose poetic igurehead he briely 
became in the 1930s.
 3. Eric Mottram, ‘1924–1951: Politics and Form in Zukofsky’, MAPS 5 
(1973), 77, 97.
 4. Robert Hass, ‘Zukofsky at the Outset’, The American Poetry Review 34:5 
(September/October 2005), 69; Peter Quartermain, Disjunctive Poetics: 
From Gertrude Stein and Louis Zukofsky to Susan Howe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 87.
 5. Susan Vanderborg, ‘“Words Ranging Forms”: Patterns of Exchange in 
Zukofsky’s Early Lyrics’, in Upper Limit Music: The Writing of Louis 
Zukofsky, ed. Mark Scroggins (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
1997), 201.
 6. Barrett Watten, ‘Tests of Zukofsky’, talk at Wayne University, 29 March 
2004, <http://www.english.wayne.edu/fac_pages/ewatten/posts/post03.
html> (last accessed 10 May 2012).
 7. Ibid.
 8. Charles Bernstein, ‘Introduction’ to Louis Zukofsky, Selected Poems 
(New York: Library of America, 2006), xx–xxi.
 9. Zukofsky writes of his involvement in New Masses to Pound, in a letter 
dated 10 June 1936, and defends the Purges to him on 9 September 1936.
 10. Bernstein, ‘Introduction’, xx.
 11. Eric Homberger, ‘Communists and Objectivists’, in The Objectivist 
Nexus, ed. Peter Quartermain and Rachel Blau DuPlessis (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 1999), 124.
 12. See Al Filreis, Counter-revolution of the Word: The Conservative Attacks 
on Modern Poetry, 1945–1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2008), 3–54; Modernism from Right to Left: Wallace Stevens, the 
Thirties & Literary Radicalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994).
 13. New Masses had a circulation of 100,000 at its peak in December 1936 – 
just as Zukofsky was beginning to get involved at an organisational level.
 14. See Mark Scroggins, ‘The Revolutionary Word: Louis Zukofsky, New 
Masses, and Political Radicalism in the 1930s’, in Upper Limit Music, 
55–61.
 15. The examples are too manifold to go into here: the briefest search of 
radical publications in the index to both the Pound and Williams letters 
will provide ample evidence of Zukofsky’s deep intellectual commitment 
to the literary movement they were, one way or another, part of.
 16. The bastards, nitwits and shitheads are the editors of The Symposium, 
New Masses and Mike Gold respectively.
 17. Mike Gold, ‘Notes of the Month’, New Masses (September 1930), 5.
 18. Ezra Pound, ‘Pound Joins Revolution!’, letter to New Masses, 2 (December 
1926), 3.
 19. Louis Zukofsky, Prepositions: The Collected Critical Essays (London: 
Rapp and Carroll, 1967), 64, 71.
 20. Ibid., 63.
































 164    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
 22. Letter to Pound, 18 January 1936.
 23. See especially Zukofsky’s letters to Pound dated 7 June 1935, 11 July 
1936 and 12 March 1936.
 24. Letter to Pound, 29 October 1933.
 25. Ezra Pound, The Spirit of Romance (London: J. M. Dent, 1910), 8. The 
coexistence of these conlicting impulses was not unique to Zukofsky – 
indeed, one of the main anxieties of the revolutionary left itself was to 
shake off a reputation as the destructive enemy of ‘bourgeois’ tradition 
and re-cast itself, in Joseph Freeman’s words, as ‘militantly ighting for the 
preservation of culture through the triumph of the working class’ in the 
face of fascist, anti-intellectual barbarism (cited in Daniel Aaron, Writers 
on the Left [New York: Columbia University Press, 1992], 286).
 26. Louis Zukofsky, ‘Program: “Objectivists” 1931’, Poetry 37:5 (February 
1931), 268, 274.
 27. Louis Zukofsky, “‘Recencies” in Poetry’, in An ‘Objectivists’ Anthology (Le 
Beausset, France: TO Publishers, 1932), 25; ‘Sincerity and Objectiication: 
With Special Reference to the Work of Charles Reznikoff’, Poetry 37:5 
(February 1931), 276.
 28. Zukofsky, ‘“Recencies”’, 12.
 29. The typescript of the Workers Anthology is available at the Basil Bunting 
Poetry Archive, housed in the University of Durham.
 30. Ezra Pound, ‘Paris Letter’, The Dial 74 (August 1923), 273–80.
 31. Undated letter to Kenneth Burke, Isidor Schneider and Edwin Berry 
Burgham; qtd in Mark Scroggins, The Poem of a Life: A Biography of 
Louis Zukofsky (Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2007), 170.
 32. Blau DuPlessis and Quartermain, Objectivist Nexus, 3.
 33. Zukofsky, Prepositions, 142.
 34. Zukofsky, ‘“Recencies”’, 15.
 35. See Tim Woods, Poetics of the Limit: Ethics and Politics in Modern and 
Contemporary American Poetry (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 
45–51.
 36. Louis Zukosfky, “A” (London: University of California Press, 1978), 4.
 37. Ibid., 2–3.
 38. Ibid., 5.
 39. Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, 
History and Theory 8:1 (1969), 52.
 40. Zukofsky, “A”, 6.
 41. Zukofsky, ‘Program’, 268.
 42. Zukofsky, ‘“Recencies”’, 16; ‘Program’, 268; ‘Sincerity’, 273; ‘Program’, 
269.
 43. Max Eastman, Enjoyment of Living (New York: Harper, 1948), 432.
 44. Alain Badiou, ‘An Essential Philosophical Thesis: “It Is Right to Rebel 
Against the Reactionaries”’, trans. Alberto Toscano, positions: east asia 
cultures critique 13:3 (Winter 2005), 670.
 45. Zukofsky, ‘Program’, 268; Gold, ‘Notes of the Month’, 5.
 46. Morris Schappes, ‘Historic and Contemporary Particulars’, Poetry (March 
1933), 343.
































Notes     165
 48. Herman Spector, Bastard in the Ragged Suit: Writings of, with Drawings 
by, Herman Spector (Sacramento: Synergistic Press, 1977), 104. Spector, 
himself criticised in radical quarters for his afinities with the ‘thin, ema-
ciated verse’ of Zukofsky, would later publish a scathing ‘Dirge for the 
Objectivist Poets’ in Exile, where ‘objectivists stuff cotton into ears, / 
disdain the clear emphatic voices of revolt’ (Herman Spector, ‘Sadly They 
Perish: A Dirge for the Objectivist Poets’, Partisan Review 1:3 [June–July 
1934], 32).
 49. Louis Zukofsky, ‘Objectivists Again’, Poetry (May 1933), 117.
 50. Zukfosky, ‘“Recencies”’, 18.
 51. Zukofsky, ‘Sincerity’, 278.
 52. Ibid., 274. My italics.
 53. Zukofsky, Prepositions, 54.
 54. Zukofsky, ‘“Recencies”’, 25. This dialectic is exhaustively explored by 
Charles Altieri in his important essay, ‘The Objectivist Tradition’, where 
he succinctly describes how ‘Objectivist poetics creates an instrument suf-
iciently subtle to make attention and care – to the world and to the cor-
responding energies the world elicits – ends in themselves. Attention, care, 
and composition become testimony to levels of it between the mind and 
the world in rhythmic interactions that require no supplementary justiica-
tion in the form of abstract meaning’ (in Blau DuPlessis and Quartermain, 
Objectivist Nexus, 32).
 55. Louis Zukofsky, ‘Mantis’ and ‘Mantis: An Interpretation’, All: The 
Collected Shorter Poems (London: Jonathan Cape, 1966), 67–73.
 56. See Woods, Poetics of the Limit, 39–42.
 57. See Bernstein, ‘Introduction’, xviii–xxi. Both Woods and Bernstein want 
to link organic form to the reactionary poetics of the New Criticism, but 
it is equally applicable to the New American Poetry, based on Charles 
Olson and Robert Creeley’s famous statement, ‘Form is never more than 
an extension of content’ (Charles Olson, ‘Projective Verse’, in The New 
American Poetry 1945–1960, ed. Donald Allen [New York: Grove Press, 
1960], 387).
 58. Letter to Pound, 14 November 1934.
 59. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in The Karl 
Marx Library, vol. 1, ed. Saul K. Padover (New York: McGraw Hill, 
1972), 246.
 60. T. S. Eliot, ‘War-Paint and Feathers’, Athenaeum (17 October 1919), 
1036.
 61. Stephen Fredman, Contextual Practice: Assemblage and the Erotic in 
Postwar Poetry (Stanford: University of California Press, 2010), 3, 52.
 62. Zukofsky, ‘“Recencies”’, 11.
 63. Zukofsky, Prepositions, 18.
 64. See Ezra Pound, ABC of Reading (London: Faber, 1951), 13–14; 
Zukofsky, ‘Program’, 268.
 65. Zukofsky, ‘Program’, 268; Prepositions, 17.
 66. Louis Zukofsky, A Test of Poetry (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1952), vii.
 67. Qtd in Scroggins, Poem of a Life, 145.































 166    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
 69. See Ezra Pound, ‘A Retrospect’, Pavannes and Divagations (New York: 
Knopf, 1918); Zukofsky, Test, 87.
 70. Zukofsky, Test, 60.
 71. Zukofsky, Prepositions, 45.
 72. Mark Scroggins, Louis Zukofsky and the Poetry of Knowledge 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 38.
 73. Zukofsky, Test, 56, 60.
 74. Zukofsky, Prepositions, 19.
 75. Ibid., 49.
 76. See letter to Pound, 7 December 1931. Zukosfky writes, ‘I can see or hear 
when [notes] move up or down, & linger or proceed’, but little more.
 77. Zukofsky, Test, 65.
 78. Zukofsky, “A”, 156.
 79. Zukofsky, ‘Program’, 268.
 80. Zukofsky, “A”, 130.
 81. Richard Parker, ‘Canto 75 vs. “A”-24’, Golden Handcuffs Review 1:14 
(Winter–Spring 2011), 276.
 82. Zukofsky, Prepositions, 28.
 83. Louis Zukofsky and Celia Zukofsky, Catullus (London: Cape Goliard, 
1969), n.p.
 84. Ibid., n.p.
 85. Ron Silliman, ‘Composition as Action’, Poetics Journal 3 (May 1983), 74.
 86. See Lawrence Venuti, The Translator’s Invisibility: A History of 
Translation (New York: Routledge, 1995), 214–23, and Paul Mann, 
‘Translating Zukofsky’s Catullus’, Humanities Working Paper 102 
(Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 1984), <http://authors.
library.caltech.edu/17090/1/HumsWP-0102.pdf> (last accessed 26 
November 2014).
 87. Mann, ‘Translating Zukofsky’s Catullus’, 13. The unusual syntax is 
 transcribed as is.
 88. Zukofsky, Prepositions, 17.
 89. See Mark Scroggins, ‘Music and Poetic Form in the Pound/Zukofsky Era’, 
in Louis Zukofsky and the Poetry of Knowledge (Tuscaloosa: University 
of Alabama Press, 1998). Williams also saw, and lamented, the Poundian 
roots of Zukofsky’s notion of music, writing to the latter: ‘What the hell 
do you know about music? I think, very little. You know something of the 
effects music achieves, but that’s all. Don’t for God’s sake the Poundian 
stupidity in that Pound who can’t know music and therefore keeps drag-
ging it in’ (letter dated 19 May 1943).
 90. Ezra Pound, ‘How to Read’, in Literary Essays of Ezra Pound (New York: 
New Directions, 1954), 25.
 91. T. S. Eliot, On Poetry and Poets (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), 
38.
 92. T. S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1964), 118–19.
 93. Ibid., 155.
 94. Archibald MacLeish, ‘Ars Poetica’, in Collected Poems 1917–1982 
(Boston: Houghton Miflin, 1985), 106–7.
































Notes     167
 96. John Cage: In Love with Another Sound, ilm, directed by Miroslav 
Sebestik, 1992.
 97. Ronald Johnson, ‘L.Z.’, in The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, ed. Bruce 
Andrews and Charles Bernstein (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1984), 294.
 98. Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation (London: Vintage, 2001), 14.
 99. Bernstein, ‘Introduction’, xviii.
 100. John Cage, Silence: Lectures and Writings (London: Marion Boyers, 
1978), 130.
 101. Ibid., 3.
 102. Qtd in Michael Kirby and Richard Schechner, ‘An Interview with John 
Cage’, in Happenings and Other Acts, ed. Mariellen Sandford (New 
York: Routledge, 1995), 43. Clearly Cage is a composer, but the applica-
bility of his writings to other art forms is fully borne out in their inluence 
on US culture at large, especially on the poetry of the New York School, 
whose poets have made similar claims about music and the everyday.
 103. Cleanth Brooks, Community, Religion, and Literature: Essays (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1995), 26.
 104. Qtd in interview with L. S. Dembo, in The Contemporary Writer: Interviews 
with Sixteen Novelists and Poets, ed. L. S. Dembo and  Cyrena N. 
Pondrom (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972), 221.
 105. Louis Zukofsky, ‘Peri Poietikes’, in Anew: Complete Shorter Poetry 
(London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 213.
 106. Letter from Pound to Zukofsky, 18 November 1930.
 107. ‘Faster Between the Lines’, interview, Sunday Times (6 October 1966).
 108. Zukofsky, “A”, 511.
 109. See Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of 
Poetry (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1947).
 110. As, for example, in a letter of 1959: ‘Poetry, whatever the “subject” isn’t 
political—and it wouldn’t make sense to me to appear under that stand-
ard. People can read me as they wish—and that’s another matter, but I 
can’t think or see myself a “member” or afiliated under a slogan. It all 
sounds like classiication of literature into social, religious, nationalistic, 
etc. I’m just orthodox: poetry is poetry. As for politics, Mrs. Lee in Adams’ 
Democracy said: “I have got so far as to lose the distinction between right 
and wrong. Isn’t that the irst step in politics?”’ (Louis Zukofsky, Selected 
Letters, ed. Barry Ahearn, <http://www.z-site.net/selected-letters-of-louis-
zukofsky/> [last accessed 26 November 2014], 262).
 111. Zukofsky, “A”, 182.
Chapter 2
 1. Muriel Rukeyser, The Collected Poems of Muriel Rukeyser (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 480.
 2. Muriel Rukeyser, The Life of Poetry (Ashield, MA: Paris Press, 1996), 
41.
 3. Ibid., 213.
































 168    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
 5. Ibid.,183, 213.
 6. See Charles Olson, Additional Prose (Berkeley: Four Seasons, 1974), 40.
 7. Jane Caputi, ‘On Psychic Activism: Feminist Mythmaking’, in The 
Feminist Companion to Mythology, ed. Carolyne Larrington (London: 
Pandora, 1992), 428.
 8. Cited in ibid., 431.
 9. See Ezra Pound, ‘I Gather the Limbs of Osiris’: a sequence of twelve arti-
cles in The New Age from 7 December 1911 to 15 February 1912.
 10. Donna Haraway, The Haraway Reader (New York: Routledge, 2004), 
31.
 11. Ibid., 33.
 12. Ibid., 8.
 13. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, ‘Odysseus or Myth and 
Enlightenment’, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, New German Critique 56 
(Spring–Summer 1992), 109.
 14. Mike Gold, Daily Worker (13 June 1934), 5.
 15. D. S. Mirsky, ‘The End of Bourgeois Poetry’, New Masses (13 November 
1934), 17, 18.
 16. Rolfe Humphries, ‘Eliot’s Poetry’, New Masses (18 August 1936), 26.
 17. Ibid., 26.
 18. Muriel Rukeyser, ‘With Leftward Glances’, New Masses (10 July 1934), 
28.
 19. Christine de Pizan, The Book of the City of Ladies, trans. Earl Jeffrey 
Richards (New York: Persea Books, 1982), 3.
 20. Rukeyser, Collected Poems, 84.
 21. T. S. Eliot, ‘War-Paint and Feathers’, Athenaeum (17 October 1919), 
1036.
 22. The term is Rukeyser’s own. ‘Witness’, she says, is a preferred term due to 
its ‘overtone of responsibility’ (Rukeyser, Life of Poetry, 174–5).
 23. Susan Schweik, A Gulf So Deeply Cut: American Women Poets and the 
Second World War (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 
4.
 24. See James F. Mersmann’s introduction to Out of the Vietnam Vortex: A 
Study of Poets and Poetry Against the War (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1974).
 25. Muriel Rukeyser, Barcelona, 1936: Selections from Muriel Rukeyser’s 
Spanish Civil War Archive, ed. Rowena Kennedy-Epstein (New York: 
CUNY, 2011), 14, 5.
 26. Muriel Rukeyser, ‘Barcelona 1936’, Life and Letters Today, 15 (Autumn 
1936), 28–35. The other articles appeared as ‘Start of Strife in Spain as 
Told by an Eyewitness’, The New York Times (29 July 1936), and ‘Death 
in Spain: Barcelona on the Barricades’, New Masses (1 September 1936). 
All citations to the Life and Letters article refer to Barcelona, where it was 
reprinted.
 27. Rukeyser, Barcelona, 12.
 28. Ibid., 15–16.
 29. Ibid., 19.
 30. Ibid., 22.
































Notes     169
 32. Rukeyser, Barcelona, 15.
 33. Rukeyser, Collected Poems, 145.
 34. Ibid., 145.
 35. Ibid., 146.
 36. Ibid., 146.
 37. Ibid., 145.
 38. Ibid., 148.
 39. Ibid., 149.
 40. Ibid., 149.
 41. Ibid., 151.
 42. The pamphlet can be seen in the New York Public Library’s Berg 
Collection.
 43. Rukeyser, Collected Poems, 203.
 44. Rukeyser, Life of Poetry, 20.
 45. Anon., ‘Grandeur and Misery of a Poster Girl’, Partisan Review 10 
(1943), 471–3. Louise Bogan, review of Wake Island, New Yorker (31 
October 1942), 68.
 46. Rukeyser, Life of Poetry, 210–11.
 47. Maurice Blanchot, ‘War and Literature’, in Friendship (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), 109.
 48. Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1946), 296.
 49. My analysis here is heavily indebted to, though also at odds with, Michael 
Bell’s brilliant discussion of Pound and Eliot in Literature, Modernism 
and Myth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 120–47.
 50. Ezra Pound, The Spirit of Romance (London: J. M. Dent, 1910), 26, 
166–7.
 51. Rukeyser, Life of Poetry, 14; T. S. Eliot, Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot (New 
York: Harcourt Brace, 1975), 177.
 52. Rukeyser, Life of Poetry, 1.
 53. Ibid., 21.
 54. Ibid., 31.
 55. William Carlos Williams, Selected Essays of William Carlos Williams 
(New York: Random House, 1954), 21.
 56. John Dryden, The Poems of John Dryden, Volume Five: 1697–1700 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 605.
 57. Rukeyser, Collected Poems, 238–9.
 58. Ibid., 611.
 59. Ibid., 207.
 60. Ibid., 208.
 61. Ibid., 209–10.
 62. Ibid., 210–11.
 63. Ibid., 211.
 64. Rukeyser, Life of Poetry, 41.
 65. Cited in H.D., Trilogy (New York: New Directions, 1998), viii.
 66. Rukeyser, Collected Poems, 239.
 67. Ibid., 213.
 68. Ibid., 209.































 170    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
 70. Oscar Williams (ed.), The War Poets: An Anthology of the War Poetry of 
the 20th Century (New York: John Day, 1945), 4.
Chapter 3
 1. See Tom Clark, Charles Olson: The Allegory of a Poet’s Life (Berkeley: 
North Atlantic Books, 1991), 94–5; Robert van Hallberg, Charles Olson: 
The Scholar’s Art (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 
10–14; Heriberto Yépez, The Empire of Neomemory, trans. Jen Hofer, 
Christian Nagler and Brian Whitener (Oakland, CA: ChainLinks, 2013).
 2. Charles Olson, The Collected Poems of Charles Olson (Excluding the 
Maximus Poems), ed. George F. Butterick (Berkeley, Los Angeles and 
London: University of California Press, 1997), 14.
 3. Cited in Clark, Allegory of a Poet’s Life, 77.
 4. Charles Olson, ‘Letter to Ruth Benedict (12 Jan 1945)’, in ‘Key West I’, 
OLSON 5 (Spring 1976), n.p.
 5. I take the phrase ‘constituent power’ from Antonio Negri, who describes 
it as ‘the project of the multitude, a creative force, a living god’, stressing 
its permanently creative character: ‘the constituent process never closes. . . 
the revolution does not come to an end’. Antonio Negri, ‘Constituent 
Republic’, in Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, ed. Michael 
Hardt and Paolo Virno (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 
222.
 6. Don Byrd, Charles Olson’s Maximus (Champaign: University of Illinois 
Press, 1980), xiii.
 7. Charles Olson, Letters for Origin, ed. Albert Glover (London: Cape 
Goliard, 1970), 102.
 8. David Herd notes: ‘When in 1952 Partisan Review ran a symposium 
entitled “Our Country Our Culture”, it was clear that in so far as writers 
thought about foreign policy, their thinking was almost exclusively 
within the limits of Cold War opposition, turning on the question of how 
American artists might articulate the more defensible aspects of American 
culture. Olson’s reach was more troubling. He sought in his early poetry 
and prose to establish a background of internationalised space as the 
arena within which to imagine human suffering’ (David Herd, ‘“From 
him only will the old State-secret Come”: What Charles Olson Imagined’, 
English 59:227 [2010], 381).
 9. Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture 
in the Twentieth Century (London: Verso, 1997), 82.
 10. Clark, Allegory of a Poet’s Life, 84.
 11. Olson, Collected Poems, 165.
 12. Charles Olson, Collected Prose, ed. Donald Allen and Benjamin 
Friedlander, intro. Robert Creeley (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: 
University of California Press, 1997), 160.
 13. Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the 
Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics (New York: 
Pantheon, 1974), 71.
































Notes     171
International Affairs 2 (1988), 21. Also qtd in Giovanni Arrighi, The 
Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times 
(London: Verso, 2010), 21.
 15. Olson’s thinking here, of course, its with a wider trend among the politi-
cal thinkers that were his contemporaries, such as Hannah Arendt, to 
igure the nation-state itself as having irrevocably lost its status as the 
kind of guarantor of freedoms and agency. For an account of this see 
David Herd, ‘“In the Dawn that is Nowhere”: The New American Poetry 
and the State of Exception’, in The New American Poetry: Fifty Years 
Later, ed. John Woznicki (Lanham, MD: Lehigh University Press, 2014), 
155–70.
 16. Charles Olson, Charles Olson and Ezra Pound: An Encounter at St. 
Elizabeths, ed. Catherine Seelye (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1975), 
xix–xx.
 17. Qtd in Herd, ‘What Charles Olson Imagined’, 387.
 18. Olson, Collected Prose, 200.
 19. Ibid., 66. The phrase also appears in Collected Poems, 472.
 20. Clark, Allegory of a Poet’s Life, 84.
 21. Ibid., 84.
 22. Charles Olson, The Maximus Poems, ed. George F. Butterick (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1983), 39.
 23. Olson, Collected Prose, 109.
 24. Ibid., 106.
 25. Qtd in Ralph Maud, Charles Olson’s Reading: A Biography (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1999), 57.
 26. Olson, St. Elizabeths, 53.
 27. Charles Olson and Frances Bolderoff, Charles Olson and Frances 
Bolderoff: A Modern Correspondence, ed. Ralph Maud and Sharon 
Thesen (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1999), 256.
 28. Charles Olson, Selected Letters, ed. Ralph Maud (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2000), 85.
 29. Robert Payne, The Revolt of Asia (New York: John Day, 1947), 4.
 30. Ibid., 1.
 31. Olson, Collected Prose, 162.
 32. In the original these lines carried quotation marks that were removed 
from the inal version.
 33. Olson and Bolderoff, Charles Olson and Frances Bolderoff, 422; Charles 
Olson, Muthologos, vol. 1 (Bolinas, CA: Four Seasons Foundation, 1978), 
142.
 34. Mao Zedong, Collected Writings of Chairman Mao, vol. 3, ed. Shawn 
Connors (El Paso: Norte Press, 2009), 26; Olson, Selected Writings, ed. 
and intro. Robert Creeley (New York: New Directions, 1966), 53, 55.
 35. Payne, Revolt of Asia, 147.
 36. Olson, ‘The Kingishers’, Collected Poems, 86–93.
 37. Olson, Collected Prose, 66.
 38. Olson, Selected Writings, 84.
 39. Qtd in Clark, Allegory of a Poet’s Life, 124.
 40. Guy Davenport, ‘Scholia and Conjectures for Olson’s “The Kingishers”’, 
































 172    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
 41. Olson, Selected Writings, 78.
 42. Qtd in Maud, Charles Olson’s Reading, 54.
 43. Olson and Bolderoff, Charles Olson and Frances Bolderoff, 422.
 44. Ibid., 422.
 45. Olson, Collected Prose, 27.
 46. Olson, St. Elizabeths, 53, 83; Olson, Selected Writings, 82.
 47. Olson, Collected Poems, 47.
 48. Ibid., 83.
 49. Ibid., 127.
 50. Ibid., 189.
 51. Charles Olson, Mayan Letters, ed. Robert Creeley (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1968), 5–6.
 52. For an account of the poem’s genesis in a dream Olson had, see Michael 
Rumaker, Black Mountain Days (New York: Spuyten Duyvil, 2012), 175.
 53. Robert Duncan, The H.D. Book, ed. Michael Boughn and Victor 
Coleman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 218.
 54. Olson, Collected Poems, 431.
 55. Ibid., 363.
 56. Olson, ‘As the Dead Prey Upon Us’, Collected Poems, 388–95.
 57. Ibid., 391.
 58. Olson, ‘A Newly Discovered Homeric Hymn’, Collected Poems, 364.
 59. See ‘I have been an ability—a machine’, in Olson, Maximus Poems, 495.
 60. Olson, Collected Prose, 163.
 61. Qtd in Charles Olson, The Special View of History, ed. Ann Charters 
(Berkeley: Oyez, 1970), 12.
 62. Charles Olson, letter to Vincent Ferrini, 7 November 1950, Origin 1:1 
(Spring 1951), 6.
 63. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Free Press, 1978), 290.
 64. Ibid., 21.
 65. Olson, Special View of History, 33.
 66. Ibid., 18.
 67. Ibid., 26.
 68. Ibid., 34.
 69. Ibid., 17.
 70. Ibid., 25.
 71. Alain Badiou, Peut-on penser la politique? (Paris: Seuil, 1985), 78.
 72. Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: 
Continuum, 2006), 507.
 73. Olson, Special View of History, 47–8, 17; Mayan Letters, 67.
 74. Olson, Special View of History, 58.
 75. Olson, Collected Prose, 159.
 76. Olson, Letters for Origin, 103.
 77. Olson, Maximus Poems, 105.
 78. Charles Bernstein, Content’s Dream (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 2001), 328.
 79. Robert Creeley, A Quick Graph: Collected Notes and Essays, ed. Donald 
Allen (San Francisco: Four Seasons Foundation, 1970), 71.
 80. Olson, Special View of History, 45.
































Notes     173
Emersonian Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
38.
 82. Olson, Mayan Letters, 67.
 83. Olson, Collected Prose, 105.
 84. Olson, Special View of History, 26.
 85. Jane Harrison, Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 328.
 86. Ibid., 330. My italics.
 87. Charles Olson, ‘The Area, and the Discipline of, Totality’ in OLSON 10 
(Fall 1978), 97.
 88. Charles Olson, ‘A Letter to the Faculty of Black Mountain College’, 
Olson: The Journal of the Charles Olson Archives 8 (Fall 1977), 28.
 89. Charles Olson, ‘On Black Mountain’, in Muthologos, vol. 2 (Bolinas, CA: 
Four Seasons Foundation, 1979), 74. My italics.
 90. Olson, Collected Prose, 162.
 91. Ibid., 162.
 92. Olson, ‘On Black Mountain’, 57.
 93. Ibid., 78.
 94. Ibid., 68.
 95. Ibid., 74.
 96. Qtd in Ammiel Alcalay, A Little History (New York: UpSet Press, 2012), 
112.
 97. Olson, ‘On Black Mountain’, 69.
 98. Ibid., 67.
 99. The minutes of Black Mountain are available in the State Archives of 
North Carolina, Western Regional Ofice, box 506.1.10.
 100. This was misconstrued in the meeting by Victor Sprague, who said: 
‘Olson thinks Black Mountain [is] a college set up to take care of aberrant 
personalities.’
 101. On 2 May 1952, a motion was carried that put BMC two hours ahead of 
local time to save daylight.
 102. Olson, ‘On Black Mountain’, 67.
 103. Ibid., 74.
 104. Ibid., 74.
 105. Charles Olson and Cid Corman, Charles Olson & Cid Corman: Complete 
Correspondence 1950–1964, vol. 1 (Orono: National Poetry Foundation, 
University of Maine, 1987), 45. Duncan comments on this aspect of the 
college in day-to-day terms in relation to Olson: ‘Olson accepted the 
chaotic environment as part of an artist’s “coming to crisis” . . . [Black 
Mountain was] exactly what Charles was in many ways looking for, a 
person who will never be away from his crisis, whose crisis is seemingly 
catastrophic, and who remains an intact person’ (qtd in Mary Emma 
Harris, The Arts at Black Mountain College [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2002], 178).
 106. Olson, ‘On Black Mountain’, 64; Olson, Letters for Origin, 70.
 107. van Hallberg, The Scholar’s Art, 15.
 108. Qtd in Alcalay, A Little History, 142.
































 174    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
Chapter 4
 1. James Sullivan, On the Walls and in the Streets: American Poetry Broadsides 
from the 1960s (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 2.
 2. Robert van Hallberg, American Poetry and Culture 1945–80 (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), 145.
 3. See Caroline Slocock, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds: The 1st Casualty 
Press’, Journal of American Studies 16:1 (1982), 108–10. Other notable 
anthologies include A Poetry Reading Against the Vietnam War (1966), 
Where Is Vietnam? (1967), Poems of War Resistance (1968), Out of the 
War Shadow (1968), Campires of the Resistance (1971), and most suc-
cessfully of all, Winning Hearts and Minds (1972).
 4. See Abigail Deutsch, ‘100 Years of Poetry: The Magazine and War’, 
Poetry Foundation, <http://www.poetryfoundation.org/article/245104> 
(last accessed 26 November 2014).
 5. John Ashbery, ‘Frank O’Hara’s Question’, Book Week (25 September 
1966), 23–4. His italics.
 6. John Ashbery, letter to editor, The Nation, 29 May 1967, letters.
 7. Robert Duncan and Denise Levertov, The Letters of Robert Duncan 
and Denise Levertov, ed. Robert J. Bertholf and Albert Gelpi (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), 692.
 8. Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Poetry as Insurgent Art (New York: New 
Directions, 2007), 65.
 9. Robert Bly, ‘Protest’, New York Review of Books 9:11 (21 December 
1967), letters.
 10. Though Scott Bates’s 1969 anthology Poems of War Resistance from 
2300 B.C. to the Present (New York: Grossman) was a notable attempt 
to consciously reframe poetic tradition in such liberatory terms.
 11. There were notable exceptions, of course. Jack Spicer, in a lecture entitled 
‘Poetry and Politics’, told his audience: ‘you’re not going to be able to do a 
good goddamn thing about Vietnam—that’s absolutely out’, and attacked 
poets like Ginsberg for attempting to write anti-war poems.
 12. Charles Altieri, Enlarging the Temple: New Directions in American 
Poetry During the 1960s (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 
1980), 24, 78.
 13. Ibid., 232.
 14. See Thomas à Kempis, The Imitation of Christ (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
2005), Book 2, Chapter 6, ‘On the satisfaction of a clear conscience’, 
53–4.
 15. Qtd in Blake Slonecker, A New Dawn for the New Left: Liberation News 
Service, Montague Farm, and the Long Sixties (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012).
 16. Louis Simpson, ‘Dead Horses and Live Issues’, The Nation (24 April 
1967), 522.
 17. Robert Bly, ‘On Political Poetry’, The Nation (24 April 1967), 522.
 18. Ibid., 522.
 19. Letters of Robert Duncan and Denise Levertov, 608.

































Notes     175
 21. Correspondence in Poetry (September 1972), 362.
 22. See David Farber, The Sixties: From Memory to History (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 1–4.
 23. Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1964). Jameson makes similar observations about transformations 
of social movements at large through the sixties as move away from a 
Marxist vanguardism setting out to inluence the actions of others, toward 
the communitarian spirit of dissent toward opposition simply lived and 
enacted in self-protective coteries, and then, signiicantly, back again. (See 
Fredric Jameson, ‘Periodizing the 60s’, Social Text 9/10 [Spring–Summer 
1984], 178–209.)
 24. Jameson roots this shift in the First World in the apparent success of 
‘alternative’ (i.e. not conventionally Marxist-Leninist) political move-
ments in the Third, the disappearance of communist forces in America 
around 1956, as well as the more general lesson of the non-transparent 
nature of political practice, now veiled behind the ‘impersonal logic’ of a 
newly powerful media apparatus. His ‘Periodizing the 60s’ remains the 
most incisive charting of the changing political logic of the decade.
 25. Robert Bly, Talking All Morning (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1980), 98.
 26. Philip Metres, Behind the Lines: War Resistance Poetry on the American 
Home Front Since 1941 (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2007), 108.
 27. Robert Bly, Selected Poems (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 76–86.
 28. Robert Duncan, Bending the Bow (New York: New Directions, 1968), 
81.
 29. Letters of Robert Duncan and Denise Levertov, 563.
 30. Duncan, Bending the Bow, 82.
 31. Letters of Robert Duncan and Denise Levertov, 661.
 32. Ibid., 696.
 33. Ibid., 660.
 34. Ibid., 701.
 35. Duncan, Bending the Bow, 120.
 36. James F. Mersmann, Out of the Vietnam Vortex: A Study of Poets and 
Poetry Against the War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1974), 
77–8.
 37. Denise Levertov, The Poet in the World (New York: New Directions, 
1973), 7.
 38. Denise Levertov, New and Selected Essays (New York: New Directions, 
1992), 73.
 39. Ibid., 243.
 40. Levertov, The Poet in the World, 115; Ron Silliman, in interview with 
Gary Sullivan, Readme 3 (Summer 2000), <http://home.jps.net/~nada/sil 
liman.htm> (last accessed 26 November 2014).
 41. Denise Levertov, Poems 1968–1972 (New York: New Directions, 1987), 
123.
 42. Levertov refers to this as ‘my Ibsen quote’ in Letters of Robert Duncan 
and Denise Levertov, 316–17.
 43. Letters of Robert Duncan and Denise Levertov, 530.
































 176    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
 45. Cary Nelson, Our First Last Poets: Vision and History in Contemporary 
American Poetry (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981), 9.
 46. Laura Quinney, The Poetics of Disappointment: Wordsworth to Ashbery 
(London: University Press of Virginia, 1999), 137.
 47. Ibid., 2.
 48. See Letters of Robert Duncan and Denise Levertov, 563.
 49. Levertov, Poems 1968–1972, 121–2.
 50. Thomas Merton, ‘War and the Crisis of Language’, in The Critique of 
War: Contemporary Philosophical Explorations, ed. Robert Ginsberg 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1969), 113. His italics.
 51. Giorgio Agamben, The End of the Poem: Essays in Poetics (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), 113.
 52. Letters of Robert Duncan and Denise Levertov, 683.
 53. Levertov, Poems 1968–1972, 150.
 54. Ibid., 147.
 55. José Rodríguez Herrera, ‘Revolution or Death: Levertov’s Poetry in Time 
of War’, in Robert Duncan and Denise Levertov: The Poetry of Politics, 
the Politics of Poetry, ed. Albert Gelpi and Robert J. Bertholf (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2006), 156. His italics.
 56. Levertov, Poems 1968–1972, 142.
 57. Denise Levertov, Selected Criticism, ed. Albert Gelpi (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1993), 270.
 58. Levertov, Poems 1968–1972, 165.
 59. Levertov, Selected Criticism, 154.
 60. Michael Bibby, Hearts and Minds: Bodies, Poetry, and Resistance in the 
Vietnam Era (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1996), 175.
 61. The review is quoted in Letters of Robert Duncan and Denise Levertov, 
588.
 62. Levertov, The Poet in the World, 45.
 63. R. D. Rosen, ‘James Tate and Sidney Goldfarb and the Inexhaustible 
Nature of the Murmur’, in American Poetry Since 1960: Some Critical 
Perspectives, ed. Robert Burns Shaw (Manchester: Carcanet, 1973), 182.
 64. Paul Carroll, ‘“I Lift My Voice Aloud . . .”’, in On the Poetry of Allen 
Ginsberg, ed. Lewis Hyde (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1984), 310.
 65. Altieri, Enlarging the Temple, 131; Paul Breslin, The Psycho-Political 
Muse: American Poetry Since the Fifties (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987), 24, 31.
 66. Marjorie Perloff, Poetic License: Essays on Modernist and Postmodernist 
Lyric (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990), 203, 215.
 67. Helen Vendler, ‘Review of The Fall of America’, in Hyde, On the Poetry 
of Allen Ginsberg, 209.
 68. Nelson, Our First Last Poets, 15.
 69. Michael Schumacher, Dharma Lion: A Critical Biography of Allen 
Ginsberg (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 469.
 70. The poet literally recorded both in situ on a tape machine given to him by 
Bob Dylan.
 71. Allen Ginsberg, Collected Poems (London: Penguin, 2009), 402, 403.
































Notes     177
 73. Perloff, Poetic License, 215.
 74. Ginsberg, Collected Poems, 405.
 75. George Oppen, New Collected Poems (Manchester: Carcanet, 2003), 167.
 76. Ginsberg, Collected Poems, 413.
 77. Richard Howard, Alone with America: Essays on the Art of Poetry in the 
United States Since 1950 (New York: Atheneum, 1980), 183.
 78. Ginsberg, Collected Poems, 415.
 79. Allen Ginsberg, Composed on the Tongue, ed. Donald Allen (Bolinas: 
Grey Fox Press, 1980), 43.
 80. And not merely the poet’s, as Ginsberg’s ‘Demonstration or Spectacle as 
Example’ states explicitly: ‘We have to use our imagination. A spectacle 
can be made, an unmistakable statement OUTSIDE the war psychology 
which is leading nowhere (Allen Ginsberg, Deliberate Prose: Selected 
Essays, 1952–1995, ed. Bill Morgan [New York: HarperCollins, 2000], 
10. His italics.)
 81. Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counterculture (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1968), 29. Roszak, as editor of Peace News, was one 
of the original publishers of Wichita Vortex Sutra.
 82. Michael Davidson, Ghostlier Demarcations: Modern Poetry and the 
Material Word (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 206.
 83. Ginsberg, Collected Poems, 417, 416.
 84. Mark Silverberg, The New York School Poets and the Neo-Avant-Garde: 
Between Radical Art and Radical Chic (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 201–2.
 85. Paul Goodman, ‘Advance-guard Writing 1900–1950’, The Kenyon 
Review 13:3 (Summer 1951), 375–6. His italics.
 86. Ibid., 375–6. My italics.
 87. Michael Davidson, The San Francisco Renaissance: Poetics and 
Community at Mid-century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 40. The phrase is taken from Duncan’s ‘Ode to Dick Brown’.
 88. See Irving Howe, ‘The Idea of the Modern’, in Literary Modernism 
(Greenwich, CT: Fawcett, 1967); James S. Ackerman, ‘The Demise of the 
Avant-Garde’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 11:4 (October 
1969), 371–84; Leslie Fiedler, ‘Death of Avant-Garde Literature’, in The 
Collected Essays of Leslie Fiedler, vol. 2 (New York: Stein and Day, 
1971), 454–61.
 89. See Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation (London: Vintage, 2001); John 
Cage, ‘Lecture on Something’, in Silence: Lectures and Writings (London: 
Marion Boyers, 1978), 129.
 90. I take this position to be intimately related to the issue of coterie: Olson is 
a similar case to Ginsberg since in both his poetry and activities at Black 
Mountain College, the aesthetic and political are radically mixed; whereas 
hermitic writers like Duncan and Spicer hold faith in a pure sense of the 
poetic object.
Chapter 5
 1. Notable examples, beyond the two I go on to describe here, include: 































 178    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
Imamu Baraka’, in Afro-American Poetics: Revisions of Harlem and the 
Black Aesthetic (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 111–39; 
William J. Harris, The Poetry and Poetics of Amiri Baraka: The Jazz 
Aesthetic (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985).
 2. Kimberly Benston, Performing Blackness: Enactments of African-
American Modernism (New York: Routledge, 2000), 191; Nathaniel 
Mackey, ‘The Changing Same: Black Music in the Poetry of Amiri 
Baraka’, in Contemporary Poets, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea 
House, 1986), 400.
 3. Benston, Performing Blackness, 202–3. The historical context of Baraka’s 
work also goes unmentioned by Benston, with Preface to a Twenty-
Volume Suicide Note (1961) and In the Tradition (1982) discussed 
together as if they had identical political contents and motivations.
 4. Amiri Baraka, ‘New Black Music’, in Black Music (New York: Akashic 
Books, 2010), 174–5.
 5. Amiri Baraka, The LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka Reader, ed. William J. 
Harris (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1991), 186. His italics.
 6. Baraka, ‘New Black Music’, 175.
 7. James Baldwin, ‘Of the Sorrow Songs: The Cross of Redemption’, in The 
Picador Book of Blues and Jazz, ed. James Campbell (London: Picador, 
1996), 330. Originally published in Views on Black American Music 2:12 
(1979).
 8. Baraka, Dutchman, in LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka Reader, 35–6.
 9. W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Bantam Classics, 
1989), 2–3.
 10. See, for example, Philip Brian Harper, Are We Not Men?: Masculine 
Anxiety and the Problem of African-American Identity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 44–6, and ‘Nationalism and Social Division in 
Black Arts Poetry of the 1960s’, in Is It Nation Time?: Contemporary 
Essays on Black Power and Black Nationalism, ed. Eddie S. Glaude 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 181–6, which see the 
supposed binary structure of ‘me’ and ‘you’ as typifying the Black Arts 
movement in general; or Patrick Johnson, Appropriating Blackness: 
Performance and the Politics of Authenticity (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2003), 24–6; or again Lisa Siraganian, Modernism’s 
Other Work: The Art Object’s Political Life (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 160–1.
 11. Harper, ‘Nationalism and Social Division’, 182.
 12. The often muted and restrained delivery of the poem, such as at 
San Francisco State University on 4 March 1965, supports such a 
claim.
 13. Baraka, LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka Reader, 16.
 14. Amiri Baraka, Selected Poetry of Amiri Baraka/LeRoi Jones (New York: 
William Morrow, 1979), 99.
 15. Amiri Baraka, The Autobiography of LeRoi Jones (Chicago: Lawrence 
Hill, 2012), 445. See also Komozi Woodard, A Nation within a Nation: 
Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones) and Black Power Politics (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 219–54.
































Notes     179
Digest (July 1975), 30–42, for Baraka’s most comprehensive, contempo-
rary account of this. The article was adapted from a speech given to the 
Congress of Afrikan Peoples in March 1975.
 17. Jerry Gaio Watts, Amiri Baraka: The Politics and Art of a Black 
Intellectual (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 459; Werner 
Sollors, Amiri Baraka/LeRoi Jones: The Quest for a ‘Populist Modernism’ 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 237; Alex Houen, Powers 
of Possibility: Experimental American Writing since the 1960s (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 102.
 18. Amiri Baraka, Hard Facts: (Excerpts) (Newark: Revolutionary Communist 
League, 1975), 29.
 19. Ibid.: the short introduction to the book is unpaginated.
 20. Ibid.
 21. Ibid., 30.
 22. Ibid., 31.
 23. Baraka, Black Music, 244.
 24. Amiri Baraka, Conversations with Amiri Baraka, ed. Charlie Reilly 
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1994), 112.
 25. Ibid., 174.
 26. Ibid., 115.
 27. Ibid., 111–12.
 28. Baraka, ‘Why I Changed My Ideology’, 41–2.
 29. Baraka, Hard Facts, 23.
 30. Baraka, Conversations, 141, 244.
 31. Ibid., 118.
 32. For a brief account of this see Aldon Neilsen, Black Chant: Languages 
of African-American Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 188–90.
 33. Ibid., 111.
 34. Ibid., 142.
 35. This set of poems was only ever published at the end of Baraka’s 1979 
Selected Poetry of Amiri Baraka/LeRoi Jones (New York: William 
Morrow), 275–340.
 36. Baraka, Selected Poetry, 323.
 37. Recording of a reading with Amiri Baraka, Diane diPrima and Robert 
Duncan: Naropa Institute, 26 July 1978.
 38. Baraka, Black Music, 70.
 39. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie (Mineola: 
Dover 2003), 305, 372.
 40. Sascha Feinstein, ‘Better You Say It First: An Interview with Amiri 
Baraka’, Brilliant Corners 4 (Winter 1999), 77.
 41. Harris, Poetry and Poetics of Amiri Baraka, 106, 110.
 42. Introduction to Close Listening: Poetry and the Performed Word, ed. 
Charles Bernstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 8.
 43. Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 37.
 44. Gilroy has noted Baraka’s inluence on his own cultural studies explicitly 
(in, for example, his keynote address at the 2014 Baraka retrospective 
































 180    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
notion of black music as a ‘changing same’ in Gilroy’s work. See Baraka, 
‘The Changing Same’, in Black Music, 205–44.
 45. Baraka, Black Music, 160.
 46. Benston’s work is articulate in describing this dialectic: see Benston, 
Performing Blackness, 193–4.
 47. The most different versions are those on recording released on Poets Read 
Their Contemporary Poetry (Smithsonian Folkways, 1980), and, accom-
panied, on 1982’s New Music, New Poetry.
 48. The text here is that from The LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka Reader (263–6) 
rather than the very different version in Selected Poems, since the former’s 
layout resembles Baraka’s speech patterns much more closely.
 49. Amiri Baraka, AM/TRAK (New York: Phoenix Bookshop, 1979). The 
version quoted here refers to the text in The LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka 
Reader, 267–72.
 50. For an account of these poems see Chapter 5 of Sascha Feinstein’s Jazz 
Poetry: From the 1920s to the Present (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press, 
1997).
 51. See Baraka, ‘The Changing Same’.
 52. Werner Sollors interview with Baraka, in Amiri Baraka/LeRoi Jones: The 
Quest for a ‘Populist Modernism’, 256.
 53. Text from The LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka Reader, 302–10.
 54. Daniel Won-gu Kim, ‘“In the Tradition”: Amiri Baraka, Black Liberation, 
and Avant-Garde Praxis in the U.S.’, African American Review 37:2/3 
(Summer–Autumn 2003), 357.
 55. Baraka, Black Music, 186.
Chapter 6
 1. Some notes on periodisation are necessary here. I am placing 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E magazine at the centre of the movement’s emer-
gence because it is in its pages that the political thinking of the move-
ment appears, and therefore the most coherent articulation of its poetics. 
This magazine, which started in 1971, is often placed as the movement’s 
genesis, but at least in its early years the magazine contained far too 
diffuse a collection of writers and no systematic aesthetic, the movement’s 
most inluential quality, that could be likened to L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 
– though the magazine is, in the latter half of the seventies, along with 
Lyn Hejinian’s Tuumba Press and Silliman’s 1975 mini-anthology of 
Language poetry in Alcheringa (New Series 1:2 [1975], 104–20), inlu-
ential in establishing a canon of Language poets. L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 
magazine’s editors speak of the publication as in itself vanguard, 
as indeed creating the movement. Bernstein says in retrospect that 
Language poetry ‘looks like more of a pre-existing group, but I would say 
[L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E] was more of an editorial and territorial project, 
that brought things together that were disparate, but that had certain 
aspects of a shared aesthetic’ (Charles Bernstein, interview with David 
Wilk, WritersCast (12 April 2014), <http://www.writerscast.com/index.
































Notes     181
 2. Reports of Selected Cases Decided in Courts of the State of New York 
other than the Court of Appeals and the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court: Miscellaneous Reports (New York: Williams Press, 
1976), 699.
 3. Michael French, US Economic History Since 1945 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1997), 94.
 4. Kim Moody, From Welfare State to Real Estate: Regime Change in New 
York City, 1974 to the Present (New York: New Press, 2007), 45.
 5. Joshua Freeman, Working Class New York: Life and Labor Since World 
War II (New York: New Press, 2000), 256.
 6. Ibid., 256.
 7. See David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 43–55.
 8. Oren Izenberg, Being Numerous: Poetry and the Ground of Social Life 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 144.
 9. Leon Trotsky, Our Political Tasks (1904), <http://www.marxists.org/
archive/trotsky/1904/tasks/ch03.htm> (last accessed 26 November 
2014).
 10. Charles Bernstein, ‘The Dollar Value of Poetry’, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 
9/10 (October 1979), 9. Many essays printed in L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 
were later printed elsewhere in essay collections of individual writers, 
but since the entire run of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E is available for free at 
eclipsearchive.org, references are to the magazine, with page numbers to 
the originally unnumbered issues supplied for convenience.
 11. Steve McCaffery, ‘From the Notebooks’, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 9/10 
(October 1979), 31; Ron Silliman, The New Sentence (New York: Roof, 
1987), 93.
 12. Douglas Messerli (ed.), ‘Language’ Poetries: An Anthology (New York: 
New Directions, 1987), 3.
 13. McCaffery, ‘From the Notebooks’, 32.
 14. Charles Bernstein, ‘Stray Straws and Straw Men’, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 
Supp. 1 (June 1980), 39–40.
 15. Ron Silliman, ‘For Open Letter’, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Supp. 1 (June 
1980), 31; Steve McCaffery, ‘Death of the Subject: The Implications 
of Counter-Communication in Recent Language-Centred Writing’, 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Supp. 1 (June 1980), 8.
 16. Bruce Andrews, ‘Text and Context’, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Supp. 1 (June 
1980), 23; Steve McCaffery, ‘Intraview’, in The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 
Book, ed. Bruce Andrews and Charles Bernstein (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1984), 189. The piece never appeared in 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E magazine.
 17. The most impressive of these, which also trenchantly introduce a number 
of the other most common criticisms of Language, include: J. H. Prynne, 
‘A Letter to Steve McCaffery (2nd January 1989)’, The Gig 7 (November 
2000), 40–7; Geoff Ward, Language Poetry and the American Avant-
Garde (Keele: British Association of American Studies, 1993); Charles 
Altieri, ‘Without Consequences Is No Politics: A Response to Jerome 
McGann’, in Politics and Poetic Value, ed. Robert van Hallberg (Chicago: 
































 182    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
 18. Barrett Watten, The Constructivist Moment: From Material Text to 
Cultural Politics (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2003), 46.
 19. For examples in L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E see James Sherry, A, B, $ (9/10, 
41–3); Silliman on the ‘narrative fetish’ of Surrealism (Supp. 3, 130) and 
in ‘Benjamin Obscura’ (6, 14–16) and throughout the ‘Paciica Interview’ 
of Bernstein, Andrews and Susan Howe (Supp. 3, 25–34).
 20. See Watten, Constructivist Moment, 46–64.
 21. Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984), 58; ‘Avant-Garde and 
Neo-Avant-Garde: An Attempt to Answer Certain Critics of Theory of the 
Avant-Garde’, New Literary History 41:4 (Autumn 2010), 706.
 22. Bürger, ‘Avant-Garde and Neo-Avant-Garde’, 707.
 23. Charles Bernstein, Content’s Dream: Essays, 1975–1984 (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2001), 29.
 24. McCaffery, ‘Death of the Subject’, 9.
 25. Ibid., 11.
 26. Andrews, ‘Text and Context’, 24.
 27. Silliman, ‘For Open Letter’, 31.
 28. Charles Bernstein, introduction to ‘Language Sampler’, Paris Review 86 
(Winter 1982), 75; Content’s Dream, 29.
 29. McCaffery, ‘From the Notebooks’, 31.
 30. Bruce Andrews and Charles Bernstein (eds), The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 
Book (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), x; Bernstein, 
Content’s Dream, 81.
 31. Bernstein, Content’s Dream, 408.
 32. Ron Silliman, ‘If By “Writing” We Mean Literature (if by we mean poetry 
(if . . .)) . . .’, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 9/10 (October 1979), 45.
 33. Jed Rasula, The American Poetry Wax Museum: Reality Effects, 1940–
1990 (Urbana: National Council of Teachers of English, 1996), 399.
 34. Charles Bernstein, ‘Comedy and the Politics of Poetic Form’, in The 
Politics of Poetic Form: Poetry and Public Policy, ed. Charles Bernstein 
(New York: Roof, 1990), 236.
 35. Fredric Jameson, ‘Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism’, New Left Review 146 (July–August 1984), 53–92.
 36. David Arnold, Poetry and Language Writing: Objective and Surreal 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007).
 37. Ron Silliman, ‘Disappearance of the Word, Appearance of the World’, 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Supp. 3 (October 1981), 11.
 38. André Breton, ‘What Is Surrealism?’, lecture delivered in Brussels, 1 June 
1934; McCaffery, ‘Death of the Subject’, 2. His italics.
 39. Silliman, ‘If By “Writing” . . .’, 45.
 40. André Breton, Manifestos of Surrealism (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1972), 30–1.
 41. Barrett Watten, ‘Method and Surrealism: the Politics of Poetry’, Open 
Letter 5:1 (Winter 1982), 126, 139.
 42. Bernstein, Content’s Dream, 392.
 43. Silliman, ‘Disappearance of the Word’, 10.
 44. McCaffery, ‘Death of the Subject’, 8.
































Notes     183
 46. McCaffery, ‘Death of the Subject’, 12.
 47. Andrews, ‘Text and Context’, 24.
 48. Watten, ‘Method and Surrealism’, 129.
 49. Michael Davidson, ‘“Skewed By Design”: From Act to Speech Act in 
Language-Writing’, fragmente 2, 48.
 50. Rachel Blau DuPlessis, correspondence included as part of ‘Davidson and 
Weinberger on New Language Poetry’, Sulphur 22 (1988), 190.
 51. Ibid., 190.
 52. Ron Silliman, response to ‘Non-Poetry’, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 7 (March 
1979), 18.
 53. Ibid., 27–8.
 54. The Yellow Pages ads can be seen at <http://writing.upenn.edu/
pennsound/x/Yellow-Pages.php> (last accessed 26 November 2014).
 55. Charles Bernstein (ed.), Close Listening: Poetry and the Performed Word 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 22–3. His italics.
 56. Rasula, American Poetry Wax Museum, 379.
 57. Charles Bernstein, ‘Provisional Institutions: Alternative Presses and Poetic 
Innovation’, in My Way: Speeches and Poems (Urbana: University of 
Chicago Press, 2010), 153–4.
 58. Ibid., 144.
 59. Bernstein, ‘The Dollar Value of Poetry’, 7. His ellipses.
 60. Silliman, ‘For Open Letter’, 33.
 61. Silliman, New Sentence, 79. Silliman’s sentiment is echoed satirically in 
Bernstein’s ‘Style’, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 6 (December 1978), 26–7.
 62. Ron Silliman, ‘Poetry and the Politics of the Subject’, Socialist Review 
(September 1988), 65. His italics.
 63. Eleana Kim, ‘Language Poetry: Dissident Practices and the Makings 
of a Movement’, Readme 4 (Spring/Summer 2001), <http://home.jps.
net/~nada/language6.htm> (last accessed 26 November 2014).
 64. See, for example, Bob Perelman, The Marginalization of Poetry: Language 
Writing and Literary History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996).
 65. This is not to say the academy can necessarily foster other forms of cul-
tural resistance, however: indeed, Language poets often gave up anticapi-
talism at the same time as the avant-garde.
 66. Hejinian, for example, theorised Language-based aesthetics as a rejection 
of avant-garde practice, saying it ‘has less in common with modernist avant-
garde movements than with aesthetic tendencies grounded in marginalized 
cultural communities’ (Lyn Hejinian, The Language of Inquiry [Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000], 171), while Howe, Waldrop and 
other female Language poets have silently elided the grandstanding state-
ments in the avant-garde style typical of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, typically 
written by men.
 67. Susan Howe, The Europe of Trusts (New York: New Directions, 2002), 
14.
 68. There are examples of literary revision or scholia in all of Howe’s books. 
Being reductive, one might list Swift in The Defenestration of Prague and 
The Liberties, Dickinson in My Emily Dickinson, Melville in Melville’s 
































 184    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
Prague and The Midnight, and many other examples besides as all subject 
to Howe’s distinctive literary ’istorin.
 69. David Lehman, The Last Avant-Garde: The Making of the New York 

































Aaron, Daniel, Writers on the Left (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1992).
Abrams, M. H., The Mirror and the Lamp (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1953).
Ackerman, James S., ‘The Demise of the Avant-Garde’, Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 11:4 (October 1969), 371–84.
Adorno, Theodor W., Aesthetic Theory (London: Routledge, 1984).
Adorno, Theodor W. and Max Horkheimer, ‘Odysseus or Myth and 
Enlightenment’, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, New German Critique 56 
(Spring–Summer 1992), 109–41.
—, Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (Boston: MIT Press, 1997).
—, ‘Reconciliation Under Duress’, in Aesthetics and Politics: The Key Texts 
of the Classic Debate within German Marxism (London: Verso, 1980), 
151–76.
Agamben, Giorgio, The End of the Poem: Essays in Poetics (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999).
—, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005).
Alcalay, Ammiel, A Little History (New York: UpSet Press, 2012).
Altieri, Charles, Enlarging the Temple: New Directions in American Poetry 
During the 1960s (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1980).
—, ‘The Objectivist Tradition’, in The Objectivist Nexus, ed. Peter Quartermain 
and Rachel Blau DuPlessis (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999), 
25–36.
—, ‘Without Consequences Is No Politics: A Response to Jerome McGann’, in 
Politics and Poetic Value, ed. Robert van Hallberg (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987), 301–7.
Andrews, Bruce, ‘Text and Context’, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Supp. 1 (June 
1980), 19–26.
Andrews, Bruce and Charles Bernstein (eds), The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984).
Anon., ‘Grandeur and Misery of a Poster Girl’, Partisan Review 10 (1943), 
471–3.
Arnold, David, Poetry and Language Writing: Objective and Surreal (Liverpool: 
































 186    Crisis and the US Avant-Garde
Arrighi, Giovanni, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the 
Origins of Our Times (London: Verso, 2010).
Ashbery, John, ‘Frank O’Hara’s Question’, Book Week (25 September 1966), 
23–35.
—, letter to editor, The Nation, 29 May 1967, letters.
Badiou, Alain, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 
2006).
—, ‘An Essential Philosophical Thesis: “It Is Right to Rebel Against the 
Reactionaries”’, trans. Alberto Toscano, positions: east asia cultures critique 
13:3 (Winter 2005), 669–77.
—, ‘Destruction, Negation, Subtraction: On Pier Paolo Pasolini’, Seminar, Art 
Center College of Design, Pasadena, 6 February 2007. Transcribed at <http://
www.lacan.com/badpas.htm> (last accessed 26 November 2014).
—, Peut-on penser la politique? (Paris: Seuil, 1985).
Baker, Houston, Afro-American Poetics: Revisions of Harlem and the Black 
Aesthetic (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996).
—, ‘“There Are Songs If You Have the / Music”: An Essay on Imamu Baraka’, 
in Afro-American Poetics: Revisions of Harlem and the Black Aesthetic 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 111–39.
Baldwin, James, ‘Of the Sorrow Songs: The Cross of Redemption’, in The 
Picador Book of Blues and Jazz, ed. James Campbell (London: Picador, 
1996), 324–31.
Baraka, Amiri, AM/TRAK (New York: Phoenix Bookshop, 1979).
—, The Autobiography of LeRoi Jones (Chicago: Lawrence Hill, 2012).
—, Black Music (New York: Akashic Books, 2010).
—, Conversations with Amiri Baraka, ed. Charlie Reilly (Jackson: University 
Press of Mississippi, 1994).
—, Hard Facts: (Excerpts) (Newark: Revolutionary Communist League, 1975).
—, The LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka Reader, ed. William J. Harris (New York: 
Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1991).
—, Selected Poetry of Amiri Baraka/LeRoi Jones (New York: William Morrow, 
1979).
—, ‘Why I Changed My Ideology’, Black World/Negro Digest (July 1975), 
30–42.
Bates, Scott (ed.), Poems of War Resistance from 2300 B.C. to the Present (New 
York: Grossman, 1969).
Bell, Michael, Literature, Modernism and Myth (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).
Benjamin, Walter, Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 
1969).
Benston, Kimberly W., Performing Blackness: Enactments of African-American 
Modernism (New York: Routledge, 2000).
Bernstein, Charles (ed.), Close Listening: Poetry and the Performed Word 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
—, Content’s Dream: Essays, 1975–1984 (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 2001).
—, ‘The Dollar Value of Poetry’, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 9/10 (October 1979), 
7–9.
































Bibliography     187
—, ‘Introduction’ to Louis Zukofsky, Selected Poems (New York: Library of 
America, 2006), xiii–xxvii.
—, ‘Comedy and the Politics of Poetic Form’, in The Politics of Poetic Form: 
Poetry and Public Policy, ed. Charles Bernstein (New York: Roof, 1990), 
235–44.
—, ‘Provisional Institutions: Alternative Presses and Poetic Innovation’, in My 
Way: Speeches and Poems (Urbana: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 
145–54.
—, ‘Stray Straws and Straw Men’, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Supp. 1 (June 1980), 
35–40.
—, ‘Style’, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 6 (December 1978), 26–7.
Bibby, Michael, Hearts and Minds: Bodies, Poetry, and Resistance in the 
Vietnam Era (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1996).
Blanchot, Maurice, Friendship (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).
Blau DuPlessis, Rachel, correspondence included as part of ‘Davidson and 
Weinberger on New Language Poetry’, Sulphur 22 (1988).
—, ‘The Critique of Consciousness and Myth in Levertov, Rich, and Rukeyser’, 
Feminist Studies 3:1/2 (Autumn 1975), 199–221.
—, ‘A Test of Poetry and Conviction’, Jacket 30 (July 2006), <http://jacket 
magazine.com/30/z-duplessis.html> (last accessed 26 November 2014).
Bloom, Harold, Wallace Stevens, the Poems of Our Climate (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1977).
Bly, Robert, ‘On Political Poetry’, The Nation (24 April 1967), 522–3.
—, ‘Protest’, New York Review of Books 9:11 (21 December 1967), letters.
—, Selected Poems (New York: Harper & Row, 1986).
—, Talking All Morning (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980).
Bogan, Louise, review of Muriel Rukeyser, Wake Island, New Yorker (31 
October 1942), 68.
Boswell, James, The Life of Samuel Johnson (London: Henry Baldwin, 1791).
Braudel, Fernand, Civilisation and Capitalism: 15th–18th Century, vol. 2: The 
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